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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE BY THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE
PANEL. APPENDIX A. MECHANISMS FOR
CHANGE-ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY

Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.

July 1970

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Report to
The President
and the Secretary of Defense
on the
Department of Defense

BY THE
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.




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APPENDIX A.

Mechanisms for Change -
Organizational History.

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PREFACE

The various historical offices in the Department of Defense were requested by the Chairman, Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, to study past major organizational and managerial changes in the Defense establishment. The goal was to obtain an appreciation of why and how past changes occurred and to thereby derive a better understanding of what changes may be required today and how necessary changes might be effected. To be considered "major", a change had to have an important impact on mission performance, the decision-making process, the command and control function, or coordination with other governmental departments or agencies.

The responses received are considered to be of sufficient interest to be printed as an Appendix to the Panel's Report without necessarily implying endorsement by the Panel.

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DETAILS OF INFORMATION DESIRED REGARDING PAST MAJOR
CHANGES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

The Panel does not desire comprehensive information concerning major changes of the past. Instead the Panel wants only that information necessary to an understanding of the "mechanism for change" which was internal to the organization at the time it was reorganized in each case.

The Panel does not consider a change major which did not have an important impact on mission performance, the decision-making process, the command and control function, or coordination with other governmental departments or agencies.

ments should include, but not be restricted to:

- a. A description of each major organizational change.
- b. An identification of the "new concepts" which served to justify the change.
- c. An analysis of the relative degree to which the change in concept was motivated by ideas, events, personalities, new weapons, and formal organizations which were dedicated to bringing about the change.
- d. Showing the relationship in time among ideas, events, and hardware.
- e. Showing the role played by people operating as individuals as opposed to people who operated as movers within the organizations which pushed for the change.
- f. A description of the manner and degree in which a "mechanism for change" has been institutionalized within the military in the past at the time of each major change.
- g. A description of the interplay between individuals advocating change, and the central organizational authority of the time.
- h. A description of the relationship between military education and change.
- i. A description of the influence for change exerted by agencies which were outside of the military.



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

February 9, 1970

ADMINISTRATION

The attached comments assume that the Panel and its staff are familiar with the details of the post-1945 organizational developments. Consequently, emphasis has been placed on the abiding factors that have conditioned all Defense reorganizations and on the interaction of these factors in advancing and limiting change.

Inevitably, the point of view is that of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While it is true that the Department has no reason for its existence except the forces in the field, it is equally true that every staff officer should think in terms of the problems of his superior, not in terms of his own problems. Both facts are still frequently forgotten.

R. A. Winnacker
R. A. Winnacker
Historian, OSD

THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

It is beyond dispute that we would not have organized our armed forces the way they are today if we could have started from scratch after World War II. Such an opportunity, however, never existed. The key problem was and remains what is practicable in the existing environment, not what is theoretically desirable.

Important among the factors influencing the post-1945 military organization have been (1) the historically ingrained attitude of the country to the military, (2) the Constitutional checks and balances between the Executive and Legislative Branches, (3) the traditional relationship of the Commander-in-Chief to the military Services, (4) the changing role of the military expert, and (5) the upsetting technological revolution of our age.

1. The Nation Looks at the Military

Throughout our history we have had an ambivalent attitude to our professional military.

We have extended to the uniform much of the respect we hold for the flag. We have made honorable military service almost a prerequisite for elective office during much of our history. Most of us admire martial virtues -- honor, duty, country. The majority of our national heroes are military men.

At the same time we insist on civilian control of the military. Not many parents rejoice when their offspring chooses a military career. The vast majority readily believes any story about military waste and stupidity, symbolized in our derogatory concept of the "military mind." The military and militarism are constantly confused.

It is the attitude of suspicion that has usually been dominant. All reorganizations must claim to enhance civilian control. Civilian guidance is required to increase economy and efficiency. A Prussian General Staff system, whatever that may be, spells the doom of the Republic. In war the armed forces are "our boys," but in peace the utmost vigilance is indicated.

This attitude is reinforced by the prevalent views concerning our national interests. Geography and the wealth of our resources have made us an isolationist nation at heart. We want the world to leave us alone. The fact that such isolationism is no longer feasible is accepted only reluctantly, if it is accepted at all. We would like to ignore the world-wide responsibilities that have been thrust upon us -- largely against our will. We dream of a world as it should be, trying to ignore the world as it is, and our armed forces are a constant reminder

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that our dreams are not being realized. Thus, the military are at best a necessary evil, never to be given the benefit of the doubt.

2. The President and the Congress

In the Declaration of Independence the Founding Fathers listed in their indictment of George III that "he has kept among us in times of peace Standing Armies, without the consent of our legislators," and that "he has effected to render the Military independent of and superior to the civil power." The fear of military rule was as strong in 1787, when the Constitution was being fashioned, as it had been in 1776. The Constitutional clauses, authorizing a Standing Army and establishing a Commander-in-Chief, were approved only after lengthy debate and after specific safeguards had been written into the Constitution.

The Commander-in-Chief's office was assigned to an elected official, the President, accountable to the people every four years, but the instruments of control were vested in the Congress. Not only was the President to share his appointive power with the Senate, but the Congress was specifically given (a) the power to declare war, (b) the power of the purse, (c) the power of making rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces, (d) the power to call the militia into Federal service, and (e) the power to impeach the Commander-in-Chief.

Paradoxically, by guarding against the possible misuse of military force, the Founding Fathers weakened the exercise of effective civilian control. The armed forces received two masters instead of one, and these two, jealous of their respective powers, were frequently in disagreement with each other. The failure to define the authority of the Commander-in-Chief added fuel to the conflict. Thus, the military Services usually received a sympathetic hearing in the Congress whenever their dislike of an order from their immediate superior became known.

From a management point of view, this situation can be considered intolerable. From a political point of view, it is acceptable to those who believe in checks and balances -- particularly since the difficulties created by the dual control have been merely annoying rather than truly harmful.

3. One Hundred Eighty Years of Unification

The armed forces have been unified since 1789 under the President, their Commander-in-Chief. What has changed from time to time is merely the organizational pattern supporting the President in carrying out his military functions.

During the first nine years of the Republic, when the armed forces were practically non-existent, a single War Department assisted the President. In 1798 naval activities were assigned to a newly created

Department of the Navy, and for nearly 150 years the President was the sole coordinator of the two departments and the sole court for settling disputes.

During the 19th century this was a reasonable arrangement and not very burdensome. Army and Navy missions seldom overlapped, and, in the absence of instant communications, such problems as arose in the field had to be resolved in the field anyway. Moreover, the military Services, being relatively small organizations, except in time of war, caused no earth-shaking problems. The peace time Army never reached 30,000 men in the years before the Spanish-American War, and the peace time Navy stayed below 13,000, and the peace time Marine Corps below 4,000.

This situation gradually changed after the turn of the century. First, the emergence of the United States as a world power, accompanied by a deeper involvement in international problems, gave an increased importance to an effective joint military policy. At the same time, the technological revolution, particularly the development of the airplane as a military weapon, had a disturbing effect on the traditional missions of the Army and Navy. And finally, the constantly increasing responsibilities of the Chief Executive made the proposal to delegate the burden of coordinating the two military Services to a subordinate an ever more attractive one.

Until World War II the pressure for organization reform failed to produce any major results. New organizational mechanisms were improvised during World War II, and the National Security Act of 1947, far from being radically new, merely tied together into a single organization functions and agencies already in existence. Coordinating functions, previously carried by the President, were assigned to the Secretary of Defense. The existing Joint Chief of Staff organization, the Army-Navy Munitions Board, and the Joint Research and Development Board were made statutory bodies. The quasi-independent Army Air Force received co-equal status with the Army and Navy.

The new element in the 1947 reorganization was the possibility that the President's new deputy for military affairs would devote 24 hours of his day to his coordinating function, whereas the President, being a busy man, had been able to spend only a nominal amount of his time on this responsibility. Such a development would give new meaning to the Commander-in-Chief's powers and also might establish a barrier between the military Services and their commander. These two issues -- stricter controls and proximity to the throne -- became the major subjects of the subsequent unification debates.

4. The Military Professional

During most of the nineteenth century no sharp dividing line existed between the military and civilians. Professional training, while desirable, was not considered essential for an officer. Appointments to high military rank from civilian life were normal in wartime. With Government employees

operating under the "spoils system," military officers inevitably also participated in politics. Their political views were well known and affected their assignments. Running for office while on active duty was not considered objectionable -- see Generals Taylor (1848), Scott (1852), Grant (1868), Hancock (1880). Public criticism by military officers of Presidential policy was not infrequent and public statements on non-military matters were a normal practice.

With the rise of the professional military expert toward the end of the century this freedom was substantially restricted. Professionalism raised the authority of the military in their own field and tended to fence off military activities as a separate preserve, to be admired autonomously by professional officers subject only to the general supervision of civilians. It also reinforced the doctrine that the armed forces were merely an instrument of national policy, not a participant in its making. The Civil Service Act of 1883 marked the beginning of an apolitical civil service and, by osmosis, enjoined the military to practice political abstinence.

While military officers became less political, the military establishment, however, could not escape being drawn into politics. The use of regular troops in labor disputes brought kudos from the right and invectives from the left. To the "manifest destiny" Republicans at the turn of the century, a greatly expanded Navy was essential and the Navy, for obvious reasons, was not reluctant to support their cause, providing a philosophical justification for this doctrine through Captain Mahan. In the pre-1917 period the Army and Navy by their mere existence became involved in the "preparedness" debates, but they found few staunch defenders in the 1920's as conservatives practiced economy and pacifists and isolationists abounded in the liberal camp. During much of this period the size and role of the armed forces were a political issue, and the fact that the military establishment survived without becoming an instrument of partisan politics is a tribute to the new professionalism -- symbolized by General Pershing.

World War II and its consequences opened a new chapter. The rather narrow military professionalism, developed during the early part of the century, became inadequate to meet the requirements of World War II and the Cold War as well as those of the exploding technological revolution. The traditional relegation of the peacetime armed forces to a minor place in American life became impossible. Representing a major national effort, the armed forces began to exert, whether they wanted to or not, a major influence on foreign policy, the national economy, science and technology, personal liberties, and education.

Both civilians and the military have made only partial adjustments to these developments. Old shibboleths continued to dominate the discussion when they already had lost most of their meaning. No longer could military professionals plan in isolation and expect to take over after the diplomats had failed. The validity of military plans, policies, and requirements depended more and more on the extent to which they were

in tune with foreign, economic, and other policies than on their own merits -- although the law still called for purely "military advice." Military effectiveness was becoming increasingly dependent on the successful assimilation of non-military professions, acknowledged in part by the military Services in sending an increasing number of their officers to civilian universities for the study of economics, business management, international relations, and the sciences. Moreover, military experience lost much of its value as the effect of nuclear weapons could be measured only in theoretical war games and civilians invented new and imaginative computer techniques for determining probabilities.

As a result, the image of an expert military profession, unchallengeable in its field, began to fade. In the atomic age, a major war was no longer a continuation of policy but annihilation. Interference, while it required military strength, was as much a political, diplomatic, and economic problem as a military one. In a Cold War military advice was essential but seldom determining. Still, the military as a whole -- in contrast to many individual officers -- wanted to retain the inherited image of professionalism while being conscious that it was out of date but knowing not what to put in its place.

5. The Law of Acceleration

This is the title of the next to last chapter of The Education of Henry Adams, written in 1905 and published in 1917. Confronted by the realization that force in the universe might not be limited, but probably inexhaustible, Henry Adams wrote:

"Nothing so revolutionary had happened since the year 300. Thought had more than once been upset, but never caught and whirled about in the vortex of infinite forces. Power leaped from every atom, and enough of it to supply the stellar universe showed itself running to waste at every pore of matter. Man could no longer hold it off. Forces grasped his wrists and flung him about as though he had hold of a live wire or a runaway automobile....

"Possibilities no longer stood in the way. One's life had fattened on impossibilities....An immense volume of force had detached itself from the unknown universe of energy, while vaster reservoirs, supposed to be infinite, steadily revealed themselves, attracting mankind with more compulsive course than all the Pontic Sea or Gods or Gods that ever existed and feeling still less of retiring ebb....

"During a million or two of years, every generation in turn had toiled with endless agony to attain and apply power, all the while betraying the deepest alarm and horror at the power they created. The terror of 1900, if foolhardy, might stimulate; if foolish, might resist; if intelligent, might balance, as wise and foolish have often tried to do from the beginning; but the

forces would continue to educate, and the mind would continue to react. All the teacher could hope was to teach it reaction....

"Thus far, since five or ten thousand years, the mind had successfully reacted, and nothing yet proved that it would fail to react -- but it would need to jump."

Since 1905 the rate of change has shifted from an arithmetical to a geometric progression. It has become trite to point out how deeply this rapid change has affected all aspects of life -- so deeply that we no longer talk about progress. The military were no exception. Confronted by fundamental changes, they inevitably encountered serious stresses and strains that quickly developed into bitter debates concerning the best course to follow. We would have had these debates no matter what the current organizational pattern of the military -- no matter who occupied the White House or what the complexion of the Congress.

As a result of the scientific and technological revolution, the art of warfare entered a state of flux, and the past provided fewer and fewer guidelines for the future. But there were no easy answers. Even those who adopted the "forward look" found few if any black and white issues. The choice was usually not between a good or bad solution but between the least bad and the worst one. While changes had to be made, they had to be evaluated not only according to the goals to be reached but also according to the price to be paid by the destruction of values that might still be worth preserving. Moreover, since radical change, no matter how well conceived, upsets the operational effectiveness of any organization for a considerable time, the military reformers were confronted by the fact that the Nation could not afford such a loss in the current world situation.

Whether conscious or not of these limitations, the military establishment made a gradual evolutionary adjustment to the changing times, rather than a revolutionary one. This turned out to be an intelligent course to follow, even if it was considered too fast by the mossbacks and too slow by the missionaries. As a result it can be argued that the Department of Defense, despite its shortcomings and imperfections, is probably more responsive to "the law of acceleration" than any other agency of the Executive Branch and is certainly far ahead of the Legislative and Judicial Branches.

PRESSURES AND RESTRAINTS, 1947-1970

During World War II the forces for change, at work since the start of the century, gained the upper hand. Single direction of all military components, in the field as well as at home, became a prerequisite to the success of the war effort, particularly since the major impact of air power and strategy and tactics further confused the traditional roles and missions. In the field, this coordination was achieved through the establishment of supreme allied commanders. At home, the strategic direction of the war was superiorly taken care of by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization -- operating happily without a charter of any kind -- but the competition of the Army and Navy for manpower and production resources went beyond legitimate bounds many times and was wasteful to say the least. The importance of the issues as well as the working habits of the President made it inevitable that the Commander-in-Chief personally assumed overall direction and became his own Secretary of State, War, and Navy.

1. The National Security Act of 1947

World War II experience and developments ruled out a return to pre-war separateness and strongly influenced the new organizational pattern. The Army became the advocate of close unification, aiming to extend to Washington the unity of command that had worked so well in the field, and was strongly supported by the President who, as Chairman of the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, had acquired firsthand knowledge of wasteful Army-Navy competition for scarce resources. The Army proposals were given a major assist by the irresistible drive of the Army Air Forces for co-equal status with ground and naval forces -- if we were to have three military departments anyway, it appeared best that they be tied together somehow. The Navy took exception to this change, especially to the unified command in Washington -- fearing for the future of naval air power and the Marine Corps. It played for time, shifted the argument from coordination between the military Services to civil-military coordination on the national level, and finally accepted a compromise that partially allayed its worst fears. The Congress took a middle course. It accepted the need for unification (fusing its separate Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees into Armed Forces Committees effective in January 1947) and found the promise of substantial economies irresistible. At the same time, however, it was reluctant to bestow upon the President any additional powers that would weaken its role in the civilian control of the armed forces.

The National Security Act of 1947 reflected these diverse currents. The need for closer coordination of foreign and military policy was recognized in the establishment of a National Security Council, reflecting also a desire to reduce the alleged control of foreign policy by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff during World War II. To prevent a repetition of the haphazard economic mobilization of the war years, a National War Resources Board was created which, having been given an impossible assignment, never got off the ground. The memory of Pearl Harbor fostered, though in fact unrelated, the coordination of intelligence activities under a Central Intelligence Agency, directed nominally by the National Security Council. A Secretary of Defense was to provide the President with the long overdue staff assistance in military matters by becoming his principal assistant "in all matters relating to the national security."

Tradition triumphed over current requirements, however, when it came to the powers to be exercised by the new Secretary of Defense. He did not preside over a department, as recommended by the President, but over a new nebulous entity known as the National Military Establishment. The military Services, which the President had thought might be administered as departmental branches under Assistant Secretaries, remained Executive Departments and retained all their powers and duties, except for the vague responsibilities conferred upon the Secretary of Defense including the establishment of general policies and programs, the exercise of general direction, authority, and control, the elimination of unnecessary duplication in the logistics field, and the supervision and coordination of the budget. With coordination, rather than unification, as the motto, even the establishment of a co-equal Air Force could be considered as a step backward, leading to triplication. The lonesome Secretary of Defense could look for help only to three special assistants, although the President had proposed an Under Secretary and several Assistant Secretaries. As for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they remained a committee depending on voluntary cooperation, without the Defense Chief of Staff suggested by the President, and their functions were enshrined in law, thus removing them from any idle tampering by the Secretary of Defense. Assurance that there would be no unnecessary elimination of unnecessary duplication was provided by making the representatives of the military Services on the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board co-equal with their Chairman.

In defense of this organizational wonder, it might be said that it constituted an evolutionary approach to the problem and that any closer unification at the time would have been ineffective, in view of the bitter emotions aroused by the debate. However, it could also be predicted that a coordinator -- working merely with persuasion, sweetness, and light -- would not be able to meet unification requirements and that under such an organization the military Services were likely to imitate the tribes of Israel who stayed in the desert for forty years before they were pure enough to enter the Promised Land.

In these circumstances, the future debates inevitably centered on the powers required by the Secretary of Defense to assure properly unified armed forces and their efficient management.

2. The 1949 Amendments

The stand-off between the innovators and the traditionalists was broken within two years. While neither the President nor the Army had developed any doubts about the need for meaningful unification, the traditionalists lost two of their key supporters -- Secretary Forrestal, the principal architect of the 1947 Act, and Mr. Eberstadt, who had provided its philosophical justification.

Secretary Forrestal expressed his misgivings about the adequacy of the existing organization as early as February 1948, testified in favor of major changes in September before the Hoover Commission's Task Force on National Security Organization, and publicly called for strengthening his powers in his Annual Report released at the close of the year. Mr. Eberstadt's Task Force report, issued in January 1949, recommended similar changes and was followed in February by the even stronger recommendations of the Hoover Commission. On March 4, the President took advantage of these suggestions by resurrecting his 1945 proposals, including even a JCS chairman who would replace the Joint Chiefs as the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary.

The resulting discussions led once more to a compromise in which the innovators won their major objectives but had to accept some restrictions aimed to protect the Congress as well as the military Services against arbitrary Executive action. The National Military Establishment became a full-fledged Executive Department, with its Secretary exercising direction, authority, and control -- i.e., total power except as limited by law. To assist him in carrying out his increased responsibilities, he obtained a Deputy Secretary and his three special assistants became Assistant Secretaries. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were demoted to military departments and their Secretaries lost their places on the National Security Council. (The President, by failing to extend invitations, had already excluded them from the Cabinet.)

The President did not obtain the transfer to the Secretary of Defense of the statutory functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board nor control by the Secretary of Defense of all civilian personnel in the Department of Defense. The new JCS Chairman was not made the "head" of the Joint Chiefs nor "principal military adviser," but merely a presiding officer without a "vote," and the numerical restriction on the Joint Staff was not removed but raised from 100 to 210 officers. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense was told in no uncertain terms that he could not establish a single Chief of Staff or an armed forces general staff of his own. The military departments were protected by directing that they should be "separately administered" and providing that assigned combatant functions could not be tinkered with and that noncombatant functions could not be reassigned without first informing the Congress. Rather than depending on the budgetary and fiscal procedures assigned to the head of an Executive Department by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, such procedures were carefully outlined under a new Title IV.

In summary, the 1949 Amendments established a full-time boss for the military departments, discarding the coordinator who too often had been considered merely praeus inter pares. Despite specific limitations on his powers, challenges to his authority should become less frequent than before. Still, true unification remained an attitude of mind and could not be decreed by law. Within the National Military Establishment, the JCS machinery had creaked and groaned since 1947 under the burden of allocating scarce defense dollars and determining roles and mission. Moreover, neither the Air Force nor the Navy had been reluctant to carry their respective claims to the public. The 1949 Amendments did not and could not resolve these disputes, as was quickly demonstrated by the Navy's misbegotten attack on the B-36 and atomic air power that resulted in bitter testimony before the Congress in August and October 1949.

3. The 1953 Reorganization

The rivalry between the military Services temporarily subsided with the North Korean attack on South Korea as sufficient funds were made available to meet the requirements not only of the Korean conflict but also of countering the overall Soviet threat. Still, many people both in the Department and outside expressed unhappiness with the current organization. Retiring Secretary Lovett wrote a long letter for his successor pointing out the handicaps created by statutory rigidities and straddles and above all by the absence of adequate military advice. A problem was also created by the unresolved issue of whether a military chief was responsible to the Secretary of his military department for functions carried out as "executive agent" of the Joint Chiefs. Members of the Congress found many flaws, particularly in the supply field where duplication still seemed to flourish. In addition, President-to-be Eisenhower criticized the organization in his pre-election speeches.

The change was quick in coming. On February 11, 1953, Secretary Wilson appointed the Rockefeller Committee on Defense Organization, which, with guidance from the Secretary, issued its report on April 11, the gist of which was transmitted to the Congress on April 30 as Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953. The new organization became effective on June 30 after the traditionalist opposition in the House lost by a vote of 108 to 235.

Statutory rigidity was partially removed by abolishing the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board and transferring their functions to the Secretary, as suggested in 1949. The JCS Chairman was given the responsibility for managing the Joint Staff and approving the selection of its members, but was not recognized as the "head" of this "corporate body." Six additional Assistant Secretary positions supplemented the three in existence and a General Counsel of equivalent rank was established to provide adequate staff assistance to the Secretary.

It was hoped that administrative action could take care of the remaining problems. A legal opinion, endorsed by the President, pointed out that no function in the Department should be performed independent of

the Secretary of Defense and also stated that "separately administered" did not mean "separately administered" in the sense that the administration of the military departments was beyond the purview of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Secretaries of these departments were to be no longer just the spokesmen for their departments but also the spokesmen of the Secretary of Defense in these departments.

The President also called for a JCS reformation. The Chiefs were told to concentrate on planning and an attempt was made to resolve the "executive agent" problem by running the chain of command to unified commands through the civilian Secretaries rather than the JCS members. The Chiefs were urged to delegate lesser duties than their planning functions to subordinates and to reduce their aloofness by full cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These thoughts were incorporated in DoD Directive 5158.1, issued on July 26, 1954, which also appeared to make the Chiefs the Secretary's staff by talking about "Their Relationships with Other Staff Agencies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense."

Since the basic organizational pattern of 1947 was considered sound, there remained little, if anything, to be done to assure the Commander-in-Chief's control over the Military Services.

4. The 1958 Reorganization

Human frailty, rather than organizational faults, continued to cause difficulties. The new Administration, encouraged by the Korean Armistice, determined not only to stretch out the period for the build-up of military strength but also to aim at somewhat lower goals, by budget ceilings. This time it became the Army's turn to violate Daily Post prescripts.

Saddened by an inevitable strength reduction as a result of the end of Korean combat, the Army was further upset by the high priority given to the strategic deterrence functions of the Air Force, including the costly B-52's as well as the emerging intercontinental missiles -- a field in which it "knew" it had the greatest expertise. It felt little reluctance about letting the public know about this "discrimination." Neither an official directive assigning operational responsibility for strategic missiles to the Air Force nor stricter regulations in public relations solved the issue. The pent-up emotions burst in October 1957 when the Russians successfully launched a Sputnik and the Congress wanted to know why we had been beaten to the punch.

Subsequent Congressional hearings gave everybody a chance to air his gripes, and everybody took full advantage of this opportunity. The hearings, however, proved less than helpful for any new study of Defense organization, as "convincing" testimony for almost every possible organizational change was voiced. It appeared that the Department was suffering from uncontrolled Service rivalries and from too much control by the Secretary of Defense and his assistants; that a lack of decision existed

in high places and that too many decisions had been made that people did not like; that more money ought to be spent and that the utmost economy was indicated; and that military officers ought to have more influence and be fully under civilian control. Still, the generally accepted misconception that you resolve substantive problems by reorganization made another review of the Defense organization a political necessity.

The President announced such a review in his State of the Union message on January 9, 1958, and the need for reorganization was re-echoed on January 23 by Senator Johnson, the Chairman of the Senate's Preparedness Subcommittee, who had presided over the recent hearings. The President as well as the Secretary of Defense sought solutions in reducing the remaining limitations on the Secretary's powers, but the traditionalists fought back once more by charging that such an increase in powers would undermine the Constitutional responsibilities of the Congress for the "government" of the armed forces and further encourage OSD civilians to make decisions on military matters about which they knew little, if anything. The result, as before, was a compromise with the advantage on the side of the innovators.

To dampen the most urgent problem, research duplication in the missile field, the Secretary established on February 7, 1958, the Advanced Research Projects Agency with authority to contract for such research. The House Armed Services Committee felt that the exercise of such operational activities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense required Congressional authorization and appropriate legislation was approved on February 12.

The key to the President's message of April 3, 1958, was his statement that "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever." He asked that the Secretary of Defense be authorized to transfer, re-assign, consolidate, or abolish all functions within the Department 30 days after reporting such changes to the Committees of the Armed Services of the Congress. The military departments were to be restricted to support activities as the Chiefs of the military Services were to lose their statutory command authority which was to be transferred to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The new chain of command, bypassing the military departments, was to run from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs directly to the unified commands. All orders were to be issued under the authority and in the name of the Secretary. The current importance of research activities was recognized by vesting in the Secretary the authority to perform any military research and development function and by establishing a Director of Defense Research and Engineering to supervise and direct activities in this field.

In the debate that followed, the traditionalists tried, unsuccessfully for the most part, to restrain the control of the Secretary of Defense over the military departments and the assignment of functions. The President on May 28 publicly denounced some of the proposed restrictions.

He called the provision that the Secretary of Defense must exercise his control of the military departments solely through their Secretaries a "legalized bottleneck" and eventually won his point. He considered the statutory provision authorizing these Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs to complain to the Congress on their own initiative an invitation to "legalized insubordination" and lost his point. He protested the proposed veto power for any JCS member concerning changes in combatant functions and won this particular point while accepting more restrictive procedures in implementing such changes.

At the end of the debate, the proponents of closer unification in the Congress had carried the President's proposals even further than he had suggested. The military departments became "separately organized" rather than "separately administered," and were told that it was their duty to cooperate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering was not only to supervise and direct but also to control R&E activities. While changes in statutory and major combatant functions were to be effective only after a laborious Congressional review, supply and service functions were exempted from such a review by the so-called McCormack amendment. The Secretary of Defense was specifically authorized to assign or reassign new weapons or weapons systems -- a power not requested by the President. The Chiefs of the military Services, who were to have exercised "command or supervision" according to the President, were told that their powers were limited to "supervision" only.

In summary, it appears that the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 carried the establishment of centralized authority as far as it could be carried within the basic 1947 concept of three separate military departments. It could be argued that such centralized authority had existed since 1949, when the Secretary of Defense was given direction, authority, and control over his Executive Department, and that subsequent reorganizations merely spelled out in greater detail the extent of the 1949 delegation of authority. Still, these statutory clarifications helped to quiet the critics within the Department.

5. Developments Since 1958

Obviously the 1958 reorganization could not resolve the basic problems that had caused the stresses and strains. It could only provide a framework that might facilitate further adjustments.

The Constitutional checks and balances were bound to continue the rivalry of the Executive and Legislative Branches over civilian control of the military. The technological revolution, progressing unabated, inevitably affected the roles and missions of the military Services and with that their respective budgets. The Secretary's most urgent requirement, useful and reliable military advice, remained to be met by an organization keyed to what President Eisenhower had called "parochialism." Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel continued to think in Army, Navy and Air Force terms -- not Defense terms. The professional military continued

to insist that there was and must be a military position apart from a Defense position. During 1959 and 1960 these issues provided plenty of material for debates in the Congress, in the press, and within the Department of Defense.

The implementation of the 1958 reorganization raised once more the problem of military advice as given by the Joint Chiefs. Should the Joint Chiefs be considered part of the Secretary's staff or a separate entity? The Chiefs eventually won their separateness from a reluctant President who, on the one hand, clamored for fuller recognition by the military of the broad national and political objectives into which military requirements must be fitted and, on the other, did not want to thrust military leaders into the political arena and saw some merit in the argument that the military could not be an integral part of the civilian control mechanism.

Thus, the dilemma of the Joint Chiefs continued. The more cognizance they took of non-military considerations, the more useful were they to the President and the Secretary and, at the same time, the deeper they became involved in politics. The less cognizance they took of non-military considerations, the greater their reputation for strictly professional objectivity and the greater the need for a civilian staff to assist the Secretary in adjusting military requirements to political and economic realities. Convinced that a joint civilian-military effort was necessary for the development of effective military policy, Secretary Gates arranged weekly meetings with the Joint Chiefs to discuss mutual problems. This helped, but did not resolve the JCS dilemma. In fact, a considerable OSD review staff was found necessary, and the military Chiefs have not been shielded from political involvement.

Service "parochialism" has its roots not only in tradition but above all in the fact that the career of officers is closely tied to the prosperity of their Service. This means that programs are judged not merely on their intrinsic Defense merits but too often on whether or not they involve a gain or loss for a particular military Service. This most human reaction is reinforced by the existing chain of loyalty, which frequently extends only to the military Chief, excluding at times the Secretaries of the military departments, often the Secretary of Defense, and occasionally the Commander-in-Chief. To counter this trend, joint schools were established in the late 40's, evaluation reports by OSD civilians were authorized in 1953, and in 1958 previous duty on joint staffs was made a prerequisite for promotion to general or flag rank and procedures to ease the transfer of officers between the military Services were developed. These administrative actions, while essential, were also rather futile. With "the carrot" and "the stick" constituting the key factors in the eternal game of human relations, unification legislation called for applying the stick and failed to provide carrots that would make Defense-thinking in the personal interest of all officers.

In line with the call of the 1958 reorganization for more efficient management, Secretary Gates created four Single Managers of common supply

items, established a Defense Communications Agency in May 1960, initiated studies for the centralization of military intelligence activities, and introduced a joint targeting group into SAC headquarters. However, the clamor for more radical unification continued. The 1960 Democratic Platform made short shrift of the existing organization, considering it not suitable for the future since it was conceived before the revolution in weapons technology. A group headed by Senator Symington prepared a special report for the incoming President, recommending the abolishment of the military departments, the substitution of a single Chief of Staff for the Joint Chiefs, the establishment of functional unified commands, and having the military Chiefs run the military Services while reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. The report was accepted for "further study."

Despite the firm convictions and fervor of the proponents of radical changes, the new Administration eventually decided to use existing authority and administrative procedures to effect such adjustments as were thought necessary. The key elements to the new management were the working habits and ability of the new Secretary. Believing in "active" leadership, Mr. McNamara himself initiated hundreds of special study projects and insisted on knowing not only the so-called best solution but also all possible alternatives. If such "options" were not provided by the action officers, he turned to others for this information. Like the President, he preferred to work with individuals rather than through staff organizations. Under the Secretary's active leadership, centralized direction -- assisted by contemporary advances in computer technology -- became a reality. New Defense agencies were established for common supply items, intelligence, and contract audit. Mission-oriented budgets with 5-year projections were used to evaluate the need for new or increased programs that had passed the tough "cost effectiveness" test. Cost reduction programs, initiated only periodically in the past, were given a permanent status.

Meek acceptance of this management revolution could not be expected. Alternatives used to be thrashed out on the lower levels and, if agreement had been reached, only the best solution was forwarded. Now "prestige" recommendations were given equal consideration with "non-prestige" recommendations. With the Secretary keeping "uncivilized" working hours developing possible options, expert advice had to be defended rather than explained. With decisions being based more frequently on the Secretary's personal analysis than on military advice, enthusiasm and diligence in carrying out approved policies began to lag. Civilian-military rivalry replaced Service rivalry as a Defense malaise. The merit of the decisions reached became the first victim in the debates that ensued. The how things were done -- important to morale -- concerned the debaters more than what was done.

While the argument concerning the relative merit of centralization and decentralization as a management concept will probably never be settled, by the late sixties centralized direction had gone too far too fast in the view of many Congressional members conscious of the prerogatives

of the Legislative Branch and of many officers devoted to military professionalism. A swing of the pendulum toward the center would quiet their fears. The key problems, however, would remain -- how to make military advice most effective and useful in the determination of national policy and how to induce officers to think in Defense terms rather than military Service terms.

ARMY ORGANISATION, 1903-1963

THE MECHANISM OF CHANGE

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ARMY ORGANIZATION - 1903-1963

THE MECHANISM OF CHANGE

I. THE ARMY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The fundamental organization of the Army down to 1903 was established after the War of 1812 by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun. There were essentially two elements -- a departmental staff serving directly under the Secretary of War and the Army in the field divided into geographical districts or departments under military commanders. Calhoun also created in 1821 the position of Commanding General of the Army, presumably with authority to direct the Army in the field.

The departmental staff was called the "War Department General Staff" but it was not a "general staff" in the modern sense of the term. It consisted instead of a group of bureau chiefs, each responsible under the Secretary for the management and direction of a specialized function. By the 1890's these bureaus or staff sections consisted of the Adjutant General, the Judge Advocate General, the Inspector General, the Subsistence Department, the Ordnance Department, the Medical Department, the Quartermaster General, the Pay Department, the Chief Signal Officer, and the Chief of Engineers, in addition to a Records and Pension Office, Board of Commissioners for the Soldiers Home and a Board of Publications. Each of these separate offices functioned not only in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of War but in the management throughout the Army of assigned

functions and personnel, and each controlled expenditure of funds specifically appropriated to it by Congress.

The Army in the field, the "line" as opposed to the "staff", was organized by tactical units (the regiment was normally the largest) and stationed at posts throughout the country. The posts were grouped into geographical divisions that by the 1890's were called departments, each with a departmental commander. The line was divided into branches or arms i.e. infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Although there was much direct supervision and correspondence by the War Department with each of the many posts, the chain of command ran through the department commanders who exercised nominal control of their respective geographical areas. Above the level of the departments the chain of command was less clear and the whole set-up produced a continual conflict between the civilian secretary and the bureaus on the one hand and the Commanding General of the Army, the titular military head of the Army, on the other.

The President was constitutionally the Commander-in-Chief and many Presidents such as Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Polk, and Lincoln at times exercised their command personally, usually through the Secretary of War rather than the Commanding General. During the Civil War Lincoln did establish a unity of military command under General Grant, though the extent of Grant's control over the bureaus is a matter of some question. In any case, after the Civil War the old system of divided control was revived with resultant conflict between the departmental staff and the Commanding General throughout the rest of the century.

As prescribed in regulations the division of functions was reasonably clear. The Army was under the control of the Commanding General in all that pertained to discipline and military control, and all orders and instructions from the President or Secretary of War relating to military operations or effecting military control and discipline were to be promulgated through him. On the other hand, fiscal affairs were to be conducted by the Secretary of War through the several staff departments — "The supply, payment and recruitment of the Army and the direction of the expenditures of appropriations for its support are by law entrusted to the Secretary of War. He exercises control through the bureau of the War Department. He determines where and how particular supplies shall be purchased, delivered, inspected, stored, and distributed."

This theoretical clarity did not exist in practice. An informal alliance inevitably took shape between civilian secretaries and the staff bureaus that effectively hamstringed the Commanding General's exercise of powers over the Army. Throughout the century there was continued conflict over the question of whether bureau instructions and orders to the department commanders had to be issued through ^{the} Commanding General. The departmental staff's responsibility for logistical matters inevitably diluted the Commanding General's control over the territorial departments. General Sherman as Commanding General, when denied control over the bureaus, removed his headquarters from Washington to St. Louis where it remained for many years. Since Secretaries came and went, power gravitated to the bureau chiefs, who,

since the Army made no provision for retirement, remained in office for life or until they resigned. There was no real coordination of the efforts of the bureaus beyond the little exercised by the Adjutant General's Office, officially designated as the bureau of orders and records of the Army, and by the 1890's clearly the most powerful among the staff agencies. The various bureaus operated as virtually independent entities within their spheres of activity and these spheres overlapped and conflicted in many ways, leading to jurisdictional disputes. Since promotion opportunities in each department depended on the quotas of officers assigned it was quite natural for each, and the line branches also, to attempt to enlarge their fields of activity whenever the opportunity offered.

The whole system was sanctioned and regulated in the minutest details by Congressional legislation, and the mechanism for change involved almost invariably Congressional action. The relative influence of staff agencies and of line officers with Congress consequently was an important part of the picture.

The War Department then, at the end of the nineteenth century, was a hydra-headed organization under little effective executive control. The Commanding General of the Army, while theoretically the commander of the Army in the field, in practice had to share authority over it with the War Department bureaus. The civilian secretary, as the representative of the President and Commander-in-Chief, had no real means of exercising effective executive control through a clearly defined chain of military command. This legacy of bureau

autonomy in the management of the affairs of the Army was to be handed on from the nineteenth century to the twentieth and constitute a principal problem of Army organization down to 1962.

II. THE ROOT REFORMS, 1900-04

Elihu Root, Secretary of War from 1 August 1899 to 31 January 1904, carried through a series of reforms intended to remedy the lack of effective executive control that had been made abundantly apparent during the Spanish-American War. The substance of the Root reforms was as follows: (1) The substitution of a Chief of Staff for the Commanding General of the Army, the Chief of Staff to have supervision, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of War, of both the troops of the line and the War Department bureaus; (2) the creation of a General Staff to assist the Chief of Staff in managing current operations and to be a strategic and operational planning staff; (3) the restructuring of the Army school system to include at the top an Army War College to provide an officer corps trained in the techniques and strategy of modern warfare; (4) rotation of officers in staff and line assignments to put an end to the intramural strife that had previously characterized staff-line relationships; (5) combination of the Adjutant General's Office and the Bureau of Records and Pensions into an Office of the Military Secretary charged with handling administrative details for the Chief of Staff; (6) by the Dick Act of 1903 recognition of the National Guard of the various states as the Organized Militia and the provision of federal support for the

National Guard in this role. In essence the purpose of the Root reforms was to assert a firm executive control emanating from the President and the Secretary of War and exercised through the Chief of Staff over the whole Army, both the departmental staff and the line.

Root was the principal mover behind the reforms but they must be explained in part by the fact that he came to office when the moment was opportune for action. A Presidential commission headed by retired Major General Grenville M. Dodge laid bare the deficiencies in War Department administration during the war with Spain in some eight volumes of testimony. Lack of planning and preparation, and of coordination and cooperation among the bureaus, and the Congressionally-oriented "red tape" which delayed everything became a public scandal. The Dodge Commission report furnished Root with a springboard from which to launch a movement for reform. But there were other historical factors that dictated a change in the Nineteenth Century system. The United States had become an industrialized country and the Spanish-American War launched it as a world power in competition with the European powers. The Army of the 1890's was organized and disposed to fight Indian Wars and occasionally to suppress domestic disturbances. To equip it for its new role in support of American diplomacy required modernization of its organization and method. European powers had, by 1900, developed general staff systems; it seemed almost inevitable that the U.S. Army should also do so.

Root's concepts of reform stemmed from two sources—his experiences

as a corporation lawyer assisting in establishing centralized control over segments of major industry and ideas on the proper professional organization for a modern Army drawn from the writings of Brig. Gen. Emory Upton, an American, and Spencer Wilkinson, an Englishman. Upton had studied the organization of armies of Europe and Asia and had written a history of the military policy of the United States in which he stressed the need for an efficient professional army. Wilkinson had outlined the organization and functions of the new German General Staff. Drawing on these concepts from the business world and the best military thinking, Root evolved his program of reform.

In carrying out this program, Root had to face the fact that there was no institutionalized method through which major change could be made except by Congressional legislation and many Congressmen had vested interests in the existing fragmented system of control. Root went as far as he could without legislation when he established the Army War College in 1900 and prescribed that it should perform duties of a General Staff until such time as Congress could be induced to pass legislation establishing one. Root then, with the assistance of Brig. Gen. William M. Carter and other forward looking officers in the department, began a campaign of education of both the Army and Congress on the need for a General Staff system. The opposition, even within the Army, was formidable. A General Staff bill, drafted by Carter and introduced in Congress in 1902 failed of passage after General Nelson Miles, Commanding General of the Army, testified against it with some passion before the Senate Military Affairs Committee.

However, Root brought in other generals with substantial prestige who favored the system and his educational campaign was finally successful in persuading Congress to pass a General Staff bill in February 1903, albeit one that modified his concepts in some respects.

The General Staff as initially established consisted of three divisions, the first charged generally with administrative matters, the second with matters pertaining to information (military intelligence), and the third with military education and planning. The entire personnel of the third division formed part of the Army War College. The establishment of the General Staff, at least theoretically, provided a system through which change could be institutionalized within the limits that detailed laws prescribing the organization of the Army permitted. The General Staff was supposed to study problems and recommend solutions to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army.

The Root reforms resulted primarily from the push of an outsider, for Root must be considered that since he had not had military experience before becoming Secretary of War. However, he drew heavily on elements ^{within} / the military establishment working for change. Many of his supporters, such as General Carter, worked primarily as individuals rather than as members of organizations pushing for change. Indeed, most of the organizational pressure, notably that of the Commanding General and the Bureau, was exerted against the reforms.

Any appraisal of the Root reforms in terms of the mechanism of change must take note of the fact that they never were really carried out as intended and that down to World War I the traditionalists seeking to preserve bureau power kept the General Staff system from functioning effectively. Secretary Root left office in 1904 and not until 1911 did another Secretary with similar progressive ideas and drive, Henry L. Stimson, come along. Similarly, the first Chiefs of Staff were relatively ineffective. General Leonard Wood, who assumed office in 1910, was the first really driving personality to hold the post. Congress and the country were suspicious of the General Staff as a Prussian concept intended to subvert civilian control of the military. Root had conceived the General Staff as performing both current management duties as well as planning and policy functions and in practice it devoted the major portion of its time to the former. In this situation, Maj. Gen. Fred C. Ainsworth was able to change the Office of the Military Secretary into a new Adjutant General's Office that for some years exercised the management function more effectively than the Chief of Staff's office.

Stimson and Wood did force Ainsworth's retirement, but only at the expense of stimulating powerful opposition in Congress to the General Staff system. Congressional opposition defeated the Wood-Stimson proposals to physically consolidate the Army in a smaller number of posts and give it a more effective tactical organization, as well as those to create a large Army reserve (Continental Army

Plan) apart from the National Guard. They were able to reorganize the Army on paper into the Mobile Army, the ancestor of Army Ground Forces, the Artillery, located primarily at fixed coastal installations, and the militia. But a Mobile Army Division of the General Staff did not survive.

The National Defense Act of 1916, for all its excellent provisions, dealt a serious blow to the General Staff. It so limited its numbers that only 19 officers were on duty with the War Department General Staff when the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917. It forbade the General Staff from interfering with the administration of the bureaus and granted permanent statutory recognition to the Chiefs of these bureaus. They would henceforth regard this act as their Magna Carta to be cited whenever their independence was threatened. Moreover, the act forbade using the staff and students of the Army War College for performing general staff duties such as war planning and intelligence collection. Root had sought to provide an organization for the army in peacetime that could survive the transition to a modern war without major change or upheaval. Otherwise he predicted "a jury-rigged, ex tempore organization" would be thrown together on an emergency basis. This was indeed to happen when the United States got into World War I, and this fact provides a measure of the extent to which the forces opposing change subverted the full realization of the Root reforms.

III. ARMY REORGANIZATION FOR WORLD WAR I

There were two major organizational changes in the Army after the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917. The first was the creation of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe under General John J. Pershing in the late spring of 1917. The second was the complete reorganization of the War Department in 1918 to centralise executive authority within the department under the Chief of Staff. These two will be treated in turn.

The creation of the AEF was dictated by the Western Front strategy of the Allies which the United States accepted and the determination of General Pershing, backed by Secretary Baker and the President, that American soldiers fight in American units under American commanders and not be parcelled out among the Allied armies. President Wilson and Secretary Baker delegated broad authority to General Pershing on the accepted principle of "unity of command" in the field. Pershing reported directly to the Secretary of the War, not through the Chief of Staff, a situation that inevitably led to friction between the AEF commander and the Chief of Staff—a reversion to the traditional rivalry between the Commanding General and the Department during the 19th century which Root had sought to avoid by making the Chief of Staff his principal military adviser.

Pershing insisted on autonomy for his command and successfully resisted efforts of General Peyton March, Chief of Staff of the Army in 1918, to place the AEF's supply base under direct War Department

control. He did finally agree to placing the American force under the overall control of Marshall Foch as Supreme Allied Commander.

No new concept was involved in the creation of the AEF, only the application of the accepted military principle of "unity of command" to conditions of the European war. Wilson, Baker, and Pershing all understood "unity of command" to mean the delegation of complete authority over military operations to the theater commander. They followed this principle also when they created a small Siberian expeditionary force under Maj. Gen. William S. Graves in the summer of 1918. The nature and military geography of the war rather than the development or application of new weapons was responsible for the creation of both these theater commands. Decision was made outside the military organization by the President and Secretary Baker, although it involved applying an accepted military principle.

The reorganization of the War Department represented a far more radical break with the past. At the outbreak of the war the departmental organization was basically one of bureaus with the General Staff, restricted in size, quite unable to exercise the supervision and control over them that Elihu Root had envisaged. Congress passed legislation enlarging both the General Staff and the bureaus after war had been declared, but at first Secretary Baker permitted the various bureaus to pursue their own objectives largely independent of each other. For instance, the five supply bureaus -- Quartermaster Corps, Medical Department, Corps of Engineers, Ordnance Department, and Signal Corps -- all went about their tasks of procuring the particular

supplies for which they were responsible without reference to the activities of the others or of other departments of the government. The General Staff devoted its time to raising, training, and transporting the Army overseas and was, in practical effect, simply another bureau among many.

There was a progressive breakdown in the whole system as increasing wartime demands outran available supply and transportation. Wilson's initial reluctance to impose strong controls over the economy was overcome, and the War Industries Board was established to oversee the whole economic war effort. The War Department was reorganized drastically between February and August 1918 to provide for a close executive control by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary. The Overman Act, passed by Congress in April 1918, gave the President practically unlimited powers to reorganize the executive departments. The War Department reorganization was begun earlier but carried through to completion under the Overman Act.

The Chief of Staff was charged with responsibility and given commensurate authority to issue orders (in the name of the Secretary of War) to "insure that the policies of the War Department are harmoniously executed by the several corps, bureaus, and other agencies of the Military Establishment and that the Army program is carried out speedily and efficiently." Acting under this authority, General March proceeded to centralize authority over the bureaus and other departmental agencies under a functional General Staff with a small executive staff at the top to coordinate and expedite action. The principal

divisions of the new General Staff were Military Intelligence, War Plans, Operations, and Purchase, Storage, and Traffic. The head of each division was named a director in recognition of the fact that each was expected to exercise executive authority in controlling assigned activities, not simply to plan and supervise.

The most far-reaching change involved the Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic under General George W. Goethals which assumed control of procurement and storage of supplies, and of Army transportation in the United States. Goethals became the director of supply and bureau activities, he proceeded to functionalize activities cutting across the traditional supply bureau lines. Benedict Crowell, Assistant Secretary of War became Director of Munitions, and in practice the Division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, in its procurement activities, came under his supervision rather than that of the Chief of Staff. And its activities were, in the last analysis, closely controlled by the civilian War Industries Board.

The reorganization also produced some new organizations within the Army structure. A Chief of the Field Artillery was appointed, (one for the Coast Artillery already existed) responsible directly to the Chief of Staff, whose task it was to deal with technical matters pertaining to the Artillery. The Air Service, which had started as a division of the Signal Corps, was now made a separate and distinct arm with its own chief (Director of Military Aeronautics) and its own procurement organization. The Tank Corps became another separate and distinct arm of the Army, though its procurement functions,

like those for the artillery, remained with the Chief of Ordnance. Other new branches were the Chemical Warfare Service, Finance Department, Construction Division, and Motor Transport Corps.

The existing territorial organization for administration and training in the United States and its possessions underwent little change, consisting of six departments in the continental United States and separate departments in Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Canal Zone.

The reorganization in World War I came because the older system broke down under the strain of war, particularly that part of it concerned with the logistical effort. The lack of coordination of rail transportation, for instance, led to a situation in December 1917 where, in the absence of controls and priorities, rail traffic moving into New York was backed up all the way to Pittsburgh. A searching investigation by the Senate Military Affairs Committee led one Congressman to charge that "The Military Establishment of America has fallen down. . . . It has almost stopped functioning. . . because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every department of the Government." A reluctant President Wilson moved to establish a practicable system of wartime controls over the economy and Secretary Baker agreed to institute tight executive control in the War Department. General March returned from France to become Chief of Staff and it was he, along with Benedict Crowell, who engineered the complete reorganization that followed in the summer and fall of 1918.

The system that was adopted was developed within the military

establishment, largely by General March and other members of the General Staff. Much of it was based on the experiences of European powers in managing and supplying mass armies at war. But the outside influences and pressures cannot be ignored. The system of executive control instituted by March owed much also to the experience of large industrial corporations in this area, and indeed much of the change in organization and method in the logistical field was the work of Benedict Crowell, whose experience was that of a mining and metallurgical engineer. The development of new weapons clearly dictated the establishment of the new organizations such as the Air Service, the Chemical Warfare Service, and the Tank Corps. But in general the need for reorganization grew more out of the necessity for producing huge quantities of existing weapons to satisfy the demands of an expanded American army and of supplying raw materials to the Allies to produce weapons both for themselves and the ARV.

In terms of military education, clearly the war demonstrated the lack of training of Army officers in matters pertaining to industrial mobilization, procurement, and supply. Benedict Crowell claims that the arrangement of the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division under the Chief of Staff was a pro forma arrangement, and actually a device through which he, as Assistant Secretary, could exercise control through the technically legal channel of the General Staff. "When the War Department approaches industry with demands for production on a modern war time scale," he wrote, "to be effective

it must deal with industry on a practical industrial basis. It must speak the language of the tribe. This the General Staff officer is not fitted to do. His whole training has been in another field."

Indeed, General Pershing, John McAuley Palmer, and George C. Marshall all commented on the lack of officers with any real General Staff training. Very few had had a chance to become familiar with General Staff work from 1903 to 1917, and General Pershing testified he had had to start from scratch in France to train officers in this area.

Opposition to the changes came naturally from the old bureaus whose independence was curbed and which were, in some cases, functionalized out of business. But the early reluctance of President Wilson and Secretary Baker to recognize the need for strong controls over the bureaus was the principal reason why the reorganization did not come about until the country was faced with an imminent breakdown of the war effort. The Overman Act provided a mechanism under which the President could make change once it was decided upon. Wilson did not seek this legislation until the older system broke down.

The principal mechanism for change in the new General Staff organization established by General March was the Coordinating Branch under the Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff whose function it was to study and supervise the organization, management, and coordination of the various agencies of the War Department in the interests of increased efficiency. This group actually engineered the

reorganization of August 1918 which passage of the Overman Act had made legally possible.

The reorganization then was a product of both external pressures without the War Department and the influence of individuals and agencies within it. It is extremely difficult to differentiate the role of people operating as individuals and those operating within an organization pushing for change. The people having the most to do with shaping the Army organization in World War I were General March, General Pershing, General Goethals, and Benedict Crowell; Secretary Baker appears to have been simply the formal instrument of change, not a moving force behind it. In the case of none of these four prime movers does it seem possible to separate their roles as individuals from their roles as movers within the organization. If there was any formal organization devoted to change it was the General Staff as a corporate body which sought to fulfill the role that belonged to it in theory and it found its instrument in General March as Chief of Staff.

IV. POST-WORLD WAR I REORGANIZATION - 1920-21

The National Defense Act Amendments of 1920 scrapped much of the wartime organization and returned to the more traditional pattern provided for in the original act of 1916. They established the Army of the United States to be composed of the Regular Army, the National Guard while in federal service, and the Organized Reserves. Congress

also specified by name the various arms and services of the Regular Army, perpetuating several created during the war -- the Air Service, the Chemical Warfare Service, and the Finance Department -- but eliminating the Tank Corps and the Motor Transport Corps which reverted to the Infantry and the Quartermaster Corps respectively. A new Corps of Chaplains with its own Chief was created making a total of 17 arms and services. Statutory recognition was given to the offices of the Chiefs of the Combat Arms, thus adding to the "bureau system." The act restored much of the autonomy of the bureaus and their chiefs, listing in detail both their functions and the number of military personnel to be assigned to each. The President was to appoint the chiefs and assistant chiefs of the bureaus subject to Senate confirmation.

Congress retained close control over the composition of the officer corps, specifying the exact number by grade and branch and providing an overage of Regular Army officers to provide for training reserve components. It abolished the detail system and provided for permanent career assignment of all officers to the Combat Arms, Corps of Engineers, and Medical Department, and all those above the grade of captain in the other services. The autonomy of the bureaus was curtailed to the extent that a single promotion list was established to supplant the separate branch lists.

The War Department General Staff, headed by the Chief of Staff, was to prepare plans for mobilization and war, "to investigate and report on the efficiency and preparedness of the Army," and to

"render professional aid and assistance to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War." It was not to "assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus of offices of the War Department" which might "imperil their responsibility or initiative," impair their efficiency, or duplicate unnecessarily their work. In addition to the Chief of Staff, the War Department General Staff was to consist of four Assistant Chiefs of Staff and 88 other officers not below the rank of captain. No officer of the line in peacetime might be assigned to the General Staff Corps (which included General Staff officers with troops) unless he had served two of the preceding six years in active command of combat arms troops.

An important new provision of the law made the Assistant Secretary of War responsible for supervising procurement of all military supplies and for industrial mobilization planning. The chiefs of the supply services were to report directly to him, not through the Chief of Staff, on such matters. The Secretary, Assistant Secretary, and the Chief of Staff were to constitute a "War Council" to meet from time to time to consider policies and programs.

Unlike the Act of 1916 which legislated in detail the organization of the Army down to company level, the 1920 amendments only specified that the Army be divided into brigades, divisions, Army corps and, when the President deemed it necessary, into armies. For purposes of "administration, training, and tactical control," the United States would be divided into corps areas based on population. Under this

provision the War Department divided the Army within the United States, including Alaska and Puerto Rico, into nine corps areas.

The law did not prescribe the organization of the General Staff. When General Pershing became Chief of Staff he reorganized it along the lines of the functional staff he had developed at AEF headquarters, with a Deputy Chief and five functional Assistant Chiefs of Staff -- G-1 (Personnel and Administration); G-2 (Intelligence); G-3 (Operations and Training); G-4 (Supply); and the Chief of a new War Plans Division. The Pershing General Staff differed from that of March in that it was organized primarily as field army staffs had been during the war, and it was to be a planning or "think", not an operating or "do," organization. The whole arrangement did not provide for centralized control over the bureaus. Among other things the supply bureau would "request decisions on military questions" from G-4 and on "business and industrial questions" from the Assistant Secretary.

In most respects then the reorganization of 1920-21 did not represent new concepts but the recrudescence of old ones modified somewhat by the wartime experience. This result was primarily a product of Congressional insistence on reasserting its traditional prerogative to regulate the affairs of the Army in detail and not to permit the creation of a General Staff with what it considered inordinate powers. The expiration of the Overman Act made Congressional legislation the only possible "mechanism for change." At the end of the war General March and the General Staff, supported by

Secretary Baker, proposed to Congress an organization that would have retained the centralized functional staff created by March in 1918, with practically unlimited powers over the bureau. It also proposed a large professional Army backed by a universal military training system that would have provided an even larger reserve force under federal control. Congress rejected both propositions. "Nearly all the control heretofore exercised by Congress over the Army," said one Congressman of the proposal, "is to be transferred theoretically to the President but practically to the Chief of Staff. However, Congress is to be permitted to foot the bills. . . ." This natural Congressional resentment was heightened by General March's blunt personality, the position of General Pershing who had returned as a "war hero", and the determination of the bureau chiefs to regain their traditional autonomy. The Senate Military Affairs Committee found its own military expert in Col. John McAuley Palmer, who had served on Pershing's staff in Europe and whose views on the need for a large professional army differed markedly from those of the March school. Palmer spent some ten months working with the committee and did much to shape the amendments to the National Defense Act.

On a number of points Congress deferred to the views of General Pershing — in placing the Tank Corps under the Infantry, and in giving statutory recognition to the Chiefs of the Combat Arms and in the new Air and Chemical Warfare Services. Pershing, unlike March, opposed the General Staff undertaking duties normally performed by the bureau; and his concept of a general staff was dominated by

his own experience in France. When he became Chief of Staff he appointed a board headed by Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, who had been Commanding General of his Services of Supply in France, which worked out the details of the new General Staff arrangements.

The Harbord Board introduced a new concept on the command functions of the Chief of Staff, resting its recommendations on the "working basis" that the Chief of Staff must command in field in the event of mobilization. This, too, was apparently based on the rank of "General of the Armies" held by General Pershing and the fact that he would unquestionably assume Field command in the event of mobilization during his tenure. This would be done, the Harbord Board recommended, through the creation of a General Headquarters (GHQ), to be staffed initially by officers from WFO.

There were other influences. Pershing favored a separate Transportation Corps, but Congress turned down his proposal, and similarly it approved a Finance Department against his opposition. The provisions specifically assigning to the Assistant Secretary responsibility for procurement and industrial mobilization reflected the influence and testimony of Benedict Crowell.

As far as new weapons were concerned, their effect is obvious in the case of the Air Service and the Chemical Warfare Service, but it is equally true that new developments such as the tank and improved motor transportation did not receive the same recognition. There was no apparent relationship between military education and the reorganization, though the Army Industrial College, founded in 1924, was to

be an ultimate product of it. Rather the National Defense Act amendments reflected the experiences of the various antagonists during the war, and in this respect they embodied the lessons of the war as interpreted by the Congress, General Pershing and his supporters, Benedict Crowell, and the bureau chiefs, rather than by General March or Secretary Baker. The bureau chiefs, for example, insisted that in their experience the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division created unnecessary red tape and delay. The Chief of Ordnance testified bluntly before Congress that "not one single constructive thing has come out of the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division." All it had done was to interfere with bureau operations which, until then, he asserted, had been running smoothly. The conflict between this testimony and that of others who asserted that under the old system the War Department machinery had almost broken down is obvious.

It seems quite impossible to disentangle the influence of formal organizations from that of persons acting as individuals in bringing about the 1920-21 changes. Presumably Congressmen acted as individuals, and to a degree Pershing, Palmer, Crowell and the bureau chiefs did, though they were part of the formal organization of the Army. However, Secretary Baker, as head of the formal organization, General March, and the General Staff favored a perpetuation of essentially the wartime system. There were divisions then within the formal organization that played an important role in bringing about a change that had contradictory aspects. The reorganization of 1920-21 provided an adequate organization for the peacetime Army, but it was not one that would

survive the transition to another world war.

V. ARMY REORGANIZATION FOR WORLD WAR II

The basic Army organization for World War II was established on 9 March 1942 by executive order under the First War Powers Act, and it represented a far-reaching change in the existing methods of doing business. The essential feature of the reorganization was the creation of three zones of interior commands — Army Ground Forces (AGF); Army Air Forces (AAF); and the Services of Supply later renamed Army Service Forces (ASF). These three major commands took over most of the detailed functions formerly performed at the General or Special Staff (Bureau) level and freed the Chief of Staff to concentrate on the actual direction of the war. AGF became responsible for training the ground army and absorbed the functions of the Chiefs of the Combat Arms, whose offices were abolished. The AAF's functions in the training, administration, and supply of air forces were even broader and AAF formed the nucleus for what would eventually become an independent Air Force. ASF was conceived as a supply, service, and administrative command, a sort of catch-all for functions not otherwise assigned. It established a central control over the Supply Arms and Services (later known as Technical Services, including a newly created Transportation Corps), though these services and the offices of their chiefs remained intact with much the same functions as before; it also brought together in one organization the procurement and industrial mobilization functions

formerly performed in the Office of the Undersecretary of War with the requirements and distribution functions of G-4; and finally it included most of the administrative bureaus such as the Adjutant General and the Finance Department.

The General Staff remained nominally intact but it was much changed in character. G-1, G-3, and G-4 were reduced to small staff sections formally assigned policy matters affecting the three commands but in fact with slight power or influence. G-2, with its responsibility for military intelligence, was less affected. But the real power on the General Staff passed to the War Plans Division, transformed into an Operations Division (OPD), that constituted the Chief of Staff's command post for directing the war. OPD became, in many respects, a general staff in itself. Old methods of detailed staff coordination among many agencies were abolished, and the number of agencies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff was greatly reduced.

The Corps Areas were transformed into service commands operating under the ASF, responsible for supply, administration and housekeeping functions for both the AGF and AAF, though the AAF sought to perform as many of these functions as it could for itself. AGF also operated through territorial divisions, the XI armies, in carrying out its training functions, and the AAF had its own territorial divisions. Moreover, the country was divided into defense commands for tactical purposes, and these commands reported directly to the Chief of Staff.

The authority of the three major commands did not extend beyond the boundaries of the continental United States. The massive and

dispersed deployments of World War II required the creation of numerous overseas Army commands under theater commanders who were, in the tradition of Pershing in World War I, largely autonomous within their own areas. There were, however, significant differences. Army theater commands in World War II were normally part of joint or combined commands that were under the strategic direction of the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. And, since there were many of these commands, not one as in World War I, allocation of resources among them and the overall strategic direction of the war fell to the central authorities — the JCS and CCS and the War and Navy Departments. Essentially war planning was a function of the JCS and CCS with OPD and to a lesser degree ASF supplying Army representatives on joint and combined committees. Detailed execution of strategic plans fell to the military departments and the joint and combined commands overseas. General Marshall, as Chief of Staff of the Army exercised a control over Army commanders in the overseas theaters that General March had been unable to exercise in World War I.

World War II Army organization was complex and never completely static. There was much internal shifting and rearrangement after March 1942, and indeed the central directing agencies at higher levels largely took shape after that date, and Army organization had to be adjusted to them. Nevertheless, the central feature of the World War II organization was the creation of the three commands and the OPD command post in March 1942, and it is this event that lends itself to analysis in terms of the mechanism of change.

The rationale for the 1942 reorganization is to be found more in the prospective nature and scope of the Army's war effort than in new and theoretical management concepts. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, found the War Department at the time of Pearl Harbor "a poor command post," and he sought to make it a better one. A small army of 200,000 men scattered at continental and overseas garrisons in 1939 was undergoing an expansion that would eventually produce a force of over 8,000,000 deployed around the globe. Nevertheless, the theory behind the reorganization was drawn, how directly it is impossible to state, from the experience of large corporations that in the 1920's and 1930's had been decentralizing responsibility and authority for operations to the field, separating them from corporate headquarters. This freed top managers to concentrate on the processes of planning future operations, allocating resources among them, and supervising their execution, much as the 1942 Army reorganization did.

The major purpose of the 1942 reorganization was to free General Marshall from the excessive burden of detail the old staff system imposed upon him, and the reorganization was in a very real sense a Marshall reorganization for it produced the system and procedures that the Chief of Staff thought necessary for the direction of the Army in wartime.

A brief description of the process by which the reorganization was brought about will serve to illustrate the interplay of ideas, events, personalities, and formal organizations in bringing about

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the change. Reorganization actually began in 1940, geared to the concept developed by the Harbord Board in 1921 that a General Headquarters (GHQ) would be created separate from the War Department through which the Chief of Staff would direct field operations. GHQ was created in 1940 with Brig. Gen. Lesley J. McNair as its head and was initially assigned a training mission directing the four II armies that had come into being earlier. But in July 1941 the War Department expanded GHQ's role to include direction of operations. Meanwhile, AAF had been created as a coordinate command responsible for air training and operations, and WPD was exercising at a staff level a role that would conflict with GHQ's operational functions. When General McNair sought authority commensurate with his responsibility, it brought these conflicts to a head and forced the General Staff to face up to the issue of whether the GHQ concept, conceived in terms of a one front ground war like World War I, was an adequate one for the new situation.

The basic idea for the reorganization appears to have originated with Col. W. K. Harrison, a WPD officer in the fall of 1940. Harrison's plan contained the essentials of a three command organization with WPD serving as a command post. It was presented by Harrison, on behalf of a WPD

committee appointed to study the CHQ problem, in September 1941, but rejected by the head of WPD at that time as involving "extensive experimentation with untried ideas at a critical time." Then in November 1941, General H. H. Arnold, commander of AAF, revived it in substance in a plan presented to General Marshall to resolve the impasse with CHQ. Marshall was favorably impressed with it, and on 25 November ordered WPD to develop a plan "in sufficient detail to determine its practicality." About a week before Pearl Harbor he recalled Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, an air officer, from a special mission in London to head a committee to study and recommend a proper organization for the War Department. But McNarney was diverted temporarily to the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee and the committee did not get to work until 25 January 1942. Meanwhile Marshall, wrestling with his "poor command post", became more than ever convinced of the need for reorganization. McNarney's committee, composed of himself, Harrison, and Lt. Col. Laurence S. Kuter, another air officer serving on Gen. Marshall's staff, came up ^{on} 31 January 1942, with what was essentially a modified version of the Harrison plan. McNarney advised against following traditional General Staff procedures and warned that submitting the proposal to all interested parties would result in interminable delays.

Instead he recommended approving the plan, appointing the new commanders, and creating an "executive committee" to carry out the reorganization as soon as possible.

Marshall followed this procedure in all its essentials. McNarney was appointed head of an executive committee to work out the details and put the plan into effect, this committee to consist of representatives of those expected to head up the new organizations and hence with a vested interest in their success. The Chiefs of the Supply Arms and Services and those of the Combat Arms, whose positions were most vitally affected by the reorganization, were not represented on the committee and were given no opportunity to comment until the whole reorganization was a fait accompli. The Secretary of War and the President were persuaded to approve, and the necessary executive order was issued on 28 February 1942 making the reorganization effective 9 March.

Of the major elements contemplated in the reorganization, AAF was already in existence, GHQ could be transformed into AGF and WPD into OPD without great difficulty, but the supply command had to be pieced together from many diverse elements. It was, in the original McNarney-Harrison plan, a rather vague general concept, and the line of development that led to the creation of ASF was a partially separate one.

There had long been concern in the War Department over divided control over supply and service operations between the Undersecretary of War's Office (procurement and industrial mobilization) and G-4 (policy on military requirements and distribution). Each issued orders independently to the operating agencies, principally the Supply Arms and Services and the Corps Areas. Robert P. Patterson, Undersecretary of War employed an outside consultant firm, Booz, Fry, & Allen, to study the Army supply system late in 1941, and General Brehon B. Somervell, who became G-4 in December of that year, had a group headed by Goldthwaite Dorr make a similar study. Both studies recommended the appointment of a single military officer with functions similar to those of General Goethals in World War I. Mr. Patterson rejected this solution but it was not incompatible with the McNarney-Harrison proposal that there should be a single supply and service command. General Somervell, commander-designate of the new command, in working with the McNarney committee to develop the concept of the Services of Supply, used the ideas developed by the Dorr group extensively. Essentially the contribution from this independent line of development was the union of the functions of the Undersecretary's Office and of G-4 under the new command. This idea had not been included in the original Harrison plan.

It appears then that the 1942 reorganization was not produced through any institutionalized method for making change, but by what was a rather extraordinary process that circumvented normal staff procedures. General Marshall displayed that "certain ruthlessness which disregards accustomed methods and individual likings in striking out along new and untrodden paths" that General March had found necessary in World War I. In substance, he substituted the vertical pattern of military command for the horizontal pattern of staff coordination and he did it by an irreversible executive decision without extensive consultation of interested parties.

There is little perceptible relationship of the state of military education to this change, nor was it greatly influenced by pressures exerted from outside the Army. It was rather worked out by individuals within the formal organization who found existing arrangements unsatisfactory. The push of one organization dedicated to change, i.e. the Army Air Forces which sought greater autonomy and could not live with the GHQ arrangement, certainly played a part, but there were other individuals and organizations who also saw the need for change and supported it, among these officers in WPD, G-4, and the Undersecretary's Office. The more significant fact was that those with vested interests

in existing ways of doing business were simply left out of the planning process. The passage of the First War Powers Act by Congress late in 1941, giving the President power to reorganize the executive branch more or less at will for the duration of the war, made possible the rapid execution of the reorganization without the time-consuming process of seeking legislation from Congress to sanction it.

VI. ARMY REORGANIZATION OF 1946

Once the war was over, the Army reverted to an organization not greatly dissimilar to that existing before it began. War Department Circular 138, 13 May 1946, established the new organization effective 11 June 1946. ASF was abolished, OPD lost its preeminence among General Staff sections, and the Technical and Administrative Services were restored to their former position of relative independence. AGF and AAF were continued, the latter with increased autonomy in supply and administrative matters in anticipation of the creation of a separate Department of the Air Force.

The General Staff was to contain six co-equal directorates — Personnel and Administration (P & A); Intelligence; Organization and Training (O & T); Services, Supply, and Procurement (S, S & P); Plans and Operations (P & O); and Research and Development (R&D). Except for the new R & D directorate, they were roughly the equivalent of the pre-war G-sections and WPD. These directorates were to "plan, direct, coordinate, and supervise" activities within their respective jurisdictions and operate to the extent necessary to see that the Chief of Staff's directions were carried out. The Chief of Staff was specifically assigned "command of all components of the Army" with a Deputy Chief to assist him in his duties.

ASF Headquarters functions were divided among three staff sections — P & A, S, S & P, and R & D — with the major portion of them going to S, S and P. CPD's Logistics Group which had during the war done much

of the general staff work on logistical and personnel problems was assigned to S, S, & P. S, S, & P was in fact supposed to be something of a staff substitute for ASF with complete responsibility with respect to "service, supply, and procurement activities." But it could not exercise command functions as ASF had over the Chiefs of the eight Technical Services, and though it was assigned primary supervision over these services, in practice it had to share its control with other General Staff sections. In similar fashion the five administrative services were to work primarily under the supervision of P & A, but again there was no command line. In addition there were ten Special Staff agencies covering such fields as public relations, the budget, and civil affairs, reflecting a wartime growth of special agencies in these areas serving the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. In all some 29 individual staff agencies reported directly to the Chief of Staff or his Deputy.

Six Zone of Interior Army Areas were established to carry on training and provide tactical forces and to perform the service, supply, and administrative functions of the wartime ASF service commands. For the first of these functions they were responsible to ASF but for the second directly to the War Department. The Armies' administrative duties included furnishing support to installations (Class II) that were under the command of the Chiefs of the Technical and Administrative Services. The position of the overseas commands were not fundamentally changed though they were reduced in number. Army overseas commanders were directly under the War Department with

P & O fulfilling the old OGD role of assisting the Chief of Staff in their direction.

The mechanism of change was rather more institutionalized in this case than in that of the reorganization of 1942. A Special Planning Division was established in 1943 to plan for the post-war military establishment. It had not, before the end of the war, agreed on any plan, and on 30 August 1945 it was superseded by a special board of officers headed by Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch charged with proposing / "organization appropriate for peacetime adoption." The board conducted inquiries for several weeks and submitted its report to the Chief of Staff on 18 October 1945. The report was then circulated for comment or concurrence by the General and Special Staff Divisions, and to major commands in the zone of interior and overseas. After these comments were received the board was reconstituted on 6 December 1945, with Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson as president in place of General Patch, who died on 21 November. The report of the Simpson Board became the basis for War Department Circular 138.

The principal concepts that guided the actions of the Patch-Simpson Board — and they were hardly new — were first a belief that the General Staff as a corporate body, pushed aside during the war, must be revitalized and given the primary task of central direction of the Army, and second a belief that in order to do this the staff must, to some degree, operate — "The Board believes that while the General Staff must be the agency to deal with matters of

high policy and high level planning, it must also operate and direct, to the end that orders and directives are issued and supervised to the necessary degree in their execution."

The interaction of ideas, events, personalities, and formal organizations that led to this change were indeed complex and hard to separate one from the other. But personalities were clearly important, as were the clashing interests of agencies. Those who thought along traditionalist lines really won over the innovators—this was abundantly evident in the abolition of ASF and the rejection of the schemes for post war reorganization that the managerial experts in ASF advanced. The only real concession to modernization was the establishment of a Research and Development Division on the General Staff, and this was to be short-lived.

General Somervell had, during the war, made several attempts to carry through the 1942 reorganization to what he thought was its logical end — the consolidation of all the functions of the G-1, G-3, and G-4 of the General Staff in the ASF as a dual staff-command agency, and the functionalization of the supply and service functions in the Army through the practical abolition of the Technical Services. He abandoned the plan for absorbing the General Staff sections when it ran into overwhelming opposition, but he presented to the Patch-Simpson Board a modified plan for functionalization of the Technical Services. The make-up of the Patch-Simpson Board, however, was of a nature to exclude ASF influence. Patch and Simpson were World War II Army commanders without extensive experience in War Department staff

work. The rest of the board consisted of an Air Force planning officer, representing OPD, two officers representing the Technical Services, one from the Inspector General's Office, and one representing the Planning Division. A proposal to include Somervell's main management expert, Maj. Gen. Clinton F. Robinson, was specifically turned down. The Board listened carefully to all points of view but it seems to have been convinced from the start that the General Staff must be restored to its former place of importance in directing War Department activities and that therefore ASF must go. And the abolition of ASF and the dispersion of its functions was the central feature of the 1946 reorganization.

The abolition of ASF was a product of interplay of organizational and personal interests. In the course of wartime operations, Somervell and the ASF had made many enemies. The AAF, which in 1941 had supported the three command concept as a means of achieving a greater measure of autonomy within the Army was now determined to secure a totally independent status including a separate supply and service establishment. Its interests no longer concided with those of ASF, OPD had been alienated by Somervell's efforts to secure control of strategic-logistics planning. All who believed in the general staff system viewed its emasculation in World War II with some alarm. Within the ASF, the traditionally independent Technical Services (with the exception of the Transportation Corps, an ASF creation) resented the measure of ASF control over them and regarded Somervell's drive for functionalization as anathema. Most Regular Army logistical

officers had a technical service background as contrasted with the civilian business background of many of Somervell's management experts. The latter would depart the Army at the end of the war while the former remained. In any case, the net result was that at the end of the war the ASF was a peculiarly vulnerable organization. A sort of informal coalition took shape representing AAF, OGD, other sections of the General Staff, and the Technical Services that was anti-Somervell and hence anti-ASF.

In the elaborate hearings before the Patch-Simpson Board, the recommendations presented fell into three identifiable groups. First there were those favoring a continuance of General Marshall's tight wartime control over the Army through a vertical command arrangement, including the continuance of the ASF. The supporters included Generals Marshall, McNarney, and Harrison, the architects of the 1942 reorganization, as well as General Somervell and his principal staff advisers. Secondly, there were the representatives of the General Staff and of the Technical Services who preferred to generally to return / something closely resembling the pre-war organization. Thirdly there was General Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff from the European Theater who favored an organization somewhat similar to the second group but incorporating features of the wartime organization of the European Theater of Operations. They would replace the old staff divisions with directorates that would, in a sense, operate as well as advise. The Board listened with particular deference to Eisenhower, since he was designated as the

successor of Marshall as Chief of Staff and would have to operate under the new organization. In any case, both these latter groups attacked the ASF service command's role as unworkable in peacetime because it violated the principle of unity of command in the field. And abolition of the service commands meant there would be no further need for ASF.

The change was carried through within the Army and there was little influence for change exerted by agencies outside the military. It had no perceptible relationship to military education. It was approved by higher authority, i.e., the President under the War Powers Act, but was not initiated by him. One of its most curious features was that it appeared to have little relationship to the general scheme favored by War Department spokesmen in concurrent Congressional hearings on the creation of the post-war national security organization that would culminate in the National Security Act of 1947. Initially, the Army supported the creation of a single Chief of Staff and the organization of a fourth service that would perform for all the armed services support functions analogous to those the ASF performed for the Army during World War II. The explanation is to be found, in part, in the assumption that the 1946 reorganization would be a temporary or stop-gap one, pending the organization of a unified Department of Defense.

VII. REORGANIZATION, 1947-48 - WAR DEPARTMENT

BECOMES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

By the National Security Act of 1947, the Air Force became a separate department, the War Department was renamed the Department of the Army (DA) and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force became executive departments within the National Military Establishment under the "general direction and control" of the Secretary of Defense. The service departments were to be "separately administered" under their respective secretaries, but these secretaries lost their cabinet rank. The Joint Chiefs of Staff became a statutory body seated in the Office Secretary of Defense, specifically assigned the task of formulating joint military plans and giving strategic direction to unified commands to be established in various parts of the world. These changes in the position of the Department of the Army in the overall setup were accompanied by changes in the internal management of the department designed to enable it to function more efficiently within the new framework.

The changes in the internal organization of the department, roughly in chronological order of their occurrence, were:

- (1) The AGF command was abolished and the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) established as a DA

"field operating agency" for training all units and individuals used in a field army (not including Technical and Administrative Services training activities). Army areas, without any real change in function, were placed directly under DA Headquarters.

(2) The Research and Development Directorate of the General Staff was made a R & D Division within the S, S, & P Directorate and the title of the latter changed to Directorate of Logistics.

(3) An Army Comptroller was established "to improve the use of modern management techniques in the business administration of the Army." Within the Office of the Comptroller of the Army (OCA) a Management Division was made responsible for conducting studies and making recommendations on Army organization.

(4) The single Deputy Chief of Staff was replaced by a Vice Chief of Staff and two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, the first for Plans and Combat Operations, the second for Administration. The Deputy for Plans and Operations was charged with supervision of planning, direction of combat operations (including such as might be charged to the Chief of Staff as executive agent of the JCS), deployment of forces and allocation of resources, and assignment of strategic and tactical missions to Army commanders. The Deputy for Administration was charged with supervision of all

administrative and current operational activities outside the sphere assigned to the other deputy.

(5) The Technical Services were placed under the "direction and control" of the Director of Logistics and the Administrative Services under the "direction and control" of the Director of Personnel and Administration.

(6) The Army Secretariat under the new arrangement consisted of the Secretary, an Undersecretary, and two assistant secretaries -- one assigned politico-military matters, the other resources and administration. The final circular on organization in November 1948 stressed the civilian secretariat's supervisory control over Army logistics.

The position of the Army overseas commands underwent little immediate change, as it took time to develop the machinery of unified command under the JCS overseas. As that system took shape, however, each unified command was to consist of component commands of Army, Navy, and Air Force under a joint commander drawn from any of the three services. Much as in World War II, administrative and logistical control of service components would rest with the responsible military department and in practice one of the service Chiefs of Staff would be assigned as executive agent for each unified command. The rearrangements of 1947-48 gave legal sanction to the system in practical

effect since the establishment of the JCS in 1942. Under this system the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, exercised a dual role -- (1) As executive manager of the department for the Secretary of the Army and (2) As a member of the JCS whose responsibility was to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Army Staff served him in both these capacities.

The mechanism for change involved in the new national security arrangements appears more suitable for analysis at the Defense or JCS level. The internal changes involved as the War Department became the Department of the Army were not nearly so sweeping as those of 1942 or 1946. They grew largely out of internal examination within the formal organization, were significantly influenced by external pressures only to the extent that they were required by the National Security Act, and had no really fundamental relationship to either military education or the development of new weapons. They were regarded, as the 1946 reorganization had been, as interim changes pending the establishment by Congressional legislation of a new statutory basis for Army organization. In this respect, they were as significant in terms of what they did not do as for what they did. For the most part they involved the question of how to implement the concept of providing an adequate instrument in the central headquarters of the Department

for the efficient management of Army affairs. And on this issue the main line of division was between those who favored functionalization as opposed to the traditional arrangements of the Technical Services.

The separation of the Army and the Air Force was not a single dramatic event but a process that went on over a long period of time, beginning in fact with the creation of the Air Service in World War I. It was an organizational development that did result from an intensive drive by air officers for autonomy, and by 1947 the AAF was already a practically autonomous organization, the separation of which from the ground army involved no great difficulties. A detailed agreement between the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the Eisenhower-Spaatz Agreement, governed the many details of the split-off, still leaving the Army responsible for providing many common supplies and services for the AF.

Meanwhile, two different boards analyzed the results of the 1946 reorganization in 1946-47 at the direction of the Chief of Staff, and both found it wanting in many respects. The board headed by Lt. Gen. Wade Haislip, for instance, found the War Department organization "not conducive to either maximum efficiency or maximum economy." Among the changes recommended and carried out was the establishment of an Army Comptroller in 1947, a recognition of the need for better financial management. The roots

of the idea of comptrollership were to be found in the business world and in the Control Division of General Somervell's wartime ASF. The creation of the Comptroller anticipated a formal statutory requirement to be established by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. The other results of the boards' studies -- the substitution of OCAFF for ACF and the placing of research and development under the Director of Logistics -- resulted both from the necessity for economy and conflicting organizational pressures. ACF's position in the chain of command between the 21 armies and the DA had produced much friction. Money for research and development was scarce, and officers in the Logistics Directorate sought to eliminate a divided line of control over the Technical Services.

The establishment of the Management Division in the Comptroller's Office was the most significant development in terms of the effort to institutionalize change. This division, under Col. Kilbourne Johnston, undertook an interim study on "The Organization of the Department of the Army" and submitted a report on 15 July 1948. Studying the lessons of history, the Management Division concluded that the Army had had to abandon its permanent statutory structure in both World Wars and create an emergency organization because of two major defects -- the lack of a

truly functional staff in the sense of single staff agencies responsible to the Chief of Staff for each of the department's major functions, and "an unwieldy span of control" in that too many agencies reported directly to the Chief of Staff.

The division found most of the faults that led to reorganization in the two wars present in the post-World War II organization and recommended a functional rearrangement not too different from that proposed by General Somervell except in that it would operate under the Army Staff rather than under a service command. The three principal features of the so-called Johnston Plan were -- (1) To reduce the number of agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff by creating a Vice-Chief and two Deputy Chiefs who would supervise functional directorates; (2) To functionalize the Army staff, meaning the Technical and Administrative Services, along lines similar to the Somervell proposals; (3) to place all ZI installations and activities under the Army commanders, including the Class II installations commanded by the Chiefs of the Technical and Administrative Services.

The Management Division proposed to place the plan into effect in a series of steps. The first step, creating the Vice-Chief and two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and placing the technical and administrative services under the Director

of Logistics and of Personnel and Administration respectively was carried out in November 1948, as Phase I of the plan. But the further steps were indefinitely delayed as the opposition of the Chiefs of the Technical Services to functionalization and loss of control of Class II installations made itself felt. The Technical Service Chiefs with the support of the Director of Logistics, were able through the normal staffing procedures to persuade the Chief of Staff and the Secretary that further steps toward functionalization were not in the best interests of the Army. Even in those areas where an apparent centralization of control was formally prescribed, e. g. the Director of Logistics' "direction and control" of the Technical Services, it had little practical effect for other sections of the General Staff continued to share this direction and control.

VIII. ARMY ORGANIZATION ACT OF 1950

The reorganizations from 1942 through 1948 were carried out under the emergency war powers of the President, making change possible without Congressional sanction. The Army Organization Act of 1950 gave the Army a new statutory basis in anticipation of the expiration of the First War Powers Act of 1941. It replaced a miscellany of old laws governing the Army that dated back almost to the founding of the Republic. It was accompanied by internal changes in the department that completed the adjustment to the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments in 1949.

The distinguishing feature of the 1950 act was the flexibility granted the Secretary of the Army in prescribing the organization of the department and conducting its affairs. The Secretary, acting under the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, was to be "responsible for" and "have the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army," including the right, within certain limits and with certain exceptions, to prescribe the composition, duties and functions of the Army Staff and commands. The act stipulated that there should be one Undersecretary and two Assistant Secretaries, and an Army Staff to be composed of a Chief of Staff, a Vice-Chief of Staff, not to exceed three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and not to exceed five Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and some thirteen heads of technical and administrative services (by name but without a prescription of their duties). In accordance with previous legis-

is
lation, including the National Security Act / of 1947 and 1949, certain duties prescribed for the Chief of Staff, the Comptroller of the Army, the Inspector General, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Engineers, and the National Guard Bureau were not to be altered. Otherwise, the Army Staff was to be "organized in such manner," and its members were to "perform such duties and bear such titles, as the Secretary of the Army prescribes."

The three components of the Army established earlier -- the Regular Army, the National Guard of the United States, and the Organized Reserve Corps -- were continued. The traditional branches of the Army, sometimes called arms, corps, or services in previous acts, were continued, but the Chief of a Technical Service (Chiefs of the Combat Arms had been abolished in 1942) was not to command all personnel assigned to a branch. Functions performed by these Chiefs were to be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Army and subject to change by him, not as formerly by virtue of separate authority vested in them by Congress. The Secretary was to cause budgeting, accounting, progress, and statistical reporting to be conducted in a manner consistent with operations of the Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, which meant in practice that separate Technical Service budgets would be abolished.

The powers granted the Secretary of the Army under the act thus provided a mechanism for substantial change within the department without reliance on either Congressional legislation or the President's war powers. These powers were used to make certain rearrange-

ments in the Army Staff and modifications in procedure in 1950, generally as follows:

(1) The titles of the two Deputy Chiefs of Staff were changed and their functions rearranged; the Army Comptroller was elevated to the rank of a third deputy but without the official title. These three offices were to act for the Chief of Staff and the Vice Chief in carrying out their responsibilities, the Deputy Chief for Plans and Programs carrying responsibility for all basic planning, the Deputy Chief for Operations and Administration for execution of plans, and the Comptroller for review of the efficiency and economy of the Army's operations.

(2) The five General Staff Directorates were changed to four G-sections and their heads became Assistant Chiefs of Staff, following the Pershing pattern of the 1920's. The Organization and Training Directorate was abolished and its personnel functions transferred to G-1, its training functions to OCAFF.

(3) An Army Program System was initiated designed to translate strategic plans into action, to provide a basis for budgeting, formulation of annual programs, and a system of review of execution of these programs. Program management headed up in the various sections of the General Staff.

(4) Performance budgeting was initiated in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act Amendments of 1947, wiping out the independent budgets of the Technical Services that in some cases dated back to the Revolution. Overall control of the budget

was vested in the General Staff divisions under the supervision of the Comptroller and the Secretariat.

These changes provided for tighter executive control to be exercised over programming, budgeting, and execution through the mechanism of the General Staff and curbed some of the traditional independence of the Technical and Administrative Services. They did not, however, change the basic commodity organization of the Technical Services or their existing functions.

These changes were brought about by a variety of influences and individuals both outside the Army and within it. These influences all involved common concepts — that the basic management practices in the department needed improvements so that the cost of both material and the performance of functions could be better identified and controlled, and that the control of the department by the civilian secretariat should be strengthened.

In the meantime, the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act converted the National Military Establishment into an executive department now called the Department of Defense and reduced the status of the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force to military departments within DOD. The Secretary of Defense was to exercise "direction and control" over them.

One feature of the amendments that strengthened that direction and control and fundamentally affected the organization and procedures of the Army grew out of the studies of the First Hoover Commission. The Commission severely criticized the existing budget structure of the military departments and urged reorganizing these budgets

"on a functional or performance basis." It proposed that the Secretary of Defense should have full authority and control over the preparation and expenditure of the defense budget assuring a clear and direct accountability to the President and Congress through a single official. Title IV of the National Security Act Amendments reflected these recommendations. The position of Comptroller was established in the Department of Defense with broad authority over the financial operations of the military departments. He was to direct preparation of the Department's budget estimates, including the formulation of uniform terminology, budget classification and procedures and be responsible for supervising accounting procedures and statistical reporting. Comptrollers were to be established in each of the three services directly responsible to the service secretaries and to act under the general guidance of the Defense Comptroller. The new DOD Comptroller, Mr. Wilfred McNeil, on 17 May 1950 established the categories to be used in the new performance budgets, replacing for the Army the traditional Technical Service-oriented classifications with eight broad functional categories. This development, imposed from outside, was responsible for the new budgeting practices and influenced the other changes in procedure introduced in 1950-51.

Within the Army, a further development of the Management Division's earlier organizational studies by an outside firm, Crenap, McCormick, and Paget, pointed in the same direction. The management firm's conclusions, general similar to those of the Johnston study,

proposed the functional realignment of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the Comptroller that was carried out in 1950, and in recommending more "timely and realistic controls revealing the progress performance . . . against planned schedules or against standards of performance" pointed the way to the development of the Army Program System under the aegis of the General Staff. These were concepts common to the world of business management, General Somervell's ASF, and the Management Division of the Comptroller's Office.

The Crosap, McCormick, and Paget study went further and recommended the functionalization of the Technical and Administrative Services. But here again the opposition of the Chiefs of the Technical Services, supported by the Director of Logistics (later G-4), blocked the establishment of a truly functional staff below the levels of the Deputies and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff. General J. Lawton Collins, then Chief of Staff, agreed to the changes recommended in the study insofar as they affected the top levels but rejected the functionalization of the Technical Services as too disruptive. Collins felt that the departmental organization should closely parallel that of field organizations under FM 101-5 "with which the entire Army is familiar and which has proven itself so often."

The Army Reorganization Act of 1950 was drawn up in the light of General Collins' decisions on the management survey. Its drafting was largely the work of Lt. Col. George E. Bays of the Comptroller's Management Division, but it represented General Collins' views and those of the Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, both of whom defended it before Congress. There was considerable criticism in Congress of

the extent to which the bill centralized power in the Secretary of the Army to make changes. The Technical Service Chiefs bitterly resisted the abolition of their statutory recognition. But Congress in this case made few changes in the Army draft, so that the whole reorganization in 1950 may be considered a product of a formal organization adapting itself to changed conditions and to outside pressures for better business management. For the most part, individuals involved in bringing about this change acted as part of the formal organization and not as individuals. The central organizational authority, by this time the Secretary of Defense, appears to have played no significant role in shaping the specific changes in the Army organization but his new place in the defense set-up led to many of them.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CHANGES, 1953-58

There was no sweeping reorganization of the Department of the Army at any single point between 1950 and 1962. There were, however, cumulative changes between 1953 and 1958 that brought about substantial reorganization and change in the departmental apparatus for direction of the Army's affairs. These changes involved both shifts in the department's role as a result of increasing centralization of power in the Office Secretary of Defense and internal changes within the department itself.

At the higher level, President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953 abolished several of the boards set up under the National Security Act of 1947 and vested their functions in Assistant Secretaries of Defense. In an additional measure to emphasize civilian control over the department, executive agencies for unified commands were shifted from the service Chiefs of Staff to the departmental secretaries. Amendments to the National Security Act in 1958 further centralized power in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. The military departments were removed from the operational chain of command and the executive agency system abolished. The new chain of command ran from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the JCS to the unified commands. The departments were now to be

"separately organized" but not "separately administered." A Defense Directorate of Research and Development was set up to supervise the research and development programs of all the services. By an amendment introduced on the floor of the House, the McCormack-Curtis Amendment, the Secretary of Defense was empowered to provide for the carrying out of any supply and service activity common to more than one military department "by a single agency or such other organizational entities as he deems appropriate."

The net effect of these changes was to leave the Department of the Army responsible for organizing, training, equipping, supplying, and administering ground forces but to transfer all strategic and tactical direction to the JCS and the unified commands. Internal adjustments within the department, meanwhile, included the following principal changes between 1954 and 1957:

(1) The Army Secretariat was reorganized to include an Under Secretary; four Assistant Secretaries -- for Civil and Military Affairs, Financial Management, Logistics/Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces respectively; a Director of Research and Development with the rank but not the title of an Assistant Secretary; a General Counsel, Chief of Legislative Liaison, Chief of Public Information, and an Administrative Assistant.

(2) The Army General Staff was reorganized to provide for three Deputy Chiefs of Staff with a Chief of Research and Development and the Army Comptroller also of deputy rank, two Assistant Chiefs of Staff, one for Intelligence (ACSI) and one for Reserve Components (ACSRC). First G-4 was made Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) and given command authority over the Technical Services including their personnel and funds. Then staff responsibilities for research and development, scattered among various staff sections were consolidated under a Chief of Research and Development. Finally the offices of G-1 and G-3 were abolished and their functions and personnel combined with those of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans to form two new offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) respectively. G-2 was changed to ACSI and ACSRC created. Most of the Special Staff sections other than the Chiefs of the Technical Services were grouped under DCSPER and DCSOPS.

(3) The Office of the Chief of Staff was reorganized to make the Vice Chief of Staff responsible for effective administration and management of the Army Staff. The five deputy level officers were delegated substantial authority.

to take final Army staff action on matters in their respective areas not requiring the personal attention of the Vice Chief.

(4) The U. S. Continental Army Command (USCONARC) was established absorbing the training and combat development functions formerly performed by OCAFF. USCONARC was assigned additional command and administrative responsibilities including direct control of the CONUS armies and the Military District of Washington, but the Technical Services concurrently gained greater control of their Class II installations.

(5) The Secretary of Defense created single managerships for specific types of common supplies and services for the entire DOD beginning with food, clothing, medical supplies, and land transportation in 1956. The Secretary of the Army was designated single manager for food, clothing, and land transportation; and he delegated his operating responsibilities for the single managerships to the Chiefs of the Technical Services handling the specific commodities or services concerned.

The concepts dictating these changes appear to be: (1) the need to establish a system responsive to the direction of the Secretary of Defense; (2) the need to free the Chief of Staff for JCS duties; (3) the need to provide clear directional authority in the hands of the General Staff over both operating staff agencies and

commands; (4) the need to give research and development a proper place in a period when the development of new weapons had become a matter of transcendent importance; (5) the need to increase efficiency and economy and avoid duplication in service and supply activities.

These changes resulted from both internal and external pressures, but the mechanism of change, insofar as internal rearrangements in the department were concerned, involved the familiar processes of study, staffing, and reconciliation of disagreements within the formal organization.

When the President announced Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953 he declared that "improvements are badly needed in the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force." By instructions from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army established an Advisory Committee on Army Organization headed by Paul L. Davies, Vice-President of the Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation. The committee used a civilian staff furnished by McKinsey & Co., a Chicago management firm. The Davies Committee recommended reducing the number of agencies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, the creation of a training command, and, in the supply area, creation of a Vice Chief of Staff for Supply, a supply command, and elimination of the division of responsibility between the CONUS Armies and the Technical Services for operation of Class II installations.

The committee did not, as previous study groups had, recommend the functionalization of the Technical Services but only the establishment of closer control over their activities. "Coordination of the development, procurement, and distribution of an item is a more meaningful basis for organization," it concluded, ". . . than specialization in each function." Nor did the committee want to separate responsibility for research and development from that for procurement, reflecting in this case as in its opposition to functionalization an Ordnance viewpoint since most of its members had in one way or another been connected with the Army's Ordnance Corps.

The committee also recommended closer alignment of fiscal responsibility with the organizational structure and the establishment of a civilian assistant-secretary for financial management. It stressed the need for the Army Staff to get out of operations, something the Patch-Simpson Board a decade earlier had insisted could not be done.

The proposal that met the strongest opposition within the Army, creating a supply command, involved this principle. Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer, who had recently become G-4, turned the committee proposals upside down and proposed instead that G-4 be transformed into DCSLOG with command as well as staff authority over the Technical Services.

Palmer's argument was the same that Somervell used in World War II, that in the logistics area staff and command functions could not be separated. Palmer's view prevailed with the Chief of Staff and the Secretary and on 8 September 1954 G-4 was transformed into DCSLOG with the functions Palmer had asked. The Davies Committee recommendation to create a training command was carried out shortly afterward with the creation of USCONARC. A subsequent rearrangement cleared up much of the confusion existing about Class II installations under the Technical Services by removing the CONUS Armies' functions in providing for their housekeeping and placing them completely under the Technical Services, in effect as part of the DCSLOG "command."

Meanwhile, pressures mounted from civilian scientists within the Army, the scientific community outside represented on the Army's Scientific Advisory Panel, and the Congress for a higher place for research and development within the military organization. The first step toward meeting these pressures involved the creation in 1954 of the position of Chief of Research and Development under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans (whose position was renamed Plans and Research). Research and development functions scattered among G-1, G-3, and DCSLOG were transferred to this office but the marriage of plans and research did

not prove to be a happy one. In September 1955 the verdict of the Davies Committee was reversed and the Chief of Research and Development was given a deputy rank on the Army Staff though not the title because of the statutory limitation on the number of deputies. While the Chief of Research and Development was empowered to act in the name of the Chief of Staff and had a direct channel to the Technical Services, his ability to direct their programs was hampered by the fact that DCSLOG controlled their personnel, budgets, and facilities. The creation of the new post on the staff was followed, in November 1955, by the establishment of the position of Director of Research with a rank, but without the title, of an Assistant Secretary of the Army.

The obvious imbalance at the General Staff level led in January 1956 to the further reorganization in which G-1 and G-3 were abolished and DCSPER and DCSOPS established, making a total of five deputies exercising functions in their respective areas in the name of the Chief of Staff.

The changes of 1954-56 in the departmental staff then were the product of many influences, one of the most notable the need to provide a better system for controlling development of new weapons, the other the need to establish firmer control over the Technical Services. If any one

personality dictated these changes it was General Palmer with his concept of DCSLOG as a staff and a command, rather than the members of the Davies Committee. Palmer's concepts, however, were modified by the pressures that arose from other sources for a separate development staff, something that DCSLOG regarded as weakening the central control over the entire logistics structure that it aspired to exercise. In any case, the changes resulted from the normal workings of the internal staff processes of the department and the Army Organization Act of 1950 provided a sufficient mechanism to make these changes possible by order of the Secretary of the Army except insofar as it limited the number of Deputy Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Secretaries.

By contrast, the development of the single manager system was almost entirely a product of outside pressures. Various investigating committees of Congress continually criticized the duplication and waste involved in the separate supply and service systems of the military departments. The Second Hoover Commission in 1955 recommended as a remedy the establishment of a separate civilian-managed agency, reporting to the Secretary of Defense, to administer common supply and service activities. This recommendation was opposed both by the Secretary of

Defense and the military departments on the grounds that a civilian-managed system could not be responsive to military need. But it prodded the Defense establishment into seeking some other remedy for duplication and this remedy was conceived to be the single manager system.

X. THE MCNAMARA REORGANIZATION - 1961-63

As part of a general program to streamline the organization of DOD, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in 1961 initiated the first major reorganization of the Department of the Army since 1946. The basic reorganization plan for the Army was produced under Project 80, but it was significantly affected by Project 100 that led to the creation of the Defense Supply Agency (DSA). The reorganization involved the practical abolition of the Headquarters of the Technical Services -- the Offices of the Surgeon General and the Chief of Engineers excepted -- and the parcelling out of their functions, personnel, and installations among several new agencies.

DSA, operating directly under the Secretary of Defense, and designed to centralize performance of common supply and service functions, took over the single managerships and other similar functions, affecting primarily the Quartermaster Corps. The Project 80 reorganization provided for two new

major CONUS commands on the same level with CONARC, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Combat Developments Command (CDC). AMC was made responsible for research and development, production, and supply functions in the United States, CDC for the development of combat doctrine, and all individual and unit training was consolidated under CONARC. The Technical Services thus lost their materiel functions to AMC, their training functions to CONARC, and their functions in the formulation of doctrine to CDC. A new centralized Office of Personnel Operations (OPO) was established under the supervision of DCSPER to take over military personnel functions formerly performed by both the Adjutant General and the Technical Services. Technical Service headquarters civilian personnel functions were assigned to the Civilian Personnel Division of the Chief of Staff's Office.

The field commands and activities of the Technical Services were regrouped into five commodity type commands and two functional commands under AMC. The commodity commands - Weapons Command, Munitions Command, Mobility Command, Missile Command, and Electronics Command carried out research and development, production and procurement, and exercised integrated commodity management within their respective spheres. A Supply and Maintenance Command was

charged with operation of wholesale supply, maintenance, and distribution activities for the Army, and a Test and Evaluation Command combined test and evaluation functions for new equipment formerly performed by the Technical Services and CONARC boards. Thirty separate field installations also reported directly to AMC, including several research laboratories and eleven procurement districts. The development of approximately 30 critical weapons systems were removed from normal channels of command and placed under project managers, most of whom also reported directly to the Commanding General, AMC.

In the initial reorganization under Project 80, the Offices of the Chief of Ordnance and the Chemical Warfare Services were abolished and their staff functions transferred to DCSLOG. Residual Quartermaster functions, not transferred to DSA, were entrusted to a Chief of Support Services under DCSLOG. Chiefs of the Transportation and Signal Corps were left as special staff agencies, but by 1965 the first had been absorbed by DCSLOG and the second by DCSOPS. Of the old Technical Service Headquarters, only the Surgeon General and the Chief of Engineers remained.

The basic structure of the Department of the Army General Staff was not initially affected by Project 60, but one of its goals was to divorce that staff from

operations to the maximum extent possible, returning to the principle of the 1942 reorganization. The principal impact was a reduction in size with the cuts heaviest in OCRD and DCSLOG where identifiable operating functions were transferred to the field. In the case of DCSPER, the situation was reversed, on account of the assignment of OPO and TAGO as operating agencies under it. However, a net reduction in the Army Staff from 13,700 to 10,500 was achieved.

Subsequently, Secretary McNamara directed a further study of the Army Staff with a view to speeding its decision-making processes and reducing its size by another 15 per cent. As a result of project 39a, DCSOPS was split and staff supervision over the raising and training of the Army transferred to an Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR), along lines recommended in Project 80 but rejected at the time by the General Staff. To accelerate decision-making within the General Staff a Staff Action Control Office was added to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The Army Staff was further reduced from 10,500 to 8,500 by the end of 1963.

The Project 80 reorganization involved two main concepts -- first, that the Army Staff should not operate, a reversal of the Patch-Simpson Board verdict of 1946; and

second, that the whole Army structure should be "functional." Neither of these concepts were new. The doctrine of "functionalization" had dominated the thinking of industrial managers and public administrators since World War II. The previous decade within the Department of Defense had been one of gradual "functionalization," and within the Army the Comptroller's Office had promoted the concept since 1948.

The Technical Services had been the target of reformers since the time of General Somervell, but all previous attempts to abolish them had failed. The effort was successful in 1962 mainly because their positions had already been severely eroded by creeping functionalization in the 1950's and because Secretary McNamara developed the techniques and showed the determination to carry through a fundamental reorganization. In broader perspective, however, the reorganization was an attempt to adapt the Army to the vast changes in weapons and in the Defense environment that had come about in the 1950's.

Secretary McNamara's technique involved the creation of ad hoc committees to examine particular problem areas. Each particular study was given a project number. The projects involving organization and management were assigned to Cyrus Vance, General Counsel of the DOD,

and under him to a Director of Organizational and Management Planning, a new office under Solis Horowitz. Vance and Horowitz asked the Secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr, to make the Project 80 study, citing the need for a new examination of many questions relating to the Army's organizational structure. The Chief of Staff, General George H. Decker, personally selected Mr. Leonard Hoelscher, Deputy Comptroller of the Army for nearly a decade, to head the Project 80 Study Group and he gave him latitude to make whatever recommendations he saw fit within broad guidelines furnished by Mr. Vance. Hoelscher formed a committee of 60 Army officers and civilians which he divided into subgroups, each assigned the study of a particular Army function. The Hoelscher Committee, between April and October 1961, produced the most thorough and detailed internal study of Army organization and management that had ever been made.

The Hoelscher Committee report was submitted to the Secretary of the Army on 5 October 1961 and to Mr. Vance and the Secretary of Defense on 16 October 1961 before the Army Staff and Secretariat had arrived at their own official position on it. On 14 October General Decker appointed a committee of senior officers headed by Lt. Gen. David Traub, the Army Comptroller, to study the Hoelscher report and recommend a General Staff position.

At the same time General Staff Agencies were assigned the task of developing recommendations on the structures of the three functional commands envisaged by the Hoelscher Committee. As in the case of the 1942 reorganization, the Technical Services, the agencies most vitally affected, were not formally consulted at this point though they learned of the plan through contacts with DCSLOG.

Secretary McNamara did not want the reorganization delayed by the usual round of staff concurrences and went to work immediately with his own investigations, centering on the new Army Materiel Command. He indicated quite clearly he would accept no solution that did not abolish the Technical Services, and personally adjusted the setup of the AMC subcommands. The Traub Committee, almost of necessity, concentrated on other aspects of the reorganization and developed some modifications in the Hoelscher Committee recommendations, particularly with regard to the Army Staff. The final Traub Committee report to the Chief of Staff accepted the general concepts of the Hoelscher Committee and embodied the AMC organization developed in consultation with Mr. McNamara.

Another influence brought to bear at this point was that of General Maxwell Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff

and personal military adviser to President Kennedy. At Taylor's request Mr. Hoelscher briefed him on the concept of the reorganization, and Taylor raised many questions particularly relating to the reactions of the Technical Service Chiefs. As a result Mr. McNamara assembled them on 8 December 1961 and told them that he was interested in their comments but that he had already decided to recommend the reorganization to the President. After listening to their remarks -- their major objections were to the loss of military officer personnel career management and technical training functions -- Mr. McNamara stated he hoped the chiefs would not weaken the Defense establishment by indulging in public controversy over the reorganization. And in fact they did not.

On 10 December Secretary of the Army Stahr presented the plan as modified by the Traub Committee to Mr. McNamara, explaining that it lacked "unanimous concurrence by all consulted," but that it represented the "considered views" of the Chief of Staff, himself, and the great majority of those who had participated in the study. After further briefing of General Taylor, who raised no formal objection, the Secretary of Defense laid the plan before President Kennedy. Kennedy approved on 16 January 1962 and submitted the plan to Congress under the provisions of the McCormick-Curtis Amendment to the National Security Act

in 1958. Under these provisions any realignment of functions to increase efficiency and economy would take effect unless disapproved by Congress in 30 days. Congress did not object.

Once the President had submitted his decisions to Congress, carrying out the reorganization became the function of a DA Reorganization Project Office (DARPO) created under the Comptroller of the Army, with a Planning Council on which the commander-designates of the new commands, OEO, and of CONARC were represented. DARPO was reminiscent of General McNarney's executive committee in 1942, but it intended to proceed much more deliberately with a gradual transition. However, Mr. McNamara intervened to speed up the whole process so as to place the new organization in full effect on 1 August 1962.

The effort to make DARPO a permanent part of the Comptroller's Office responsible for recommending changes in the Army's organization and management failed. As a subordinate agency within a co-equal General Staff division it had created resentment among the General Staff and was phased out of existence in September 1962. Project 39a was monitored by the Staff Management Branch in the Office of the Chief of Staff.

The major impetus for reorganization of the Army in 1962 came then from the Secretary of Defense, representing the central organization authority. There was, nevertheless, within the Army itself sufficient appreciation of the need for change to lead to a searching self-examination and specific recommendations as to the lines the change should take. The Hoelscher Committee, the Traub Committee, and DARPO, the internal mechanisms of change in this instance, were specially created bodies, but their members were drawn from the formal organization. As in the 1942 reorganization, the voices of disagreement were largely silenced by procedures that by-passed the formal staffing processes with all their inherent delay. For this too, the Secretary of Defense was largely responsible. In the legal sense, the provisions of the national security legislation of 1958 provided a mechanism of change.

In terms of military education, one aspect of the change was the placing of a major portion of the Army's schools under one authority -- CONARC. However, the central feature of the reorganization was a broader one, the virtual abolition of the Technical Services and the establishment of functional commands to replace them. There seems no vital relationship between military education and this development. Certainly the cumulative pressures from outside the military over the years for organizational

reform played some role in leading to these changes in 1962, but at the particular time they were carried out the impetus came not from outside the DCD, but from within it.

EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

20 February 1970

EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Overview

Functionally, organizationally, and geographically the naval establishment has from practically the beginning of the Federal government under the Constitution consisted of three parts: the Navy Department at the seat of government in Washington, the Shore Establishment, and the Operating Forces.

Almost from its establishment to May 1966, the Department operated under a bilinear form of organization which resulted in two lines of control being utilized by the Secretary of the Navy. One of these lines that of "military command," was primarily concerned with training and developing the capabilities and readiness of military forces; planning and determining their support requirements; and military administration of the Department. The other line, that of "business administration," was primarily concerned with providing the equipment, material, trained personnel, and services necessary to meet the support requirements of naval forces; and the management of the efforts of the Department in meeting these requirements.

Since the early part of the twentieth century, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have been responsible, under the Secretary, for all matters relating to military command. Until 1966, under the direction of the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the chiefs of the Bureaus were responsible for all matters related to business administration.

With respect to support as related to the bilinear organization, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as

the military chiefs of the Department were viewed as representing the "consumers" of men, material and services. Hence, they were responsible for planning the requirements for support in terms of what was needed, when it was needed, and where it was needed. In contrast, the Bureaus and their field activities in various organizational combinations under the direction of the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries, were viewed as representing the "producers" of this support and were responsible for the management of the affairs of the Department in meeting support requirements. This "consumer-producer" relationship was the basis for the assignment of responsibilities under the bilinear organization.

In 1962 six Bureaus represented the producer effort: the Bureau of Naval Personnel; Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; Bureau of Yards and Docks; Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; Bureau of Ships; and the Bureau of Naval Weapons. In 1963 the material bureaus, i.e., the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of Ships, and Bureau of Naval Weapons were placed under the command of the Chief of Naval Material. The bilinear organization was retained. The Chief of Naval Operations and now the Chief of Naval Material, as well as the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, each reported directly to the Secretary.

In 1966 a unilinear form of organization was adopted. The Chief of Naval Material, with his total producer effort, along with the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery were placed under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations. Thus, the user effort and the producer effort for the first time were combined under a common superior below the Secretary: the Chief of Naval Operations.

Establishment and Early Evolution of the Department (1775-1815)

The Department of the Navy came into being in the early part of 1798, and the Marine Corps was added a few months later. The Navy of the American Revolution had, by then, completely disappeared, as its last ship had been sold in 1785. The Marines of the Revolution, dating back to 1775, had also disappeared. When the Constitution of the Federal government went into effect in 1789, the War Department was charged with the administration of both the Army and the Navy, but there was no Navy to administer.

Depredations by the Barbary pirates on American shipping in the Mediterranean led Congress in 1794 to authorize the construction of six frigates, among them the Constellation and Constitution. The construction program was not pushed vigorously and at one time was almost abandoned. When four years later the United States became involved in a quasi-war with France, the Secretary of War came in for much criticism due to naval unreadiness. The outcome was the establishment of a separate department, the Department of the Navy, on 30 April 1798, with a "Secretary of the Navy" as its chief officer.

Benjamin Stoddert, the first Secretary of the Navy, was a shipping man of wide experience who knew the operation and maintenance of merchant ships thoroughly. The nature of naval warfare of that period, together with the small size of the naval establishment, made administration of the new department a comparatively simple matter for a man of his wide experience. There were only a few ships in service and half a dozen employees to supervise in the Navy Department

itself. Navy agents in the principal seaports from Maine to Georgia handled the Navy's business in the field.

The Secretary of the Navy's job in the early days was to arrange for ships, their officers (crews were enlisted locally), and their supplies. He gave general instructions as to the missions to be performed and then, because of poor communications facilities, had to leave the rest to squadron commanders or to the commanding officers of ships operating singly.

The War of 1812 led to the first change in Navy organization. There was much criticism of the Navy's unpreparedness for that war and of the fact that the law made no provision for professional assistants or advisors to the Secretary of the Navy. The war, when it came, resulted in a considerable increase in the size of the Navy and its shore establishment. The experience of the war and the size of the Navy indicated very definitely that the Secretary of the Navy needed more assistance than was authorized by law, and especially that he needed the help of professional naval officers. Until 1815, administration of the Department was entirely in the hands of civilian appointees. Naval Officers served at sea.

The organization of the Department during this period (1775-1815) was clean-cut and simple. The Secretary of the Navy exercised direct control over the Navy Department and Shore Establishment and such control as existing communications permitted over the Operating Forces.

Board of Navy Commissioners (1815-1842)

Much study was made of the Secretary's need for professional assistance and many recommendations were made to correct the situation.

which had become unsatisfactory to Congress, to the Secretary of the Navy and to professional naval officers. The outcome was a law passed under date of February 7, 1815 "to alter and amend the several acts establishing a Navy Department by adding thereto a Board of Navy Commissioners," which was to consist of three senior naval officers. Under the Secretary of the Navy, the Board of Navy Commissioners was to "discharge all the ministerial duties of said office, relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials and the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of vessels of war as well as all other matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States." The law prescribed that nothing in the Act was to be construed "to take from the Secretary of the Navy his control and direction of the naval forces of the United States, as now by law possessed."

The Commissioners held their first meeting on April 25, 1815 and within a month clashed with Secretary of the Navy, Crowninshield over their respective spheres of duty, the specific question being whether the Secretary was obliged to communicate to the Commissioners "the destination of a squadron." The disagreement was settled by President Madison who decided that the Commissioners were to handle matter such as the building, repairing, and equipping of ships and the superintending of navy yards, but that military functions were to remain in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy. In other words, the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Navy were to lie principally in the field of naval command; those of the Navy Commissioners principally in the field of logistics. This concept would come full circle in 1915.

Except for the establishment of the Board of Navy Commissioners,

the basic organization of the previous period (1775-1815) was left untouched. The significant development during this period was the emergence of the concept that responsibility for support of the fleet could be kept apart from responsibility for fleet operations. This appears to some as the first indication of the development of a bilinear form of organization within the Department.

Emergence of the Bureau System (1842-1909)

By 1842 dramatic advances were being made in such things as ordnance, design-rifled guns, explosive shells, breech-loading guns, and rotary mounts. The Navy now had in its fleet two steam men-of-war and a steel hull steam frigate. Technology had begun to exert an influence on the Department of the Navy which was to result in the establishment of what some have called the Navy Bureau System.

Recognizing the magnitude of the Navy's technical and material problems, the Congress established a Bureau system with five individual Bureaus under the Secretary, each identified with a specific task. These Bureaus -- Yards and Docks; Construction, Equipment and Repairs; Provisions and Clothing; Ordnance and Hydrography; and Medicine and Surgery -- had their duties documented in the Navy Regulations of 1842 as follows:

"The business of the Department of the Navy shall be distributed among the Bureaus in such a manner as the Secretary of the Navy shall judge to be expedient and proper."

For the ensuing 15 years, the "business" of the Department was conducted, as was prescribed by Navy Regulations, through or by the Bureaus, while fleet operations and personnel matters were handled by the Secretary's office directly, thus preserving the general bilinear arrangement which had emerged 25 years before.

However, as the Civil War approached, and with it the problems of expansion, the Secretary found himself in need of further advice and staff support.

As a result, Gideon Welles, as Secretary of the Navy, did four things: (1) he increased the number of Bureaus to eight, (2) he established a set

of boards to advise him directly on specific matters, (3) he appointed a Solicitor (Judge Advocate), and (4) he obtained an Assistant Secretary.

The eight Bureaus were: Yards and Docks; Navigation; Ordnance; Construction and Repair; Steam Engineering; Provisions and Clothing; Medicine and Surgery; and Equipment and Recruiting.

With one exception, the increase in the number of Bureaus represented only a further subdivision of the technical cognizance established in the earlier Bureaus. The Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, however, was now assigned cognizance over all enlisted personnel matters, heretofore the exclusive province of the Secretary. Thus, in 1862, the present Bureau of Naval Personnel had its origin.

The purpose of the special boards established by Secretary Welles was to consider some of the many technical problems facing the Department. They were concerned with areas such as "science and inventions," "harbors," "plans for new vessels," and "strategy."

The new Solicitor was to advise the Secretary on legal and disciplinary matters; and the new Assistant Secretary was to assist the Secretary by exercising coordination over the Bureaus.

This was the organization under which the Union Navy fought the Civil War and under which the Department of the Navy operated for the ensuing 20 years. During this latter period, the Department experienced but one major internal shift of authority, namely, the assignment of additional responsibilities to the Bureau of Navigation.

The Bureau of Navigation, in its original form, was established primarily to handle technical matters related to hydrography and related sciences. However, following the war, the task of officer detail was

passed from the Secretary's office to this Bureau. A few years later, cognizance of enlisted personnel was transferred from the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting to the Bureau of Navigation. In 1882, when a Chief of Naval Intelligence was established, his office, too, was placed in this Bureau. Finally, in 1884, the Secretary handed over the task of directing ship movements to the Bureau of Navigation.

These acts, as is clearly evident, assigned to the Bureau of Navigation cognizance over both technical and operational matters. This brought about a troublesome imbalance in the organization and operation of the Navy Department and gave rise to a series of efforts designed to create a countervailing force which would unseat the Bureau of Navigation from its overdominant position. Principal among these was a powerful movement to reorganize the Department along lines then being popularized in Germany.

General Staff and The Naval Aide System (1909-1915)

During the closing years of the 19th century, constant complaint was heard in the Department of the Navy that: (1) the Secretary of the Navy was incapable of personally coordinating the activities of the Department due to their extent and complexity and thus required a military staff agency interposed between himself and the bureaus; and (2) the Navy Department had no adequate means of developing war plans and of assuring the Secretary that the fleet was in fact prepared for war.

These defects, it was alleged, would quickly be eliminated by the establishment of a general staff. Thus it was that a series of proposals was made for establishment of a general staff, with a title such as "Board of Admiralty" or "Board of Survey." Finally, in 1909, it was proposed that the General Board of the Navy -- heretofore an advisory body -- be placed in a position of staff preeminence, with the President of the Board serving as a Naval Chief of Staff. The Secretary of the Navy, Truman Newberry, briefly put this plan into effect. Meanwhile, the intensity of the agitation for establishing a Chief of Staff organization in the Department of the Navy, such as had recently been adopted by the Army, caused the matter to come directly to the attention of President Theodore Roosevelt, who convened a board to inquire into the problem.

The board submitted to the President a report on the fundamental principles of organization of the Department. Essentially, the board found that the duties of the Secretary of the Navy fell into two distinct areas: (1) civil duties concerned with procuring and providing all of the means required by the Navy to make war, and (2) military duties relating to the actual employment of those means. The board observed that: "this

condition necessitated a subdivision of duties ... through a medium of responsible subordinates ..." and ... "In this subdivision, the principle of undivided responsibility, within the appointed field of subordinate supervision, should obtain."

Shortly following the submission of the board's report, and before any action could ensue, the national administration changed, and with it the Secretary of the Navy. The new Secretary, George von L. Meyer, promptly abolished Secretary Newberry's general staff type organization and convened a committee on organization of his own which, being unable to reach any agreement, was followed in rapid succession by two more boards convened for the same purpose.

The combined counsel of these boards induced Secretary Meyer to conclude that, without in any way disturbing the system of Bureaus, he required the services of four Naval Aides -- senior officers to advise him personally on matters concerning operations, personnel, material, and inspection. He desired these officers to serve him as advisers and not as an executive staff. Accordingly, he preceded the designation of these Naval Aides by seeking the opinion of the Attorney General on the legal scope of the authority which might be assigned them. The Attorney General said that:

"It is unquestionable that Congress has intended that the administration of affairs in the Navy should be through the bureaus created by the statutes ... (Further) The work of the Navy Department may be grouped under general divisions, each of which may include different Bureaus; and in each division the Secretary of the Navy may detail an officer of the Navy as an 'aide' to advise the Secretary on all matters pertaining to the duties of the division and to transmit orders of the Secretary to the various chiefs of Bureaus and to other subordinates of the department, signing such order 'by direction of the Secretary of the Navy'. However, such aides cannot, individually or

collectively, exercise any supervisory authority over the chiefs of Bureaus. That is the exclusive province of the Secretary and cannot be delegated by him..."

Secretary Meyer appointed the four Naval Aides to serve as advisors.

Thus the general staff idea, given a thorough examination and even for a brief time tested, was rejected.

Chief of Naval Operations (1915-1921)

One critical area of departmental direction remained inadequately provided for. It had to do with the readiness of the fleet, its training, and preparation of plans for its employment in war.

By 1912 advances in ordnance and fire control, the emergence of the submarine as a practical weapon, and most of all, vast improvements in communications had made naval warfare most complex in terms of planning, training, and execution.

Secretary Myer considered the Naval Aide System satisfactory, but was unable to obtain statutory authorization for it from Congress. Joseph Daniels, when he became Secretary of the Navy in 1913, did not like the system and allowed the Naval Aides for Personnel and Inspections to be detached without reliefs. He retained the Naval Aide for Operations, RADM Bradley A. Fiske, on the advice of Admiral Dewey, the Chairman of the General Board. Fiske subsequently made an effort to obtain statutory authorization for his office. Congressman Richmond P. Hobson, himself a former officer in the Construction Corps of the Navy and a hero of the Spanish-American War, at the request of Fiske, and with the unanimous approval of the House Naval Affairs Committee, incorporated the following provision in the Naval Appropriation Bill, pending in March 1915: "... there shall be a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy not below the grade of a Rear Admiral, appointed for a term of four years by the President by and with the advice of the Senate, who under the Secretary of the Navy shall be responsible for the readiness of the Navy for war and be charged with its general direction." The provision was, however, promptly stricken from the bill in

the House on a point of order, but in altered form, Hobson maneuvered the rider back into the bill in the Senate. It finally passed both houses of Congress on 3 March 1915.

The rider originally prepared by Hobson and Fiske was highly unpalatable to Secretary of the Navy Daniels because, in his opinion, it placed too much power in the hands of the proposed Chief of Naval Operations. As modified to meet the objections of the Secretary and passed, the bill read:

"There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President ... from among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of Captain for a period of four years, who shall under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war ..."

To be charged merely "with the operations of the Fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war" was obviously a far cry from Hobson's and Fiske's original proposal that the CNO should be "responsible for the readiness of the Navy for war and be charged with its general direction." Many officials felt that the new office lacked sufficient authority to make it effective, and particularly deplored the fact that the CNO had been given no direct authority over the Bureaus.

However, in August of 1916, Congress authorized the rank and title of "Admiral" for the CNO, and greatly strengthened his authority by providing that: "All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary and shall have full force and effect as such."

The success of the new organization was of necessity largely dependent upon the attitude of the Secretary of the Navy toward it. Seeing that civilian control had not been impaired, Secretary Daniels' early hostility to the office soon changed to one of warm endorsement. In his annual report of 1916, he stated that the new organization gave the department "... in connection with the Bureau chiefs named by the President, what naval experts at home and abroad have declared to be the best naval organization that human wisdom has devised. While civilian control essential in a Republic, has been preserved, responsibility has been placed upon the Chief of Naval Operations and the chiefs of the Bureaus."

Colossal war had raged in Europe since August 1914. The likelihood of our being drawn in grew progressively greater and more apparent. President Wilson's pacifistic tendencies were being rapidly transformed and his Secretary of the Navy ardently followed his lead. Many members of Congress and other officials did likewise. In 1916 there came a huge naval building program adopted by Congress under Presidential sponsorship. Men who were to be responsible for our conduct of the war were beginning to be regarded with great respect and favor. All of this substantially helped the new office of the CNO to get away to a good start. It tended to soften the attitude of Secretary Daniels and the Bureau chiefs toward the CNO, and intensified their readiness to cooperate with him. Admiral W.S. Benson was appointed the first Chief of Naval Operations on May 11, 1915. He took over the duties that were being performed by Admiral Fiske as the Aide for Operations.

Thus, for the first time at the outbreak of any war involving the United States, there existed within the Navy Department in 1917 an office specifically charged with the general planning for, and to some extent,

the Naval conduct of war. Having great confidence in Admiral Benson, and perhaps chastened by the grave responsibilities and technical aspects of the war, Secretary Daniels left naval operations during World War I almost wholly to the CNO. The soundness of this principle was well proven during the course of the war. The mere fact of there being a central coordinating agency encouraged the Bureaus and Offices to use it. Eagerness to assure success in the war was a strong influence toward cheerful cooperation of all hands with the CNO.

Due to the establishment of the Chief of Naval Operations, the powerful position of the Bureau of Navigation was substantially diminished as were the strategic planning functions of the General Board of the Navy.

Naval Aviation (1921-1941)

The bilinear system had come of age, and for the ensuing 20 years there were no major changes in the Department's organization, other than the centralization, in 1921, of all aeronautical matters in the Bureau of Aeronautics, followed 3 years later by the authorization of an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aeronautics.

The Navy's interest in aviation goes back to Professor Samuel Langley's "Aerodrome" on which he was working at the turn of the century. In 1898 the Navy Department assigned two officers as members of a "Joint Army-Navy Board to examine the Langley Flying Machine." The Board expressed the opinion that such machines could be developed for use in warfare.

In September 1910, Captain Washington Irving Chambers, USN, as an assistant to the Aide for Material, and later as an assistant to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, was detailed to take charge of aviation correspondence for the Secretary of the Navy. He subsequently became the Secretary's principal adviser on matters of naval aviation. In addition to his own views he synthesized for the Secretary the opinions on aviation of the General Board, the Bureau chiefs, and of other high ranking officers in the Navy Department and in the fleet, as well as the views of aviation enthusiasts among the young officers. He became the point of contact in the Navy Department for civilians interested in aviation and for the early airplane inventors and builders. Captain Mark L. Bristol, USN, later Admiral, one of the outstanding naval officers of his time, who relieved Captain Chambers in December 1913, was the first individual given the title of Director of Naval

Aviation. These two officers were largely responsible for formulating for the Secretary of the Navy the policies that were followed during the infancy of Naval Aviation from about 1910 to 1913. After that, the newly established Chief of Naval Operations became the Secretary's principal adviser in such matters.

The policy of using the existing Bureau system for handling the various aspects of aeronautical engineering, aircraft procurement, the training of aviators and, until the establishment of the CNO, the operational aspects of naval aviation was adopted early.

Perhaps the greatest contribution made by the Navy Department to the progress of aviation during its early years was in the education and training of aeronautical engineers; a contribution which made it possible for the Bureau of Aeronautics, when it was established in 1921, to take on all of the functions of a technical bureau without a lengthy interregnum for training its personnel.

With the outbreak of World War I in Europe in the summer of 1914, the interest in aeronautics and aviation became universal. In January 1914, actually before the war started, the Navy Department opened up the abandoned Navy Yard, Pensacola, Florida, as a flying school and as a research and testing station.

In the summer of 1916 Congress voted \$3,500,000 for Naval Aviation, and authorized Naval Reserve aviation personnel. To accelerate production, overhaul and experimental work, the Naval Aircraft Factory was established at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in April 1917.

The Navy went to war in April 1917 with 48 pilots, 239 men with aviation training, and 54 planes. Over a period of 19 months until

the Armistice in November 1918, naval aviation experienced an almost unbelievable growth to 42,051 officers and men and 2,127 airplanes. In Europe the Navy had 1,147 aviation officers, 18,308 enlisted aviation personnel, 400 planes, 30 kite balloons and three dirigibles.

With the end of World War I hostilities, marked differences of opinion appeared in the command branch of the Navy as to the place of Naval Aviation in the administration of the Navy Department and as an element of the combatant forces of the Navy. Opinions ranged all the way from those who saw in Naval Aviation the future of sea power and believed that it should be so recognized in importance and in the expenditure of funds, to those who saw in the airplane only another naval weapon and that administratively it did not require a special place in the organization of the Navy Department. Following the latter line of thinking, the Division of Naval Aviation in the office of the CNO (OPNAV) was in August 1919 downgraded to a Section in the Plans Division, with many of its former duties distributed to other parts of OPNAV and to the Board of Inspection and Survey. However, shortly thereafter a threat from the outside caused the hierarchy of the Navy Department to reconsider the entire question. General William Mitchell, Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service, started his campaign for a separate and independent Air Force.

General Mitchell made Naval Aviation his particular target. Fear that a separate Air Force would deprive the Navy of control over Naval Aviation caused the upper echelons in the Navy Department to bury their differences in matters of administration and to get behind the proposition that a separate Bureau of Aeronautics was in fact needed.

Bureau of Aeronautics was established by law on July 12, 1921. General Order No. 65 of August 10, 1921, defined the duties of the Bureau as comprising "all that relates to designing, building, fitting out, and repairing Naval and Marine Corps aircraft" and further "to furnish the information covering all aeronautic planning, operations and administration that may be called for by the Chief of Naval Operations." The duties and cognizance of the other Bureaus and of the Marine Corps were also spelled out in the General Order. The activities in the other Bureaus dealing with aeronautics, together with appropriate resources, were transferred to the new Bureau.

Although the law establishing the Bureau gave the Secretary of the Navy unlimited authority as to the matters with which the Bureau could be charged, and General Order No. 65 implementing the law was the result of months, even years, of study, it is not surprising that time and further experience were necessary to iron out the many problems that were to confront the new Bureau. The scope of its activities was much greater than that of any other Bureau, as it covered material, personnel, aviation shore establishments, and many phases of aviation operations. Boards were appointed from time to time during the next five years to advise the Secretary of the Navy and the President on aviation matters.

One of the most important was the Board appointed by President Coolidge, with Dwight W. Morrow as its Chairman. The Board made its report under date of November 30, 1925. Its report was a monumental survey of the history of aviation and of its current ailments. The

Board took a firm stand against the establishment of a separate air force, and against any merger of the Army and Navy air forces, or of the consolidation of military and civilian aviation. The Board had many recommendations, among them one concerned the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. Favorable action was taken on practically all of the recommendations of the Morrow Board except that naval aviators were still not given the voice in high level planning and policy-making that they considered their due. This question was not settled to the satisfaction of the aviators until the establishment of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air in 1943.

The "Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air" was authorized by Congress on 24 June 1926.

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet (1941-1947)

On 7 December 1941 command of the United States Fleet was vested in three Commanders-in-Chief, one commanding the Asiatic Fleet, one the Pacific Fleet, and one the Atlantic Fleet. This organization had been placed in effect on 1 February 1941. Provision was made whereby one of these three officers acted as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) and in case two or more fleets operated together the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet would exercise overall command and would coordinate their activities. On 7 December 1941, Admiral H.E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was also designated Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Among the many administrative measures taken by President Roosevelt in the early days of the war, few contributed more to the effectiveness and efficiency of operations of the United States Navy than the issuing on 18 December 1941 of Executive Order 8984, "Prescribing the duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, and the Cooperative duties of the Chief of Naval Operations." The order provided that the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet "shall have supreme command of the operating forces comprising the several fleets of the United States Navy, and the operating forces of the naval coastal frontier commands, and shall be directly responsible under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy to the President of the United States therefor." It provided also that "the principal office of the Commander-in-Chief shall be in the Navy Department" and that "the Commander-in-Chief shall keep the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the logistic and other needs of the operating forces, and in turn the Chief of Naval Operations shall keep the Commander-in-Chief informed as to the extent to which the various needs can be met.

Subject to the foregoing the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations under the Secretary of the Navy will remain unchanged. The Chief of Naval Operations shall continue to be responsible for the preparation of war plans from the long range point of view."

On 20 December 1941 the President designated Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N. as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. Admiral King assumed his new duties on 30 December 1941.

It was implicit in Executive Order No. 8984 that certain functions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations would have to be transferred to headquarters COMINCH. On 30 December, Admiral King, in a memorandum to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, announcing his assumption of the duties of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, stated "During the period of transition essential for the organization of my office, it is requested that I may carry on the duties thereof through the appropriate agencies of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations." A memorandum of the same date from Admiral Stark to the Divisions and Sections of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, stated "The details of the reorganization of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations to effectuate this order (Executive Order 8984) are still in process of being finally worked out. Pending final decision regarding the details, Divisions will continue to function as heretofore, generally preparing correspondence, dispatches, etc. for signature or release of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet as appears appropriate under Executive Order 8984."

In order to clarify and to cover in greater detail the distribution of duties between CNO and COMINCH, the General Board which had drafted

Executive Order 8984 was directed by the Secretary of the Navy to study the subject further and to submit recommendations defining the duties of the two offices. This was done in a memorandum dated February 9, 1942, which became broadly the basis for the procedures followed by the two offices during the war.

By memorandum of 19 February 1942 to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral King stated that "The definition of duties... as set forth in the attached paper (the General Board report of February 9, 1942) is, from my point of view, satisfactory. Minor difficulties are rapidly disappearing..."

In discussions with the Secretary respecting the command relations between COMINCH and the CNO, Admiral King personally stood out for the principle that COMINCH should be under CNO. The question recurred from time to time, during the early months of the war and on one occasion, when at the White House with Secretary Knox, he spoke to President Roosevelt about the matter, pointing out that he as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, was perfectly willing to serve under the CNO, and in fact thought that to be the logical arrangement, but that in any case the command relationship should be settled one way or the other.

The result was the issuance of Executive Order 9096, dated March 12, 1942, providing that "the duties of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations may be combined and devolve upon one officer who shall have the title "Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations," and "who shall be principal Naval Adviser to the President on the conduct of the war and the principal Naval Adviser and Executive to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the Naval Establishment."

The duties and responsibilities, respectively, of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and of the Chief of Naval Operations, in this

combination, were stated in the following terms in the Executive Order:

"As Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, the officer holding the combined offices as herein provided shall be charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the United States Navy, and with the coordination and direction of effort to this end of the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department except such Offices (other than Bureaus) as the Secretary of the Navy may specifically exempt. Duties as Chief of Naval Operations shall be contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet."

On 14 August 1945 Japan accepted the surrender terms agreed upon by the Allied nations at the Potsdam Conference, and, on 15 August, Admiral Nimitz ordered the Pacific Fleet to cease offensive operations against the Japanese. The administration of the Navy Department now entered a new phase in which demobilization, and shrinking the entire Naval Establishment to peace time needs, became its principal tasks.

When Admiral King was appointed COMINCH, he felt and expressed the view that the Chief of Naval Operations should be the top man in the Navy. After the War, he began taking steps to put that view in practice by planning to return to CNO the functions taken over from his immediate office, and to discontinue others no longer necessary for peacetime administration. He proposed an organization for the Office of the CNO consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, assisted by a Vice Chief, five Deputy Chiefs for (Operations), (Personnel), (Administration), (Logistics), and (Air), and an Inspector General.

After some discussion, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Admiral King went to the White House together and on September 29, 1945 had President Truman sign Executive Order No. 9635, entitled "Organization of the Navy Department and the Naval Establishment." This Order revoked the orders establishing the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in the Navy Department and outlined the principal duties of the Chief of Naval operations.

The purpose of Executive Order No. 9635 was stated in its first paragraph as follows: "In order to provide for a more effective integration of its activities, the Navy Department shall hereafter be organized to take cognizance of the major groupings of: military matters; general and administrative matters; and business and related industrial matters."

A Navy Department directive put Executive Order No. 9635 into effect as of 10 October 1945.

Other important organizational changes during this period included designation of an Under Secretary of the Navy and an Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy; redesignation of an Assistant Secretary for Air; and establishment of the Bureau of Ships.

National Security Act of 1947 (1947-1950)

Prior to 1947, the military affairs of our country were managed through two Executive Departments -- the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. For various reasons growing out of World War II it was felt in 1947 that we had to take a good look at our defense posture and at our Defense organization. On this there was virtually unanimous agreement.

There were two schools of thought however, about what exactly should be done. There was the school reflecting the general thinking of the War Department -- Henry Stimson's point of view and Robert Patterson's -- that we should have a single unified Department. On the other hand, the general views of the Navy, although again not unanimous, represented by James Forrestal, were opposed to unification. The Navy position called for imposing a new management layer on top of the existing structures. They wanted that layer, however, to be strictly a coordinating body. In this conflict between, basically, an Army view and a Navy view, the Congress supported the Navy.

With the National Security Act of 1947, Congress established three Executive Departments -- an Army, a Navy, and an Air Force. The Secretaries in charge of these Departments were members of the Cabinet, as well as members of the National Security Council. No Department of Defense as we know it today was established. Instead, these three Executive Departments were formed into an amorphous body known as the National Military Establishment. At its head was an official called the Secretary of Defense, but he was not the Secretary of Defense we know today. He was to exercise only general authority, direction, and control. The statute stated that all powers not

specifically given to the Secretary of Defense were reserved to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

At the same time, Congress gave statutory recognition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a body established in WWI, and provided a Joint Staff to assist them. The Joint Chiefs were to be the principal military advisors to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council.

Mr. Forrestal, having won his point as Secretary of the Navy, became the first Secretary of Defense under the arrangement which he had so successfully proposed.

He worked valiantly with this organization structure for just two years before deciding that it didn't work -- and couldn't work. He recommended to President Truman, that the Defense establishment be organized along the lines which he had initially opposed. This led to the 1949 Amendments, which provided for a single Executive Department headed by the Secretary of Defense, who became the principal assistant to the President for all matters relating to Defense. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force lost their Cabinet status, and their organizations became military departments within the single Defense Department. The Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) was also established at this time.

In 1953, President Eisenhower said that his concept of the Department of Defense was that there was to be no Department of Defense function independent of the Secretary of Defense, and that he regarded

the Secretaries of the military departments as operational managers for the Secretary of Defense.

The last major Defense legislation, the Reorganization Act of 1958, increased the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense for military operations and gave him new tools to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities. That statute specifically states that all forces committed to unified and specified commands are responsible to the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States. The Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, added the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the operational chain between the Secretary and the unified and specified commands. The new tools given were the power to consolidate, transfer, reassign, or abolish functions involving common services or supplies, even though established by statute.

The act of 1958 had a significant impact on the authority of the Secretaries of the military departments. The role of the Secretary of the Navy and the Department of the Navy changed from that of providing strategic direction to the naval combatant forces of the nation to that of providing an organized, trained, equipped, and ready naval force to the unified and specified Commanders operating under the Secretary of Defense's direction. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs now provide the strategy; the unified and specified Commanders decide and apply the tactics; and the military departments produce the trained and equipped forces.

Organizational Studies (1938-1966)

On at least two occasions in the 1930s, the Navy scrutinized its organizational makeup because of complications engendered by new weapons technology. The entire fabric of Navy organization was first examined between October 1933 and April 1934 by the Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy, chaired by Thomas Gates. Apart from a recommendation that resulted in adding two more Assistant Secretaries to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy to distribute the functions of that office more evenly, the Committee found that the existing Navy organization was basically sound.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 instigated a move within the Navy Department to again re-evaluate its organizational structure, this time to determine if changes were necessary or desirable in the light of the new orientation within the DOD. In August 1958, the then Under Secretary of the Navy, William B. Franke, and a select committee began a comprehensive study of the department and issued a report in January 1959. The Franke report reviewed the history of the Navy, made disparaging remarks about the General Staff concept of organization, and concluded that the then current bilinear structure (CNO and Bureaus) provided a sound structure for operating the Department. The report strongly endorsed the Bureau system, but recommended that the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Ordnance be consolidated into a single Bureau of Naval Weapons in order to effect an improvement in weapons system management and development. This consolidation was accomplished in 1959. One major organizational change was made in the Department prior to the Reorganization of 1966. In 1962, a committee,

headed by John M. Dillon, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary, examined the department in great depth and issued a voluminous report containing over 100 recommendations for the improvement of the department's management processes and structure. The most noteworthy recommendation from an overall organizational standpoint was that advocating the establishment of a single producer executive in the Navy:

"A Single Producer Executive is required in the Navy, an executive who will serve the Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the voice of the resources interest and be responsible for the effective management of the Navy's resources capabilities. The Secretary will be free from the burden of resolving many of the differences between the material bureaus and can devote his time to more constructive efforts. The Chief of Naval Operations will acquire a strong right hand, a single responsible and responsive expert..."

The report recommended that this new Producer Executive should control, coordinate and command the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Naval Weapons, Ships, Supplies and Accounts, Yards and Docks, and absorb the Special Projects Office (Polaris). In 1963, the material Bureaus and the Special Projects Office were placed under the command of a separate functional executive of the department, the Chief of Naval Material (CHNAVMAT) who was directed to report to the Secretary.

The 1963 reorganization was intended primarily to strengthen the Secretary's management of the four material bureaus by placing them under the command of a full-time specialist in material matters, whose Office of Naval Material (ONM) would act as their central coordinating office. Thus, for the first time since the establishment of the Bureaus, it was officially recognized in the Department that some type of a professional operating executive was required not only to coordinate the Bureaus, but to command them as well.

During the period 1963-1966, the Secretary had under his immediate direction five senior military executives of the department: the CNO, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Chief of Naval Material, the Chief of Medicine and Surgery, and the Chief of Naval Personnel.

While the 1963 reorganization reduced the Secretary's required span of supervision, it also diluted the tenuous control that the CNO previously had over the production and procuring divisions of the Department. This reorganization also had other disquieting effects that led to imbalances in the Department's organizational structure. The status of the six Bureaus changed radically. All the material Bureaus dropped from a second to a third echelon status. The service Bureaus (BUMED and BUPERS) became the senior Bureaus, still in direct contact with the Secretary of the Navy and responsive to the CNO. The chiefs of these two Bureaus held the rank of Vice Admiral while the chiefs of the Bureaus of Naval Weapons, Ships, Yards and Docks, and Supply and Accounts remained Rear Admirals. This point of difference in echelon and rank was duly noted in the Department's organizational charts. Another effect of the reorganization was the new stature and position of the Chief of Naval Material. While directly responsive to the requirements of the CNO, he was directly under, and thus had direct liaison with, the Secretary, and he was senior in position to the chiefs of all the Bureaus, including BUPERS and BUMED. This placed the Chief of Naval Material almost, but not quite, on the same horizontal organizational line as the CNO vis-a-vis the Secretary. These relative positions in the hierarchy were also duly noted on the department's organization charts.

The Unilinear Organization (1946-Present)

The present organization of the Department of the Navy, effected on 1 May 1966, was a further refinement of the 1963 reorganization. It was the result of a year-long study directed by the Secretary of the Navy, Paul N. Nitze, and conducted by the Chief of Naval Material in consultation with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In concept, the 1966 reorganization represented the most revolutionary change to the organizational structure of the Department of the Navy since establishment of the Bureau in 1842.

The following communications of the President and the Secretary of Defense succinctly set forth the background and objectives of this reorganization.

LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

The White House
Washington, March 10, 1966.

Hon. John W. McCormack,
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Speaker: I have approved a plan for the reorganization of the Department of the Navy.

I am enclosing for transmission to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee a communication from the Secretary of Defense reporting, pursuant to section 125, title 10, United States Code, the action to be taken with reference to this reorganization.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

The Secretary of Defense
Washington, March 9, 1966

Hon. L. Mendel Rivers,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The principal function of a military department within the Department of Defense is to organize, train, and equip military forces appropriate to its mission, to provide these forces to unified and specified commanders, and to support the forces so assigned. The Department of the Navy, like the other military departments, engages in a broad scope of activities in performing this function. These activities include both the total effort to prepare military forces for assignment to unified and specified commanders, and the total effort to develop and provide the manpower and material resources to support military forces.

In order to enable the Department of the Navy more effectively to perform the foregoing mission, the Secretary of the Navy, on March 29, 1962, directed a comprehensive review of the effectiveness, responsiveness and economy of the management processes and structure of the Department of the Navy. As a result of that review, which was conducted throughout most of 1962, the Secretary of the Navy, on July 1, 1963, made a number of management and organizational changes in the executive administration of the Department, the most significant of which was the creation of the Naval Material Support Establishment (NMSE) under the command of the Chief of Naval Material. The NMSE consists of the Office of Naval Material, the Bureau of Naval Weapons, the Bureau of Ships, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, the Bureau of Yards and Docks and associated shore (field) activities.

The 1963 reorganization was accomplished within the existing statutory framework of the Department of the Navy and did not affect the traditional bilinear organization of the Department of the Navy; nor did it change the statutory bureaus which form the principal operating structure of the NMSE.

It is the belief of the Secretary of the Navy, which I share, that the Department of the Navy should be organized in such a fashion that the Navy's senior military officer, the Chief of Naval Operations, will have the same breadth of authority and responsibility for material, personnel, and medical support functions as he now has for the operating forces of the Navy. Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy believes that the organizations performing the Navy's material support functions should be restructured as to subject them to more effective command by the Chief of Naval Material under the Chief of Naval Operations. The Secretary has recommended to me a reorganization plan which would accomplish these purposes. The structure he has recommended would, at the same time, preserve the existing relationship between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Material. This new structure includes the reconstituting of the Naval Material Support Establishment

as the Naval Material Command under the command of the Chief of Naval Material and the realignment and assignment of the work of the NMSE among six functional components. To accomplish this result, however, it is necessary to-

(a) abolish the statutory basis for the Office of Naval Material, the Bureau of Naval Weapons, the Bureau of Ships, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and the offices of the chiefs and other officials of the office of Naval Material and such bureaus; and

(b) vest in the Secretary of the Navy responsibility for their duties so that these duties may be reassigned.

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, and with the approval of the President and in pursuance of the authority vested in me by section 125, title 10, United States Code, I have this date signed a reorganization order which would accomplish the foregoing.

The effect of this reorganization upon the principal components of the executive part of the Department of the Navy will be as follows:

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

The planned reorganization will not take away any of the present duties or responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations, nor will it affect the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations directly. Under the reorganization, however, the Chief of Naval Operations, in addition to commanding the operating forces of the Navy, as at present, will command the Naval Material Command, the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. He will exercise these latter responsibilities through the Chief of Naval Material, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, respectively, who will have specific responsibility for commanding the Naval Material Command and their respective bureaus and for directing the efforts of their organizations in meeting the material, personnel, and medical requirements of the operating forces of the Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations will exercise his authority over the Naval Material Command and the Bureau of Naval Personnel and Medicine and Surgery in such a manner as to continue the present relationship between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chiefs of these organizations.

THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

The reorganization will not affect the Commandant of the Marine Corps. As already stated, the new command relationship of the Chief of Naval Material will not disturb CNM's traditional relationship to the Commandant. As at present, the Chief of Naval Material will be responsive directly to the Commandant in meeting those particular material support needs of the United States Marine Corps which are required to be provided by the Naval Material Command.

Similarly, the Chief of Naval Personnel and the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, will be directly responsive to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in carrying out their responsibilities for support of the Marine Corps.

It is not the intention of this reorganization to affect the present Marine Corps material support system. Rather, it is expected that by improving the command relationships and flexibility of the present Naval Material Support Establishment, the responsiveness of that reconstituted organization to the material requirements of the Marine Corps will be enhanced.

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL AND THE NAVAL MATERIAL COMMAND

As already stated, the Secretary of the Navy will implement the reorganization order by establishing under the Chief of Naval Operations a Naval Material Command which will be commanded by the Chief of Naval Material.

In lieu of the four material bureaus which currently comprise the principal elements of the Naval Material Support Establishment, the Naval Material Command will be divided along functional lines into six subcommands-namely, the Air Systems Command, the Ship Systems Command, the Ordnance Systems Command, the Electronic Systems Command, the Supply Systems Command, and the Facilities Engineering Command, each under a commander.

The foregoing readjustments will permit realining and assigning the work of the Naval Material Command along more logical, functional lines. Contemporaneous with this realignment, the Secretary of the Navy will assign to designated senior officials of the Department the present responsibilities of the material bureau chiefs as principal advisers for officer corps and officer specialty groups in order to preserve the traditional prestige of the officers of these groups. They include engineering duty officers, aeronautical engineering duty officers, Supply Corps officers, and Civil Engineering Corps officers.

Further, in order to preserve the perquisites of office formerly enjoyed by the chiefs of the material bureaus and to accord appropriate recognition to the Vice Chief of Naval Material, the Secretary of the Navy, on behalf of the Department of Defense, will forthwith forward to the Congress draft legislation which will, if enacted, entitle the officers serving as Vice Chief of Naval Material and commanders of the six functional commands to the rank, pay, and retirement privileges to which bureau chiefs are currently entitled. The draft legislation would also authorize for the deputy commanders of the component commands the same privileges as now exist for the deputy chiefs of bureaus.

THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AND THE BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY

Under the proposed reorganization, the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Naval Personnel and Medicine and Surgery will retain their separate identities and present functions. Their command relationships, however, will be adjusted to place them under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The changes outlined in the foregoing paragraphs will make possible a number of improvements in the management of the Department of the Navy. The vesting in the Chief of Naval Operations of authority over and responsibility for the Naval Material Command and the Bureaus of Naval Personnel and Medicine and Surgery is a significant improvement in the command and control of the Department of the Navy's performance of its functions. The realignment of the material bureaus on a functional basis will permit more effective command by the Chief of Naval Material and thus increase the efficiency and economy of the Navy's material support organization. The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and I believe that these organizational adjustments will provide the Department of the Navy with the flexibility necessary to enable it to perform its mission more effectively.

I believe that the reorganization should be placed into effect. The reorganization will become effective only when the requirements of section 125, title 10, United States Code, have been met.

Respectfully,

ROBERT S. McNAMARA

The Secretary of the Navy implemented the above reorganization plan on 1 May 1966. On that date, Navy's long-standing bilinear form of organization became history.

LOCATING THE MECHANISM FOR CHANGE IN THE AIR FORCE:

AN INTERPRETATIVE ESSAY ON AIR FORCE HISTORY

"History is useful only as it helps us to look ahead. This is the truth which underlies all Air Force tradition." * This view of the utility of history presumes that the more significant events in the past are those most relevant to present or future problems and that perception of the significance of such events within an historical milieu may enable us better to understand, control, and reorder our affairs. A similar supposition is inherent in the current interest of the 1969-appointed Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in knowing what "mechanism for change" has been operative at significant junctures of each military service's life. We think the question important in itself, not because we anticipate the present review will lead directly to substantial change in defense organization; indeed, the whole history of such reviews as they have affected the development of the Air Force convinces us otherwise. Major change, it seems, results only from the dramatic proof of need. Rather, we think the question valid because understanding the subject is vital to the survival of any organization in a competitive environment and because in its pointed sense the question focuses attention on essentials--"the truth which underlies all Air Force tradition." This, history illustrates, has been in effect a tradition of championing

* James H. Straubel, "Airpower's Past is Prologue," Air Force and Space Digest, Sept., 1965, p 10.

change.

If we were to seek only a single mechanism for change operative at the time of the one major reorganization in the relatively short Air Force life to date--the creation of the USAF in 1947--the answer might be rather easily derived from a cursory review of the Air Force record. On the other hand, because that particular mechanism appears not to have been very influential since 1947, we think it necessary to broaden our inquiry in both focus and scope. To be sure, the emphasis will be upon identifying and relating the several forces for change which together constituted a process of change leading to Air Force independence. But this broadened focus and emphasis does not relieve us of the responsibility of at least sketching the influence of similar forces in the post-unification period, recognizing that their ultimate influence is still uncertain.

A true appreciation of the Air Force as an adaptive organization, especially since 1947, would probably require the collection of massive amounts of empirical data, imaginative research studies, and a high order of deductive reasoning leading to a creative synthesis which would at once reveal the structure, form, process, and function behind the organization's vitality. Unable ourselves to make an elegant synthesis, we will nevertheless attempt a crude distillation of Air Force history as it impacts on the central question. Two methodological assumptions underlie our approach. First, it is assumed that an illuminating pattern

of the unifying, progressive currents traceable throughout the course of Air Force history can be achieved as a logical consequence of the interdependent influences we categorize for convenience as society/ environment, doctrine, organization, technology, and leadership. These forces, we think, serve variously as "mover" or "inhibitor" in the change process.*

Secondly, we assume that by pursuing certain premises concerning the establishment and growth of the Air Force it is possible to identify in the abstract that particular phenomenon--the mechanism for change--which has driven the development and established the lifestyle of the Air Force. Perhaps, too, this approach may enable us to discern optimum conditions for dynamic change while not overlooking the persistence of retarding influences.

The Formative Years of Struggle

It is neither possible nor desirable here to describe and document the myriad of events in the 40-year period between the formation of the Aeronautical Division within the Signal Corp. in 1907 and the creation of the USAF in 1947. The story has been ably told and documented in the several USAF Historical Studies which have examined the same period, albeit from differing perspectives.** The reader who has the time to peruse these professional studies will not only be

* For an analysis of the influence and interaction of these forces see "All the Winds of Doctrine", by Major William M. Crabbe, Jr., USAF, Air Command and Staff College, 30 Apr 64.

** See "Selected Bibliography" for a list of those studies underpinning this interpretation.

rewarded for the effort, he will also be amused at the way their different perspectives dovetail to become mutually supporting. The effect, in brief, is to detail an epochal struggle of the airmen for independence--to confirm the popular notion derived from the Mitchell legend. This conclusion would probably not surprise students of organization theory. One such student has noted that all bureaucratic organizations owe their existence to the efforts of a small group of zealots who create an enabling environment in one of four ways:

1) the routinization of charisma; 2) the "splitting off" of an established organization; 3) entrepreneurial development of a new idea; and 4) an ex nihilo creation by powerful members of other institutions.

The Air Force experience is perhaps distinguished in that all four of the above forces clearly were operative in its genesis. Put another way by Craven and Cate, "to understand this special character of the Air Force . . . it should be sufficient here to describe the three paramount trends of the period: the effort to establish an independent air force; the development of a doctrine of strategic bombardment; and the search for a heavy bomber by which that doctrine could be applied."** We need only add the routinization of aviation, along with the air power concept, within the society, and the influence of

* Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, Mass., Little, Brown and Company, 1967).

** Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol I, p 18.

the legislative and executive branches holding divided powers and responsibilities for defense policy. But why did it take so long, relative to other of the world's air forces, to create a favorable environment in the United States?

The military institutions of any society, Huntington reminds us, are basically shaped by a "functional imperative"--threats to national security--and a "societal imperative"--the social forces, beliefs, and political institutions which are dominant within the society.^{*} Simply stated, there were no demonstrable threats to U.S. national security throughout most of the period in question, while neither the national psychology nor the entrenched strengths of the military and naval departments of the time were conducive to such change. In the end, autonomy for the Air Force required both a widespread recognition of the need and a clear capacity of the function to deliver the promise of air power. Meanwhile, it was probably the resistance of status quo thinking which provided the goad and thrust for Air Force independence.

In the gradual and faltering struggle for independence it was the "promise of air power" which at once sustained and retarded the effort. Clearly, the ideas and beliefs of the airmen generally exceeded the capability of the airplane. Equally clear was the pacing effect of forward thinking on the development of that technology. Rather than cite

^{*} Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959), p 2.

the influence of air power in ambiguous terms, we should pinpoint the elements of the continuously evolving concept which impacted on organizational issues. In brief, the airmen came to view the airplane as an instrument which, because of its flexibility, ubiquity of operations, penetrability and capacity for concentrated employment, offered a new and preferable means to achieve the ultimate military objective in war--the destruction of the enemy's will to resist. The genesis of the air theorists' macrocosmic conception appears to have been largely a reaction to the horror of the stalemated trench warfare of the first World War, which cast doubt on the utility of the traditional defeat of the enemy forces in battle thesis.

Thus two of the points to be in contention throughout our period of review revolved around the capability of the aircraft and the objective in war. To these should be added conflicting interpretations of the principles of unity and economy of effort, the airmen contending that sensitive employment of the new instrument required command by knowledgeable officials with a vested interest in its maximum development. Holding air power indivisible, the airmen would argue that central control of air power resources by one authority would permit both effective concentration of force and economy of effort. These views, of course, threatened both the General Staff's authority and the nascent naval air arm. We should acknowledge, too, that despite the train of compromises which led to Air Force autonomy, these basic differences have not yet been fully resolved.

Douhet specifically stated that his theories were directed at the Italian defense problem and should not be considered applicable to all countries: "To offer a general recipe for victory applicable to all nations, would be downright presumption on my part." As it turned out, each of the major powers developed an air force based on its own functional and societal imperatives, as well as its own interpretations of air power. The U.S. was late to capitalize on the revolutionary technology it had pioneered mainly because of its geographical isolation, the earlier option for a naval first line of defense, and the general preference of the polity for values non-military. And, as we have noted, military conservatism within the established bureaucracies provided the retarding edge, with the Army General Staff and certain War Department executives appearing the chief villains to airmen who, in turn, were thought tendentious and undisciplined.

Having established above the significant elements of the environment, it remains to trace the countervailing influences which paced the evolution from Aeronautical Division to Air Service to Air Corps (to GHQ Air Force) to Army Air Forces to United States Air Force. Conveniently spaced in time, these incremental changes generally followed dramatic external events which gave impetus to the change process. Facilitating this process was the extensive elucidation of the issues involved in giving organizational recognition to the role of aviation as they were

* Edward M. Earle (Ed), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press, 1947), p 500.

developed in the series of board, commission, and committee reviews of the period, as well as in the equally educative but mostly abortive bills introduced for legislative enactment. Each of the reviews, however, had some organizational consequences, including critical legislative funding and force authorizations.

Although the Chief Executives during this period generally reflected and upheld the conservatism of the War Department, the two Roosevelts exerted positive impact. Theodore Roosevelt, impressed by the European endorsement of the new technology for war, gave the nod which preceded the creation of the original Aeronautical Division within the Signal Corps in 1907. More instrumental was Franklin Roosevelt's blessing of the GHQ Air Force and associated reforms following the disastrous Army airmail episode in 1934, and his dramatic boost to the faltering aircraft development and production programs following the lesson of Munich. Further, it was the progressive leadership of PIR which set the tone in the General Staff revitalization of the late 1930's and early 1940's when the old guard gave way to the responsive and liberating leadership of General Marshall, leading in turn to the elevation of the innovative General Arnold and his AAF.

World War I, which enabled the early founding of the independent RAF, had no great effect on the U.S. development other than the doctrinal stimulant already mentioned. Public disillusionment with the too little, too late American aerial contribution

nevertheless led to remedial legislation and the removal of the Aviation Section from the Signal Corps to confirm the Air Service organization in 1920. Between this example of the impact of public opinion and the next one, which resulted in the organization of the Army Air Corps in 1926, there was the proximate "heroic age of doctrinal development" wherein the lessons of the great war were applied to future needs *. It was also the age of sensitive leadership under General Patrick, who discreetly probed the limits of purposeful advance.

Not so discreet, Billy Mitchell, after first failing to find a solution within the system, took it upon himself to break the deadlock that threatened to end the age as well as the hope for any further degree of independence. His campaign to educate the public through writings, interviews, speeches, public hearings, and ultimately court-martial, apparently brought forth only the mouse that the 1926 act seemed then to the united airmen and their outside supporters; in retrospect, the campaign planted the seeds which were to germinate into public acceptance of a technological development--the long-range bomber--otherwise incompatible with the functional and societal imperatives.

Indeed a pacing influence throughout the four decades, technological perfection of the instrument was crucial in the advance from Army Air Corps to the inclusion of a GHQ Air Force. In turn,

* USAF Historical Study No. 89.

technological progress stemmed from the favorable environment created by the many record-breaking flights by military and civilian airmen, the most spectacular being the Lindbergh triumph. Also stimulating to the aircraft industry was the election of a President open to new ideas. Of course, the traditional concern for military economy militated against the production of costly aircraft as they competed for defense and social welfare dollars in a period overshadowed by economic depression. Nevertheless, the thrust of the research and development effort was sufficient to threaten a supremacy of pursuit aviation as the offensive sword of air power, a position it had enjoyed since the end of the first world war. More important, in the long-range bomber (and its associate bombsight) was to be found the key to the long sought recognition of an independent function, which even the Baker Board had to acknowledge in 1934. How did this come about at a time when national policy was defense oriented and the bombardment function generally abhorrent under the prevailing national psychology?

All Air Force histories suggest that one answer to our question is to be found in the unique role of the Air Corps Tactical School between the world wars. We suggest that therein is also the answer to the Defense Blue Ribbon Panel's query, for it was clearly the one institutionalized "mechanism for change" which, after 1926, perfected the "Air Force idea" and earned the several degrees of

independence granted up to the 1947 unification. Appropriately, the school's motto came to be Proficimus More Irretenti--"We Make Progress Unhindered by Custom." Lacking an air body of custom, the school's instructors and students accepted the challenge, making the school a dynamic and constructive center for the development of doctrine. Out of this challenging and participatory milieu emerged the leaders of World War II, strengthened by the experience and confident in their trust. "Of 320 general officers on duty with the AAF at the close of World War II, 261 were Tactical School graduates . . . 3 four-star generals--McNarney, Kenney, and Spaatz--and 11 of the 13 three-star generals--Emons, Brett, Yount, Eaker, Giles, George, Cannon, Vandenberg, Stratemeyer, Twining, and Whitehead--were graduates of the school" ** Many of the students--Lofkey, for example--were later to translate school lessons into daring tactical innovations in furtherance of the major strategic war plans detailed by their former instructors--Kuter, for example. Undoubtedly, the school experience had sharpened minds for the coming test; having cut bait, all were prepared to fish.

The airmen's solution to the problem of the potentially inhibiting national policy was to work around it. While their superiors in Washington argued for the bomber as a defensive requirement (soon

* USAF Historical Study No. 100.

** USAF Historical Study No. 100, p. 25.

linked to the Monroe Doctrine) the Tactical School contingent were rationalizing the offensive role in a theoretical, future oriented framework based upon their view of war's objective. Their original contribution to strategic and tactical thought was the daylight, high altitude precision bombardment concept--it being considerably more sophisticated than the Douhet version. Now the objective became the destruction of the enemy will to resist through the destruction of his military and economic capacity. Definition was given to the old "vital centers" concept through the identification of weak links in various strategic industries.

Although the American strategic preference was influenced by the "moral blockade" of the age, it appears mainly to have been a sincere expression of the airmen's confidence in the efficiency and economy of effort to be afforded by their instrument. Also, based on the Japanese bombing in China, some airmen argued against the validity of population intimidation *. Significantly, they resisted any (including War Department) arbitrary limitations on range, speed, etc., opting for development of the instrument to its limits. To be sure, they trusted too much to faith when, after Chennault retired from the school, pursuit (escort) development was permitted to lag. And, despite all their emphasis on the heavy bomber its production if not development also lagged, largely due to continuing War Department and Navy Department opposition. Although over 200 B-17's had been requested, only 13 were on hand at the outbreak of World War II in Europe.

* USAF Historical Study No. 89, p. 115.

Failing in their material goals the airmen meanwhile achieved recognition of the strategic concept in the GHQ Air Force. Although to Mitchell this appeared a further fragmenting of air power, most of the airmen had come to accept the necessity for a compromise solution by 1933, and many were satisfied to give the new organization the trial period MacArthur suggested and Arnold seconded. Although this trial proved that the divided authority between OCAC and the CG, GHQ Air Force and between air and army corps commanders created problems, the changes to Army Air Forces in 1941 and 1942 did not resolve the basic unity of command issues. Later, Arnold headed off further problems, including possible misuse of his strategic force, by holding the reins of the Twentieth Air Force within the JCS in Washington.

World War II was of course to prove the culminating point of the independence movement, with the 2.5 million man Army Air Forces virtually autonomous at its end. In truth, both the need for parity and the capacity of the instrument had been amply demonstrated. Also demonstrated, however, was the necessity for integrated employment of all the armed forces under a unified strategy. Following this line to what seemed to them a logical conclusion, the airmen pressed for true unification but got parity in the 1947 National Security Act federalization compromise.

The Post-Unification Period of Instability

Briefed by half than the period of gestation we have already reviewed, the post-unification period of Air Force adolescence (1947-1967) is by far the more difficult for the historian to assess. It's not just a case of being still too little removed in time; rather, adequate perception appears further impaired by the monumental complexity of comprehending the period's meaning for the present and future. Aware of our limitations, we will nonetheless attempt to sketch some of the more dominating influences upon the organization's maturation, hoping to account for the apparent lack of a formalized, internal "mechanism for change." Futrell has noted the failure to restore and sustain the old mechanism within the Air University system, implying in the process that the need remains. * We are not sure the answer is that simple.

If it is true that radical changes tax the momentum and continuity of any organization, we may conclude that the Air Force adolescence was a taxing period indeed, with events overwhelming plans. Only beginning to recover from the instant demobilization of World War II, it was taxed first by the unification squabbles, then the Korean War, then the deterrent imperatives, then the missile gap and Sputnik, and finally Vietnam. To be sure, most of these events provided opportunities for growth, but hardly of the orderly kind. Pragmatic

* USAF Historical Study No. 139

considerations necessarily replaced the theoretical constructs of Air Tactical School days. Perhaps the most taxing if not unwelcome responsibilities thrust upon the nascent organization was that of 24 hour security watchman--the instant readiness for a D-day that had to be faced every day. If this imperative did not produce distortions it would be a wonder. But what were the alternatives?

Ironically, the influence of air power upon history was to have double meaning for the Air Force. As Edward Mead Earle noted, there were two primary effects of the successful melding of the aircraft and A-Bomb:

1) It changed "the political relationships between states so drastically as to put the peacefully inclined and the militarily careless at a heavy initial disadvantage in any war of survival," and

2) Since it threatened cities it threatened the survival of civilization. * The first of these influences concerns the old functional imperative, so it led to acceptance of the airmen's quest for forces-in-being. The second influence concerns the societal imperative, and it led as certainly to resurrection of the old "moral blockade"--now the "nuclear firebreak." And the nuclear holocaust psychology produced the hope of stopping the nuclear geni. Without making value judgments about these developments, we can be certain their

* Ed. Mead Earle, "The Influence of Air Power Upon History," in G.B. Turner, A History of Military Affairs Since the Eighteenth Century (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1956), pp 604-605

collective influence has been decisive--overshadowing, shaping, pacing and dictating, relative to the influences of doctrine, organization, technology, and leadership.

The dichotomous imperatives and inherent dilemmas found in the realized promise of air power, in effect, at once required strong arms and arms control, centralization and decentralization of authority, military and civilian expertise, expense and economy, flexibility and rigidity of will, incremental improvement of existing systems and technological breakthroughs. They both advanced and retarded development of the same weapon (ICBM), produced an innovative but alternately valid or wasteful developmental process (concurrency), required more and diverse systems which appeared to compete against one another (missile vs. aircraft; bomber vs. fighter) in a time of prohibitively rising costs ("cost squeeze").

In sum, the imperatives and dilemmas of the 1947-1967 defense environment would demand both military progressivism and military conservatism. Arnold drew that lesson from the early heritage and from the technological revolution born of mating scientific/engineering excellence and military purpose, following a courtship he had encouraged in many ways, including the planting of the germinal seed of RAND. The wartime embroilment of the airmen with the civilian was, it seems, a significant factor in the emergence of the USAF as a fully competitive organization at birth: for sustenance, it needed to draw upon all available strengths. But Arnold could not forget what to him had

seemed the key inhibiting factor in the early struggle, "the cry" haunting the airmen to the end: "For what purpose?" That lesson was answered when he passed the baton to Spaatz, and presumably at every subsequent turnover.

What, if anything, can be concluded from this obviously limited review of a complex question and equally complex history? First, we would guess that despite the evidence of the early heritage, the key to successful generation of or adaptation to change is not to be found in organization per se, although we know certain organizational forms tend either to inhibit or facilitate change. What distinguished the early heritage, including the Air Tactical School environment, was the élan, the fraternalism, the sense of style and purpose which permeated it. Those airmen were different and they knew it, and they knew "for what purpose." They learned the hard way that "air force plus intellect equals air power." The unity they achieved was born of the response to challenge. Since there is no lack of such challenge today--including the need to resist any sense of drift or guilt the environment of the adolescent stage tempted--the Air Force is in good position to depend on its personnel and educational systems as a sensible mechanism for both adapting to external change by studying the environment (and warfare in general) and for promoting internal change through critical self-analysis.

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**A HISTORY OF
MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS
1775 -- 1970**

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I

ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE MARINE CORPS

President Harry Truman once stated -- and then hastily apologized for it -- that the Marine Corps was the Navy's police force and that it had a propaganda machine that was almost equal to Stalin's. The apology was demanded by an outraged Congress and American public which considered the charge neither an accurate portrayal of Marine Corps roles and missions nor an apt description of the unique corner which the Marines hold in the heart of the American public.

Status of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy and the relationship between the U. S. Navy and the Marine Corps has been the subject for considerable confusion, however. This lack of understanding has been based partially on the circumstances under which the Navy and the Marine Corps were created, and the manner in which each are organized and operated. A distinction between the terms "U. S. Navy" and "Naval Establishment" or "Department of Navy" is essential in any discussion to understand the relationship between the two naval services.

In brief, the term "Naval Establishment" embraces all the activities under the supervision and control of the Secretary of the Navy. This term is defined in Public Law 432; it is synonymous with the term "Department of Navy" as defined in the National Security Act of 1947. Conversely, the term "U. S. Navy" has been taken to mean the vessels of war and their crews as well as all supporting activities of the fleets, both ashore and afloat. The Marine Corps is an integral part of the Department of the Navy; it is not a part of the U. S. Navy.

In view of the variability of the term, "U. S. Navy," it is little wonder that authorities often appear confused as to the status of the Marine Corps in relation to the Navy. But from a careful study of the historical development of the Navy and the Marine Corps and the laws which pertain to the military establishment, it is clear that the Marine Corps is a distinct military service within the Department of the Navy, that its Commandant has always been subject only to the control of the Secretary of the Navy within the Department of the Navy; and that the Marine Corps is charged by law with certain, distinct functions and responsibilities as a separate service. The National Security Act of 1947, which wrought revolutionary changes in the overall organization for national defense, did

nothing to alter this traditional relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy. In fact, the act served to strengthen and clarify that relationship.

This short history of the Marine Corps is an examination of the roles and missions which have been assigned to the Marine Corps both by tradition and by law; the relationship of the Marine Corps to the other services; and the effect upon the Marine Corps of reorganization efforts within the military establishment over the past quarter-century.

Today the Marine Corps looks back on more than 195 years of faithful service to this country. Some of those years have been spent in watchful vigilance on far-flung outposts around the world; some of it has been in violent conflict against the enemies of this country. But regardless of the tasks assigned, all Marine Corps service has been marked by dedication and devotion to the ideals and objectives of this country.

One of the former Commandants of the Marine Corps, General Clifton B. Cates expressed it thus:

"The reputation of the Corps -- the manner in which it is looked upon by the American people whom it serves -- is a priceless asset. It was established in faithful and unswerving service rendered with a high order of professionalism and competency at all times. A great part of it was due to the successes of Marines in battle. A significant fraction comes, however, from the fact that habitually Marines discharge any job assigned in a satisfactory manner."

Although the Marine Corps is most readily identified with amphibious operations and doctrine, landing of assault forces over a hostile beach is just one of the skills of the Marine Corps. Versatility is a well-known attribute of the Corps; and dating from the Revolutionary War, United States Marines have performed a wide variety of roles and missions in the national interest. Commencing with the action by the Continental Congress on 10 November 1775, in which two battalions of Marines "acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea, if required," were authorized, the Marine Corps has been a full-fledged partner of the U. S. Navy in most of those endeavors.

The Continental Congress, apparently understanding that Marine duties would be the conventional ones performed in naval vessels afloat, did not specify a particular mission for the Marines thus authorized. However, since expeditionary employment of permanently organized tactical units of Marines was an established practice in the British service, U. S. Marines were first considered for a raiding operation on Nova Scotia and then later actually employed in the seizure of New Providence in the Bahamas in March, 1776, and in an amphibious operation carried out against the British advance naval base on Penobscot Bay in 1779.

A new Marine mission had also evolved in 1776 when a battalion of three companies of Continental Marines were assigned to Washington's army for service as infantry troops during the Trenton-Princeton campaign. This initiated a practice, continued through the present day, for Marines to reinforce the Army for land operations when additional troops are needed. By the end of the Revolutionary War, Continental Marines had discharged three missions -- service afloat, amphibious operations, and land warfare in support of the Army. Each set a precedent for the traditional role of Marines, and each is still continued as a mission of the Marine Corps.

Disbanded in 1783, the Marine Corps was reestablished by Congress as a distinct service in 1798. Two passages of that 1798 act provided the basis for assigning duties to the new Corps, i.e., service afloat and shore duty at seacoast forts and garrisons. The law also included, "or any other duty on shore, as the President, at his discretion, shall direct."

These broad roles and missions were gradually defined through the years. In 1834, Congress decreed that Marines could be "detached for service with the Army," when authorized by the President; and in 1908, an Executive Order specified Marine Corps duties included, *inter alia*, garrisoning of naval yards and stations within and outside the United States, mobile defense of naval bases outside the U. S., and furnishing expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace.

By 1909, Navy Regulations specifically included Marine Corps missions as service on armed vessels of the Navy, intervention in foreign countries in defense of U. S. citizens, training of foreign military forces, operations in support of other services, security forces for naval installations, defense of advance naval bases outside the United States, and conduct of amphibious operations.

These roles and missions, however, did not evolve without considerable influence by events through the years. With the building of the new steam-powered navy of armored ships and long-range guns in the 1890's, the Navy considered that Marines afloat were no longer considered essential to efficiency or discipline of a ship. Congress ultimately decided the issue, and sea duty remained as one of the Marine Corps duties. Similarly, other events and other developments through the years continued to shape Marine Corps responsibilities. Principal among those events was the acquisition of world power status by the United States, resulting from the Spanish-American War.

Marines had earlier been employed by the United States in application of force in varying degrees to establish relations with oriental countries, particularly Japan, China, and Korea. But after the Spanish-American War, incidents of political as well as nonpolitical intervention became more frequent; and Marines saw service as well in Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Mexico. These interventions, in the main, were landings by Marines to protect U. S. citizens where local governments were unwilling or unable to do so. Most of these landings were by ships detachments; however, by 1927, forces of brigade size were employed in China, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Marines deployed in those countries added up to about 9,000, about one-half of the Marine Corps strength at that time.

A by-product of Marine interventions was the necessity to organize and train military forces for these countries in order to provide stability through indigenous police and military forces. Thus evolved another of the Marine Corps tasks. In this regard, use of Marines as an intervening force deserves some comment. History shows that the United States has been the most consistent user of such force in our past international relationships; and although the phrase, "any other duty on shore, as the President...shall direct" does not confer on the President a special mandate to employ Marines in certain instances to protect lawful and legitimate interests, the Marine Corps has been the customary vehicle. Use of the Marines is in accord with international law, custom and precedent, and landing by Marines is less likely to be considered an act of war. Further, use of Marines in such instances has usually been dictated by the fact that the Marines were readily available when and where such action was required.

Another Marine Corps mission, to support operations of other services, evolved from the simple expediency for reinforcing the Army with trained regular troops when necessary. Marines were added to Army forces for operations against the Seminoles and Creeks in 1836 and the Mexican War in 1847. Marine service in the Civil War, however, was extremely limited.

World War I, however, was a different story. Marines realized that there was little chance for combat in any of the naval missions, and so the Marine command pushed for duty with the AEF in France. Eventually, a total of four Marine regiments saw duty in France. In World War II, Marines, in addition to contributing in a major way to the naval campaign in the Pacific, served with the Army in land warfare in the defense of the Philippines in 1941 and the recapture of those islands in 1944-45. Marine aircraft and artillery supported Army forces in the latter campaign. Additionally, the III Marine Amphibious Corps served as part of the Tenth Army in the conquest of Okinawa.

The operations in Korea in the 1950's and in the Republic of South Vietnam at the present are similar instances of Marine and Army units fighting side by side.

As indicated, Marine Corps roles and missions through the years were logical tasks assigned as dictated by events and developments, with no real need for finite definition. In practice, an executive order or act by Congress was required only when a major dispute arose as to what the Marine Corps missions should be. However, after World War II, pressure for the unification of services resulted, for the first time, in a statement of statutory roles and missions -- not only for the Marine Corps but for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This law, the National Security Act of 1947, outlined in detail the functions specifically assigned to the Marine Corps as well as each of the other services. It is interesting to note that the roles and missions language of the 1947 Act, as originally written, has remained unchanged; and that the original functions have withstood intensive examination by both executive and Congressional committees in subsequent years. Amendments to the act have served only to enlarge or expand the statutory roles and missions originally assigned.

It is interesting to note, at this point, that a clear understanding of the meaning of "roles" and "missions" is essential to an analysis of assignments given the Marine Corps by higher authority. Neither the word "role" nor "mission" appears in the existing laws or directives pertaining to the present Marine Corps. Instead, the words "duty" and "function" are employed, and both words are used indiscriminately and synonymously in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the basic law which provides for the National Military Establishment and the coordination of all governmental agencies contributing to the national security.

Basic organization and responsibilities of the Marine Corps are contained in Section 206(c) of the unamended National Security Act of 1947, the forerunner of a number of legislative acts, executive orders, and committee reports which had as a common theme the reaffirmation of service functions and responsibilities.

The provisions of the original Act of 1947, relating to the Marine Corps, were:

"The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those aspects of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy and shall provide security detachments for the protection of property of naval stations and bases and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct, provided that such additional duties shall not detract from, or interfere with, the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized."

The National Security Act of 1947, as enacted and as subsequently amended through Congressional action, firmly established the Marine Corps' position within the military establishment. The original act clearly expressed the intent of Congress, as evidenced by the record of testimony before Congressional committees and by statements before Congress by members: That the Marine Corps should enjoy unquestioned status as one of the Armed Services of the United States.

The act also confirmed that the Commandant of the Marine Corps was directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for matters under the Commandant's jurisdiction. By treating the Navy and the Marine Corps separately in prescribing composition and functions, and by its definition of the "Department of Navy," in Section 206(a), Congress recognized that a vital and indissoluble relationship

existed between the naval services and reaffirmed the historical fact that the Navy and the Marine Corps are distinct and separate services with the Department of the Navy.

In discussing the Act of 1947, the Commandant, General Alexander A. Vandegrift wrote in 1948:

"All the foregoing (functions) are factual. They admit of no interpretation, and combine to form a direct mandate. It is the Commandant's position that none shall be slighted, that all shall be implemented with the full energy of the Corps."

Later amendments to this act and later modifications of assigned tasks have not affected the basic missions of the Marine Corps; however, several later documents are worthy of note. These include the Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 of 31 December 1958, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," in which the Marine Corps was invested with the primary interest in development of those landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps. Similarly, Army primacy in airborne operations was also established. This so-called "Functions Paper," actually restated the functions contained in the Act of 1947, and as revised in 1953 and 1958 to adjust to changes in the National Security Act of 1947. Similarly, functions assigned the Marine Corps were not changed by the publication of another document by the Departments of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, Joint Action Armed Forces or its successor, Unified Action Armed Forces, published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1959.

The amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 have contained many comforting assurances for Marines. However, the assigned responsibility for development functions relative to landing force matters in amphibious operations has been paramount.

This legal mandate demanded that the Marine Corps take the lead in research in landing force matters, and that the Marine Corps make available to the other services all of the results of this research for their consideration, acceptance, modification or rejection -- depending upon their individual needs. To the Marine Corps, this function was considered reaffirmation of what Marines had long considered as their primary mission: The maintenance of combat ready air-ground landing forces of combined arms, thoroughly trained in amphibious tactics and techniques

Marines, in fact, considered the act as authority for the amphibious development work which they had been carrying on since 1902.

II

DEVELOPMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE

Although some post-World War I photographs show Marines leaping from whaleboats into the surf at Culebra and other Caribbean islands in rudimentary amphibious landing drills, Marine Corps interest and absorption in the manifold problems of landing assault forces from the sea over defended shorelines actually dated from the Spanish-American War when a battalion of Marines landed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to seize an advance naval base. Later assigned the purely defensive missions of protecting such naval bases, the Marines turned the time to good advantage by studying how best such isolated bases could be attacked. To the Marines, the only practical way to seize a shore installation in hostile waters was by amphibious assault. Amphibious doctrine of today, as a concept, began with that belief.

The British disaster at Gallipoli in the Dardanelles in 1915 almost sounded the death knell for the ship-to-shore assault. The amphibious landing calculated to threaten the Central Powers' southern flank was sketchily planned and prepared, support fire was badly coordinated, the operation ended in a dismal failure, and professional military opinion agreed that the amphibious assault could not prevail against modern firepower.

But the Marines persisted in their attempts to develop amphibious techniques, and a series of practice amphibious landings in conjunction with U. S. Fleet exercises strengthened their belief that amphibious assault doctrine was feasible.

Another event considerably aided this belief. The acquisition by Japan of the former German islands in the Pacific under the Versailles Treaty drastically changed the strategic balance of power in that area, and Japan now possessed a deep zone of island outposts. Fortified and supported by a first class fleet, they constituted a serious obstacle to continued operations of the United States Fleet in the Pacific.

Marine Major Earl Ellis, who drafted the original plan for the amphibious assault of key Central Pacific islands in the event of future hostilities with Japan, is generally

given credit for initial recognition of this strategic shift. This plan became the basic war plan for operations in the Pacific, and the amphibious doctrine developed by the Marine Corps over the years in the face of strong negative sentiments provided the basic tactics and techniques used by both the Marine Corps and U. S. Army forces in those Pacific operations and other amphibious landings in Europe.

During World War II, at least 171 amphibious landings of varying scale were conducted by Marine and Army forces, of which 70 are known to have been opposed. Of those 70, only two were unsuccessful; and these were assaults of a minor nature and hastily planned and executed.

One account of the history of amphibious warfare expressed it thus:

"That the U. S. Army was able to train troops so quickly for crossing beaches held by hostile nations is attributable to its own flexibility and leadership, and equally important, to the availability for its guidance of a sound body of amphibious doctrine previously drawn up by the United States Navy and the Marine Corps."

The original Navy-Marine Corps concept of amphibious doctrine was expressed in a 1934 document, Tentative Manual for Landing Operations prepared for instruction in amphibious warfare in the Marine Corps Schools. It served as a guidebook for all the early landing exercises which the Navy and the Marine Corps held each year until World War II. It was adopted with revisions by the Navy in 1938 under the title, Landing Operations Doctrine, Fleet Training Publication 167, and became official doctrine for landing operations.

The first major landings of World War II indicated that there were few faults in the basic landing doctrine; however, these operations made it clear that some facets of amphibious landings required more emphasis than previously thought necessary. Naval gunfire support and close air support in the critical periods of the movement from ship to shore were areas in which additional improvements were needed. The need for more suitable landing craft and vehicles, as foreseen in the Tentative Manual, was especially made clear. Later, significant improvements in fire support and landing craft and vehicles were made which enabled U. S. forces to conduct landings with greatly increased potential for success.

Among the most significant developments were two assault vehicles -- amphibian tractors (LVTs or tracked landing vehicles) for the Marines, and the amphibian truck, DUKW, for the Army. The eventual evolution of the amphibian tractor from the rudimentary vehicles of the early 1940's to the present multi-purpose model of 1970 with five configurations for differing tasks is a testimonial to the far-sightedness and tenacity of Marine officers who saw this vehicle as an integral part of the concept of amphibious warfare and who persisted in its conception, and development, and utilization in spite of many setbacks. Marine Corps efforts to develop, obtain, and perfect this amphibious vehicle is but one instance of the dedication demonstrated by the Marines in developing equipment for amphibious assault landings.

Development of amphibious equipment and improvement of fire support, however, was only a minor part of amphibious assault landing development. By the end of the World War II, when truly major landings were undertaken in Europe and the Western Pacific, all aspects of the intricate planning and coordination necessary for assembling ships and forces for successful execution of a truly complex operation had been mastered.

By war's end, the battle had been carried to the doorsteps of our enemies in Japan and Europe on the landing force concepts and amphibious doctrine first examined and practiced by the Navy-Marine Corps team some 20 years earlier. However, military orthodoxy minimized the survivability of this concept in the face of nuclear weaponry, and for a time it appeared that military experts who predicted that there would never again be another amphibious landing might be right. Events in South Korea, however, only five years later would require the Navy and Marine Corps once again to land an assault force over the defended shorelines of an enemy. And by that time, enactment of laws establishing the Marine Corps as responsible for amphibious doctrine ensured that this country would continue to improve its unique capability for projecting military power from the sea.

After World War II, the Marine Corps -- which had reached a peak strength of more than 500,000 in 1945 -- faced a number of tasks, all requiring immediate attention. Chief among these was the requirement to demobilize while still maintaining sizeable occupation forces in the Pacific. Another was the requirement to shape an organization for a post-war regular force. Additionally, the Marine Corps was faced with the problem of responding to new challenges to

amphibious doctrine inspired by the advent of the atomic bomb; as well as confronting the problem of what one historian has described as "ill-defined but disturbing pressures for extensive reorganization of the defense establishment which boded nothing but trouble for the Marine Corps."

Recommendations for reorganization of the defense establishment had been triggered during the latter stages of World War II by the increased size of the armed forces and by the proposed establishment of the Air Force as a separate service, distinct from the Army. With these proposals came the requirement for new definitions of roles and missions. In this vein, various ideas were proposed for the Marine Corps of the future, including that the Marines be allowed to fight only in combat operations in which the Navy alone was interested and that the Marines be restricted only to waterborne aspects of amphibious operations. The Act of 1947, which established the Marine Corps in a continuing amphibious role, is a testimonial to the awareness of this country's leaders for the continuing requirement for an amphibious capability.

III

REORGANIZATION EFFORTS

In the decade after World War II, 1945-1955, scarcely a year passed that concerted attempts were not made to effect major reorganization of the military establishment. Some were bona-fide attempts to improve the military establishment; others were attempts by service partisans to realize singular aspirations. Throughout this period, the Navy and the Marine Corps recognized the requirement for reorganization of the Armed Forces but steadfastly held to a position in opposition to the establishment of a single General Staff, feeling that such a staff might eventually come under the domination of one or more services to the neglect and detriment of the other services.

As the pressure for reorganization of the military establishment mounted, the Marine Corps maintained a policy of close cooperation with the U. S. Navy in all matters of common concern so as to enhance the ability of the Marine Corps to carry out its assigned functions. The Marine Corps policy was not calculated to acquire additional status or authority; rather, it was only to preserve the identity and integrity of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy, as established by statutes.

During this period of intense examination of the roles and missions which the various services were to hold in the post-war years, the Marine Corps held that military forces should be grouped permanently on the basis of identity of those missions, regardless of the natural media in which the various components might have to operate. This was in opposition to other concepts which held that all air assets should be grouped, all land assets grouped, and all sea assets grouped. The Navy and the Marine Corps have always held that permanent grouping based on identity of mission results in greater operating efficiency.

Resolution of the conflicting viewpoints relative to a general staff and assigned functions of the various services led to the National Security Act of 1947, as previously discussed, in which functions of the Marine Corps and the other services were delineated.

The Act of 1947 created, inter alia the office of the Secretary of Defense, provided for the administration of the service departments as individual executive departments by their respective secretaries under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense, perpetuated the World War II-born Joint Chiefs of Staff, authorized a Joint Staff, and established the Air Force as a separate service.

Although the 1947 mandate established a viable defense establishment, reorganization efforts were continued by service partisans who had not been fully satisfied by the Act of 1947. A number of proposals were re-examined and a number of changes were created by the later Security Act Amendments, none of which affected seriously the functions assigned to the Marine Corps. In fact, the major directive effecting the Marine Corps was the so-called "Key West Agreement," in 1948, which constituted a restatement of service roles and missions, and which imposed upon the Marine Corps an ultimate mobilization ceiling of four divisions -- an arbitrary limitation which had no relationship to either mobilization capabilities or requirements in event of war.

In 1949, reorganizational proposals continued to fly, most of which had as their aim more efficient and economical operation of the military establishment without change in the basic organization. Marine Corps concern centered on proposals that would empower and allow the Secretary of Defense and top-level defense agencies to transfer roles and missions, personnel, and appropriations from one service to another.

The Security Act Amendments enacted during 1949 concentrated on affecting reorganizational changes within the Secretary of Defense offices, now called the Department of Defense. These amendments, in the main, enhanced the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

The amendments specifically stated that the combatant functions assigned to each military service by the original Security Act could not be transferred, reassigned, abolished, or curtailed; and that these combatant functions should not be impaired by the transfer or assignment of personnel, or by use or withholding of Department of Defense funds.

Later in 1949, the Committee on the Armed Services of the House of Representatives opened hearings on unification and strategy. These hearings were in effect a continuation of previous hearings which had opened with an examination of irregularities in the procurement of the B-36 bomber and had carried through an examination of the Defense Department's broad concepts of national defense and the role of each service in that concept.

The Navy and the Marine Corps, advocating adherence to the 1947 Security Act, charged that the Defense Department was trying to vitiate the assignment of service roles and missions and relegate the Navy and the Marine Corps to an insignificant and militarily unsound role in the defense structure.

Basically, the Navy and the Marine Corps sought a realistic concept of national defense devoid of inter-service political considerations and recognition of the principle that each service should be free to develop and exploit its intrinsic capabilities to the utmost within the framework established earlier in the National Security Act of 1947.

However, by 1949, the defense budget had begun to exert more of an influence on the military establishment. Now, each service was supported within one budget, and the strategic plan for defense had become the justification for budget appropriations. Thus, each service was forced to contest among the other services for what it considered its proper share of the defense budget.

Emphasis shifted to fundamental disagreements among the service as to basic national strategy. The Navy and the Marine Corps feared that the naval services would be relegated to an inferior role in any future conflict

because it was felt that the nation's civilian and military leaders did not fully understand or appreciate the role of seapower in national strategy.

The inter-service debate was not confined to Congress or the services; it was carried into the public forum and the period was one of highly charged opinions from all sides over matters of strategy and the allocation of defense funds.

The Marine Corps position, in the hearings by the House Armed Services Committee, was to the effect that proposed plans to limit the size of the Marine Corps to regimental size organizations, to divest the Marine Corps of its amphibious role, and to prohibit expansion of the Corps in event of war would serve to reduce the striking power of this country all out of proportion to the economies which would be achieved thereby. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Clifton B. Cates, noted that important matters affecting and involving the Marine Corps were, in fact, being decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff without the Marine Corps having a voice in the matter.

The Committee report on Unification and Strategy was released in March 1950, and several of its conclusions had direct and important application to the position of the Marine Corps within the Department of Defense. The report was prelude to later enactment of legislation favorable to the Marine Corps. By August of 1950, moreover, the nation was involved in the Korean War, and the Marine Corps' ability to respond immediately to a contingency situation and its brilliantly successful amphibious assault landing at Inchon had engendered an increased fondness in the hearts of the American public.

In June, 1952, Public Law 416, incorporating many recommendations made in 1950 was enacted. In addition to fixing a floor of three combat divisions and three air wings for the Marine Corps, this legislation gave the Commandant the right to sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a co-equal in respect to any matter of direct interest to the Marine Corps. Thus, the Commandant had a voice equal to any one of the Chiefs in the formulation of strategy and the determination of forces required for executing national strategy. This provision brought the Marine Corps into the main stream of military strategic planning from which it had been previously excluded.

By the time of passage of Public Law #16, the defense establishment had been subjected to seven years of intense inspection by the Congress and the public and equally close introspection of itself. However, attempts to review the top level military planning organization still continued. Aim of the defense critics was to eliminate alleged flaws in the organization which purportedly weakened planning. Modifications recommended included unification of the services and strengthened civilian control.

General Cates, in his testimony before the so-called Rockefeller Committee convened in 1953 to air these recommendations, expressed his confidence in the present system, stating:

"As I have noted earlier, there are areas where it (Department of Defense) may be materially improved through a scrupulous adherence to the existing law. I believe that in just such adherence lies the progress and the improvement which this Committee is seeking."

The Rockefeller Committee report formed the basis for the Reorganization Plan #6 of 1953. The plan authorized certain actions by the Secretary of Defense and abolished several boards and agencies. It did not, however, address the entire question of service functions, although earlier recommendations to review this aspect had been made by one of the services. The other services however, expressed the view that roles and missions of the Services, as expressed in the Functions Paper, were clear, and that the document provided reasonable, workable guidance for service programs.

Through the years 1952 to 1958, changes directed by Reorganization Plan #6 were implemented, among them being the increase of Assistant Secretaries of Defense from six to nine. With this increase, emphasis within the Defense Department seemingly shifted from an examination of roles and missions of the services to a closer examination of the authority and operations of the agencies within the department. In effect, nine assistant secretaries were now positioned to coordinate their particular specialties and interests within three military departments -- and four services. This had the effect of spreading top echelon control horizontally through the Department of Defense to pick up vertical lines of control. This increased civilian control of the military establishment, predictably

enough, caused some concern that the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might be eroded.

In terms of the National Security Act and the later amendments and amplifying documents, the Marine Corps felt that service missions had been adequately defined. However, many compromises in the organization of the defense structure had been effected in the years since World War II, and not all framers of the various acts had been completely happy. Thus, in 1958, the spotlight was turned once more on the oft-debated subject of service roles and missions and reorganization and unification of the services.

The reorganization proposals presented to Congress for consideration were advanced as streamlining measures to ensure the rapid response required in a missile age. Included in the proposals was one giving the Secretary of Defense the power to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate functions authorized by law -- a new attempt to revive an old issue rejected in 1953. The Secretary of Defense, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, denied any desire for authority to emasculate any of the four services. The desire was simply for the President and the Secretary of Defense to have authority to eliminate any overlap and duplication of functions.

Two Marine Corps generals disputed this rationale. The then-Commandant, General Randolph McC. Pate, explained that prescribing basic roles of the services in the law ensures the stability essential for orderly administration of our national defense and permits logical and systematic assignment of the basic tasks. A former Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates, was more to the point. He stated bluntly that unless the power to transfer, consolidate, reassign, or abolish combatant functions is restricted by law, the Marine Corps might well wake up some morning and find itself reorganized and consolidated and reassigned into nonentity.

But Public Law 85-599, enacted in August of 1958, granted in part, the power requested by the President for the Secretary of Defense. The language of the Defense Reorganization Act, however, did provide for the integrity of the Departments and Services. The new law declared that the Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force were under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense but provided that each military service would be separately organized under its own Secretary.

The Secretary of Defense was to provide for unified direction under civilian control, but could not merge these departments or services.

Since 1958, there have been a number of individual proposals, both inside and outside of Congress, which advocated further reorganization of the Department of Defense. Most of these proposals were by avowed adherents of the concept of a single chief of staff, the elimination of the individual services by merger into one service, and the institution of functional commands within that service -- all proposals which at one time or another had been examined for feasibility and then rejected.

However, new impetus to the evolution of the Department of Defense into a monolithic structure was provided by the committee appointed by the then-Democratic Party candidate for the Presidency, Senator John F. Kennedy. This committee, headed by a former Secretary of the Air Force, Senator Stuart Symington, submitted its report to President-Elect Kennedy in December, 1960.

The committee, in effect, proposed among other things, to eliminate the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; to create two new Under-Secretaries for administration and weapons systems; create a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Arms Control; redesignate the Chairman of the JCS as Chairman Joint Staff; abolish the JCS and establish a Military Advisory Council; establish for each service a full-time Chief who was to report directly to the Secretary of Defense; and establish unified commands for strategic missions, tactical missions, and continental defense missions. Other proposals related to the relationship of the Secretary of Defense and the Appropriations Committees of Congress.

Main difference between the Symington Report and other proposals extant at the time concerned the question of eventual military control. One school of thought held that military control should be vested in a single Chief of Staff; the Symington Committee proposed that the Secretary of Defense would be the unquestioned authority over all elements of the Department of Defense at all levels. Consolidation of activities and procedural changes directed within the Department of Defense organization since 1960 have tended to follow the trend of the Symington Report.

These trends were indicated by the establishment of the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Supply Agency, all forerunners of future consolidations of services or specialties under one centralized control.

Further centralization of control within the Department of Defense Force Structure and Financial Programming System which was conceived to bridge the gap between service plans and programs and the budget. This system of planning, programming and costing requires detailed justification of all forces and program changes over an established dollar, force, or personnel level.

Another noticeable change has been wrought by the unified specified command concept in which the separate military departments are far removed from the operational channels and are only required to provide forces, organized, trained, and equipped for various types of combat to unified commanders who will employ the forces under the direction of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

IV

THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM

There are two operational concepts which the Marine Corps has developed through the years which have figured prominently in the advancement of amphibious warfare. These are the Marine Corps' concept of close air support as part of the Marine air/ground team; and the vertical assault by Marine forces in helicopters as part of the ship-to-shore movement of amphibious forces. Each of these concepts will be briefly discussed in the following sections:

Close Air Support in the U. S. Marine Corps Doctrine and Practice

Marine Corps aviation has been an integral part of both the Navy and the Marine Corps since 1912, when two officers and an enlisted Marine were detailed to undergo aviation training at Annapolis, Maryland. In October 1917, the first Marine aviation unit was organized and equipped for service overseas in World War I, and was given a mission of supporting Marine infantry in France. The exigencies of war prevented fulfillment of this particular mission, although Marine pilots and planes participated fully in the war.

In the early post-war years, Marine aviation units were organized to operate with Marine Corps expeditionary brigades in Santo Domingo and Haiti, where Leatherneck flyers and aircraft were employed in patrolling, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting missions.

The organization of the Fleet Marine Force in 1933 and the subsequent development and codification of amphibious warfare doctrine relied heavily on the lessons learned in the conduct of these earlier Marine Corps landings and expeditions. The rudimentary techniques of close air support first employed in Nicaragua influenced early Marine Corps planners as they wrote what was to appear finally in FTP-167 (Landing Operations Doctrine). This publication was the basic manual for the conduct of amphibious assault operations in World War II. First published in 1938, it stated:

"Marine pilots and observers may be utilized in Naval planes engaged in land reconnaissance, attack in support of ground operations, and other air missions for which they may be specially trained."

In early 1939, the Secretary of the Navy approved the following mission and organization of Marine Corps aviation:

"Marine Corps aviation is to be equipped, organized and trained primarily for the support of the Fleet Marine Force in landing operations and in support of troop activities in the field; and secondarily as replacement squadrons for carrier-based naval aircraft..."

Thus, as the United States prepared for World War II, the doctrine for employment of Marine Corps planes and pilots throughout the war was fixed. A review of certain Marine Corps operations in the Pacific provide clearcut examples of how the doctrine and techniques of close air support were developed and increasingly refined in succeeding landings.

At Guadalcanal, as soon as it was feasible, in August 1942, Marine squadrons were brought in to operate from Henderson Field, but their basic role was in the air defense of the island and a secondary emphasis was placed on air support. In practice, close air support employed at Guadalcanal was little changed from the type of preplanned,

visually controlled missions flown during the Corps' expeditionary years in the Caribbean.

A great advance in the employment of close air support as a supporting arm in combat appeared during the Bougainville campaign in late 1943. Prior to this operation, Marines tended to regard close air support as risky. Preparations for close air support at Bougainville began with the idea of developing techniques which would result in maximum accuracy at minimum distance from Marine lines. Air liaison parties were organized, equipped with radios, and trained so that each infantry command post would have at least one man available to direct close air support missions in combat. Pre-strike briefings by air and ground officers were keys to the success of this evolutionary technique.

As the scene of Marine operations was changed to the Central Pacific area, and with each succeeding amphibious assault, close air support techniques were improved. The Army was introduced to the benefits of Marine close air support in the Philippines campaign in 1944, when Marine Aircraft Group 12 was ordered to support General MacArthur's forces on Leyte. After getting their first taste of what close air support could do for them, Army units were soon total adherents of the Marine Corps concept.

At Iwo Jima, in early 1945, the recently organized Marine Landing Force Air Support Control Units perfected previous techniques and doctrine and provided Marine ground units air support that was more immediately responsive to current needs. During the later stages of the war, and especially on Okinawa, improved aircraft, proven control procedures, and pilots skilled in providing close air support served together to make this supporting arm one of the most powerful that was available to the infantry.

Following the end of World War II and during the pre-Korean War period, Marine doctrine emphasized the concept of the air-ground team and great emphasis was placed on further improving close air support techniques. This interwar period of training paid off in Korea, where the 1st Marine Division and Wing indeed operated as a team. While overall direction of air operations in Korea was the responsibility of the U. S. Air Force, the special expertise of Marine air units in the field of close air support was readily recognized and they were in constant demand, not only by Marine ground units, but by other United States and United Nations forces, as well.

The advent of the jet age in Korea, together with the introduction of sophisticated electronics equipment demanded the revision of existing close air support techniques to meet the requirements of the new aircraft, equipment, and weapons.

Again relying on lessons learned cumulatively following World War II and Korea, the Marine Corps updated the mission of its aviation component, changing little of the old concepts. Accordingly, by 1966, the mission of Marine aviation was:

"...to participate as the supporting air component of the Fleet Marine Force in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. A collateral function of Marine Corps aviation is to participate as an integral component of naval aviation in the execution of such other Navy functions as the fleet commanders may direct. Air component tasks include planning and employing air power to seek out and destroy enemy forces and supporting installations, gaining and maintaining air superiority, preventing movement of enemy forces along routes of communications into and within the objective area, and providing aerial reconnaissance and observation."

In Vietnam, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was faced with still yet another challenge -- could the wing with its high-performance aircraft, intricate equipment, and sophisticated air control system adapt to the earthy complexities of a counterinsurgency environment? Despite adverse weather conditions, rugged terrain, and fluid small unit warfare, the concept of close air support proved to be not only workable but highly successful in the Republic of Vietnam. The Marine process for getting aircraft airborne and controlling them over the target was tailored to meet the ground commanders' needs and required little alteration. In fact, the system's inherent responsiveness, flexibility, and tight control were the salient features of close air support. Thanks to a time-tested process for routing air requests, the 1st Wing could provide the ground commanders with pre-planned strikes for scheduled operations or immediate on-call air support in cases of emergency.

During these strikes, Forward Air Controllers attached to the supported unit, or Tactical Air Controllers (Airborne) in light observation craft over the target area controlled the attack aircraft for the most efficient application of firepower and precluded the possibility of inflicting casualties on friendly troops. The entire effort to date is balanced and rapid, and provides the man on the ground with the most professional and effective air support in history.

Evolution of Helicopter Warfare

The era of nuclear warfare ostensibly foretold the doom of amphibious warfare as the United States knew it during World War II. Marine observers of the nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll in 1946 were convinced that future amphibious task forces could be destroyed by a nuclear armed enemy unless new concepts were developed to execute the amphibious mission. In December 1946, General A. A. Vandergrift, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, signed the directive creating an experimental helicopter squadron (HMX-1) at Quantico, Virginia to explore the military potential of helicopters particularly in the amphibious role and to develop tactics and techniques for their employment. Thus, the Marine Corps, last of the U. S. military services to have a helicopter, became the first to launch a long-range program of developing helicopter combat techniques.

HMX-1 had been training pilots and enlisted personnel, as well as developing an amphibious vertical assault doctrine for 2 1/2 years, when the Korean war broke out. The doctrine developed in theory and practiced in training exercises, proved valid in the ensuing combat operations. Initially helicopters were used for command and liaison flights, rescue and medical evacuation missions, as well as reconnaissance and emergency resupply roles. However, before the conflict ended, such combat operations as the lift of an infantry company to the front line were followed by the landing of a company at night and the relief of a fully equipped battalion on the front lines. These pioneer precepts of helicopter doctrine were quickly recognized by the Army and Air Force, and they both enlarged the scope of their helicopter operations in 1952.

As the technology provided larger and more efficient helicopters, the Marine Corps continued to develop the vertical assault doctrine to fully exploit this added capability. The multi-deck concept of launching the landing force from widely separated amphibious ships while "over the

horizon" from enemy beaches was successfully tested in the mid-sixties in such exercises as "Quick Kick V" at Onslow Beach, North Carolina and "Steelpike" in Spain. The first night combat helicopter amphibious assault was accomplished during the Dominican Republic crisis in 1965. With the advent of the large U. S. combat commitment in Vietnam, helicopter operations have become common place. The U. S. Army, following the Marine Corps lead, developed the Air Mobile division to increase responsiveness and mobility of the foot soldier in the counterinsurgency environment. Since the beginning of the build-up in Vietnam, the Marine Corps and Navy have executed repeated amphibious operations along the coast of Vietnam, sometimes assaulting the beaches and other times leap-frogging the beaches by helicopter and striking the enemy in the hinterland. Operation Dewey Canyon, which was conducted in the Ashau Valley of Vietnam in 1969, was a totally helicopter dependent combat operation in mountainous jungle terrain. Helicopters supported this multi-battalion operation in sustained combat over support lines exceeding 50 kilometers from the nearest supply base under extremely adverse weather conditions. Thus, the techniques, tactics and doctrine conceived by HMX-1 over 20 years before and refined by the Marine Corps during the interim, have proven to be valid in the present day counterinsurgency environment.

V

SUMMARY

This short history of the Marine Corps has detailed the relationship of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy, outlined the 194-year traditional role of the Marine Corps in the military establishment of this nation, and traced the development of statutory roles and missions. The development of amphibious doctrine, about which books could and have been written, is reported only to the extent required to show Marine Corps dedication and championship of this unique capability. This nation has long recognized the requirement for sea power -- naval forces which can ensure the freedom of the seas and unhindered use of international waters, and amphibious assault forces which can project the power of this country across the littorals of a nation -- and against force, if required.

The Marine Corps, together with the U. S. Navy as part of the Navy/Marine Corps Amphibious Team, is uniquely qualified by mission, doctrine, capability, and experience to provide this entry/reentry capability.

**MAJOR CHANGES IN
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
1942 - 1969**

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
23 January 1970

Origin of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff came into being to meet an immediate need, without a background of long study and specific decision within the US Government regarding the most effective form of higher military organization for war. With the entry of the United States into the war after the Pearl Harbor attack on 7 December 1941, some form of US-British military cooperation and coordination became necessary. The problem was addressed at the ARCADIA Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and their advisors, held in Washington during the period 22 December 1941-14 January 1942. At this conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) were established as the supreme military body for the strategic direction of the Anglo-American military effort in World War II.

As his military assistants at the ARCADIA Conference Prime Minister Churchill had present the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, a body consisting of the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Chief of Air Staff. In existence since 1923, this committee held a corporate responsibility for the command and strategic direction of the forces of the United Kingdom and for providing military advice to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet.

The United States at that time had no agency comparable to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee in stature and responsibility. A Joint Board of the Army and Navy had prepared joint war plans and dealt with questions of inter-service coordination during the prewar years. Its membership of eight officers, however, did not fully encompass the chiefs of staff level of the US Services as constituted in December 1941 but did include several officers of lesser rank. Primarily an advisory and deliberative body, the Joint Board was not designed for direction of the Army and Navy in wartime operations.

Accordingly, for the military discussions at ARCADIA the US delegation consisted of the officers whose responsibilities most closely matched those of the members of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. The US representatives were never specifically designated by the President or other authority. Their assumption of the duty was simply recognized as appropriate under the "opposite number" formula. For the US Army, General George C. Marshall as Chief of Staff held a position directly comparable to that of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The responsibilities of high command in the

US Navy had recently been divided between two officers, Admiral Harold R. Stark as Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral Ernest J. King, the Commander in Chief, US Fleet (COMINCH). Both appeared as US representatives in the military discussions, as a dual counterpart to the British First Sea Lord. In arranging for US air representation, direct comparability was not possible. In the United Kingdom the Royal Air Force was an autonomous service, co-equal in all respects with the British Army and the Royal Navy; in the United States, air forces functioned as integral or subordinate elements of the Army and the Navy. The foremost spokesman available, however, was Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. It was recognized that, when sitting as a US representative, General Arnold could speak authoritatively only for the air forces of the Army and that he functioned always as a subordinate of General Marshall.

During the ARCADIA meetings the US and British officers mapped broad strategy and settled upon an organizational arrangement for the strategic direction of the war. They recommended establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the British Chiefs of Staff and their "United States opposite numbers." With the approval of the President and the Prime Minister, the Combined Chiefs of Staff came into operation almost immediately, holding their first numbered meeting on 23 January 1942.

The establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff had a profound influence on the evolution of the military high command of the United States. The four officers who had represented the United States at ARCADIA were to continue to sit as the US members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In preparation for the CCS meetings they would have to consult closely and direct the preparation of US position papers by subordinate staff agencies. Thus the establishment of a new organization, the "Joint US Chiefs of Staff," was implicit in the arrangement. The title followed the definition of terms agreed to at ARCADIA, under which "Combined" signified collaboration between two or more nations while "Joint" was used to designate the interservice collaboration of one nation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff held their first meeting on 9 February 1942, to deal with agenda items associated with their CCS duties. Thereafter, an institutional development occurred at the national level that was a direct consequence

of the fact that the authoritative leaders of the Services had already been brought together in an organized way to represent the United States on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The same officers, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, soon began to function as a corporate leadership for the US military establishment. At the national level the Joint Chiefs of Staff became the primary agency for coordination and strategic direction of the Army and Navy, responsible directly to the President as Commander in Chief. They advised the President with regard to war plans and strategy, military relations with allied nations, the munitions, shipping, and manpower needs of the armed forces, and matters of joint Army-Navy policy. In the course of this development, which was largely completed by March 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff absorbed the functions of the prewar Joint Board and superseded it in the governmental structure.

The functions and duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally defined during the war period. They were left free to extend their activities as needed to meet the requirements of the war. The desirability of preserving this useful flexibility was the chief reason offered by the President himself for declining to issue a basic directive.

During March 1942 Admiral Stark departed for a new command in the United Kingdom. The two posts of Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, US Fleet, were combined in one individual, Admiral King, and the JCS membership was accordingly reduced to three. Shortly thereafter, General Marshall became convinced that it would be desirable to have a fourth member, designated to preside at JCS meetings and maintain liaison with the White House. For this purpose the President on 20 July 1942 appointed Admiral William D. Leahy to the new position of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

The direct responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President was a cardinal feature of their operations during World War II. President Roosevelt had assumed to the full his constitutional role as Commander in Chief, treating it as somewhat separate from his other duties as Chief Executive. When dealing with strategy and military operations, he preferred to work directly with the uniformed chiefs of the Services, rather than through the civilian leadership of the War and Navy Departments. The responsibilities of the Secretaries of War and the Navy were limited largely to

matters of administration, mobilization, and procurement. In these circumstances the appointment taken up by Admiral Leahy proved particularly valuable in facilitating operation of the mechanism for direction of the war. As Chief of Staff to the President he served as the normal channel for passing White House decisions and requirements to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for presenting JCS views and recommendations to the President. This arrangement did not preclude direct consultation by President Roosevelt with Generals Marshall and Arnold and Admiral King, but it removed the need for such consultations for the routine exchange of opinions, information, and direction.

A supporting organization for the Joint Chiefs of Staff came into existence piece by piece during 1942, more in spontaneous response to the need for agencies to deal with evolving requirements than in fulfillment of any large or conscious design. Most of the new joint agencies were created to provide US representatives to sit with the British in combined committees subordinate to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but they also supported the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discharging responsibilities at the national level.

The most important component of the JCS organization was the Joint Staff Planners, which provided the US representation on the Combined Staff Planners. By March its membership had been stabilized at five officers: the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) of COMINCH Headquarters and two of his assistants; the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department's Operations Division; and the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) of the US Army Air Staff. Thus all the members had major primary responsibilities in the Service staffs, and their assignment to the Joint Staff Planners was an additional, part-time duty.

Besides drawing assistance from their own Service staffs, the members of the Joint Staff Planners were supported by a full-time working group, the Joint US Strategic Committee. A former Joint Board agency, it had been absorbed into the JCS organization and made subordinate to the Joint Staff Planners on 9 March. The Joint US Strategic Committee consisted of six officers on assignment from the war plans division of the Army and Navy staffs.

Another element of the initial JCS organization was the Joint Intelligence Committee, consisting of the US membership of the Combined Intelligence Committee. Like the Joint Staff

Planners, it had a working level supporting agency composed of officers on full-time assignment from the Service staffs. This body was the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, later called the Joint Intelligence Staff.

The further joint agencies established during the first months of 1942 included the Joint Military Transportation Committee, the Joint Meteorological Committee, the Joint Communications Board, the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, and the Joint New Weapons Committee. Of these, the first three provided US membership on CCS committees with parallel titles, while the last two were strictly joint US organizations. The need for a committee at the JCS level to coordinate the efforts of the various agencies operating in the psychological warfare field had first been suggested by the Army G-2; the Joint New Weapons Committee grew out of a proposal by Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, a White House organization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also served by a Secretary, who headed the Joint Secretariat.

One final component of the early JCS organization was the Office of Strategic Services, the World War II forerunner of the present Central Intelligence Agency. It had been formed in 1941 as the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), a civilian agency directly responsible to the President. Investigation convinced the Joint Chiefs of Staff that COI was capable of making an important contribution to the war effort but that its activities must be placed under military control to assure proper coordination with military operations. In March 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied the President with a proposed Executive Order, drafted in collaboration with the COI Director, that would make the agency responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In June, as part of a broader reordering of government operations that also included establishment of the Office of War Information, President Roosevelt placed COI under JCS jurisdiction and redesignated it the Office of Strategic Services.

The Wartime Reforms

The initial JCS organization that came into being during the early months of 1942 was one in which the vast majority of business funnelled through one undermanned and part-time agency, the Joint Staff Planners. The limitations of this key agency became increasingly apparent to discerning US staff

officers as the year progressed. Its shortcomings became evident to the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves in early 1943 at the Casablanca Conference. At this gathering of the President and Prime Minister and their principal assistants, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves at a disadvantage when confronted by the large and smoothly functioning British staff, which had not only prepared thorough positions on every anticipated point but was geared to produce quickly additional papers as needed during the conference itself. The handful of officers making up the Joint Staff Planners were unable to match the skill and speed of this efficient planning organization.

The inadequate performance of the Joint Staff Planners stemmed both from their composition and from the scope of the responsibilities they were expected to discharge. Already heavily burdened by their regular duties in the Service staffs, the members constituted the sole agency for the accomplishment of most of the planning tasks required for the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in both their national and international roles. As a result, the agenda of the Joint Staff Planners was a heavy and exceedingly varied one.

Still committed, during this first year of the war, to the traditional staff practices of the two Services, the members of the Joint Staff Planners were further handicapped by their methods of operation. The leading members of the Joint Staff Planners had a view of their responsibility that prevented them from relinquishing immediate and detailed control over the planning process in favor of a broader general supervision. The Planners assigned some subjects to their only permanent and full-time agency, the six-man Joint US Strategic Committee. Most of the subjects on the agenda, however, were assigned to ad hoc subcommittees composed of planning personnel and staff experts drawn from both Services. All work returned to the Joint Staff Planners for scrutiny in detail, with final decision on all matters requiring the personal approval of the two senior officers of that body.

The revelation at Casablanca of the inadequacies in the JCS supporting organization led to sweeping reappraisal and fundamental reform during the first half of 1943. But even before this date, discerning officers within the JCS organization and the Service staffs had recognized the need for improvement and had successfully initiated two significant changes. These were the establishment of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, on 7 November 1942, and the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff on 11 December 1942.

Recognition of the need for a separate Joint Strategic Survey Committee had emerged "from the discussion of a different organizational proposal, originated by an Army member of the Joint US Strategic Committee. His suggestions regarding a change in the status and responsibilities of the latter committee were adopted and refined by the War Department General Staff and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Marshall. The subsequent JCS discussion culminated in agreement to establish a Joint Strategic Survey Committee, composed of three officers of flag or general rank on full-time assignment. Kept free from any involvement with short-term operational problems, they were to perform longer range planning and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on current strategic decisions in the light of the developing war situation and the objectives of national policy.

The establishment of the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff was proposed by Admiral King, who wished to relieve the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the burden of detailed and routine matters coming before them. His proposal was to refer such matters to a group of deputies, for action in the name of their superiors. In discharging their responsibilities, the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff would "interpret and implement the known policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

These limited improvements were followed in early 1943 by a comprehensive reappraisal and reorganization of the supporting structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 20 January the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff appointed for the purpose a special committee, entitled the Committee on War Planning Agencies. It conducted a thorough investigation of the problem, based on inputs from all the components of the JCS organization. The committee also completed studies on the British staff organization and on the workload of the Joint Staff Planners.

On 12 March 1943, the Committee on War Planning Agencies submitted its findings to the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Recognizing that the overloading of the Joint Staff Planners was the cardinal difficulty, the Committee recommended the shifting of a vast load of administrative and routine planning detail to a new committee, to be called the Joint Administrative Committee. The new committee would consist of the Chief of the Logistics Branch of the Army Operations Division and the Director of the Logistics Plans Division of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and would be supported by ad hoc groups from the Service staffs. The Joint Staff

Planners, with their duties now restricted to broad strategic and operational planning, would be limited to three members: the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans), COMINCH; a representative of the Army Operations Division; and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, of the US Army Air Forces. The Joint Staff Planners would continue to receive support from the Joint US Strategic Committee, now redesignated the Joint War Plans Committee and reinforced by officers transferred from the Service planning staffs in order to reduce the need for ad hoc committees. The Committee also proposed broadening the Joint Intelligence Committee by adding to it the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found the report generally acceptable, but before giving final approval subjected it to review by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint Staff Planners, and the Army and Navy staffs. The report was favorably received by the reviewing agencies, who suggested only minor changes. Principal among these were Navy recommendations to add an additional naval officer to the Joint Administrative Committee and Joint Staff Planners and an Army recommendation to drop the Army Air Forces member from the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff.

After accepting these proposals and making certain minor changes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the Committee on War Planning Agencies at meetings during the period 4-10 May 1943. Specifically, they approved the issuance of the set of revised charters for all JCS committees and agencies that the Committee had drafted.

Later in 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved redesignation of the Joint Administrative Committee as the Joint Logistics Committee and strengthened its capabilities by adding a supporting Joint Logistics Plans Committee. This change resulted from an increasing awareness of the complexity of logistics in military planning, and from recognition of the degree to which this field had already become the primary concern of the committee. The new supporting Joint Logistics Plans Committee, like the Joint War Plans Committee and the Joint Intelligence Staff, was manned by officers on full-time assignment.

From mid-1943 to the war's end several other joint committees were created to deal with matters that had assumed increased importance, such as the Joint Production Survey Committee, the Joint Post-War Committee, and the Joint Civil

Affairs Committee. The first two of these were full-time agencies.

The following charts (I, II, and III) depict the evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II.


THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



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CHART III



The National Security Act of 1947

At the end of World War II there was widespread agreement among military and civilian leaders that the military establishment would have to be reorganized and placed on a permanent basis adequate to the needs of the United States in the postwar era. During World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff had emerged as a corporate command and planning agency serving directly under the constitutional Commander in Chief, the President. The Army Air Force had become virtually autonomous. There had been some centralization of intelligence collection and analysis, and war production, prices, manpower, shipping, propaganda and scientific research had been subjected to control by civilian agencies. These arrangements had, on the whole, worked well under the pressures of wartime, but there was no certainty that they would function adequately in time of peace.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a central element of the military establishment, would be affected by any reorganization that was undertaken. While few questioned the desirability of continuing some such agency in the national defense structure, there was authoritative opinion that improvements were needed, possibly involving a somewhat different conception of the JCS role. General Marshall observed that "the lack of real unity has handicapped the successful conduct of the war." In his view a system of coordinating committees such as that embodied in the JCS organization could not be considered a satisfactory solution. It resulted in delays and compromises, and was "a cumbersome and inefficient method of directing the efforts of the Armed Forces." Secretary of War Stimson declared that the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an "imperfect instrument of top-level decision," because "it remained incapable of enforcing a decision against the will of any one of its members." Others, recalling the record of difficulties encountered in Army-Navy cooperation in earlier times of peace, doubted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could "continue to work together effectively for very long after the termination of hostilities."

Deliberation on the nature of the postwar military establishment began even before the termination of hostilities. A House Committee under the chairmanship of Representative Clifton A. Woodrum conducted hearings on postwar military organization in the spring of 1944 and heard varying testimony from Army and Navy witnesses. The Army proposal, presented by

General Joseph T. McNarney, called for a single military department under a Secretary of the Armed Forces, who would supervise such matters as procurement and recruiting but would not have authority over the military budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, redesignated the United States Chiefs of Staff, would remain in existence and continue to be directly responsible to the President. Their central duty would still be that of making recommendations to the President on military strategy, but they would gain the significant new power to recommend the military budget. The proposal called for adding to the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Director of Common Supply Services. Further, the Chief of Staff to the President was to "head" the United States Chiefs of Staff. Navy witnesses made no specific proposals but cautioned against reaching any conclusion on the question of military organization without thorough study. At the conclusion of the hearings, the Committee recommended that the Congress take no further action until the end of the war.

While the Woodrum hearings were in progress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated their own study. They created a Special JCS Committee on Reorganization of National Defense and directed it to submit recommendations on postwar defense organization, including a recommendation on the advisability of continuing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As part of its survey, the Committee spent the fall of 1944 touring the combat theaters and ascertaining the views of the major commanders. Fifty-six high-ranking officers were interviewed. The large majority of the Army officers and about half the Navy officers favored a single military department.

On 11 April 1945, the committee submitted a split report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the senior Navy member, Admiral J. O. Richardson, dissenting, the committee recommended the creation of a single military department presided over by a Secretary of the Armed Forces. It would include a Commander of the Armed Forces supported by an Armed Forces General Staff, and a purely advisory United States Chiefs of Staff consisting of the Secretary, the Commander of the Armed Forces, and the three Service military heads.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff began serious consideration of the Special Committee's report shortly after the Japanese surrender. General Marshall, while he did not fully concur in the report, recommended that it be sent to the President along with a statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed

in principle on a single-department system of organization. General Arnold supported this view, but Admirals King and Leahy opposed it on the grounds that a single military department would be inefficient, would weaken civilian control over the military, and was contrary to wartime experience that showed the superiority of a joint over a unitary system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the report and their individual comments on it to the President on 16 October 1945. They set forth four possible courses of action for his consideration:

1. Submit all the pertinent papers to Congress.
2. Appoint a special civilian board to study national defense organization.
3. Achieve a degree of unification by appointing a single individual as Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy.
4. Retain the existing organization, "with appropriate augmentation of the joint agencies."

By this time the postwar era had begun, and decision on national defense organization took on new urgency. In October, the Senate Military Affairs Committee began hearings on the various defense organization plans produced up to that time. Several months earlier Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, had proposed to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal that the Navy Department "should attempt to formulate a plan which would be more effective in accomplishing the objective sought."

Secretary Forrestal agreed with the Senator's view. On 19 June he asked a personal friend, Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, President of a New York investment banking firm, if he would prepare a report discussing

what form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other Government departments and agencies most effectively to provide for and protect our national security?

Mr. Eberstadt agreed to undertake the study with the assistance of a committee made up of civilians and Naval

officers. Three months later he submitted his report to the Secretary.

The Eberstadt Committee concluded that "under present conditions unification of the Army and Navy under a single head" would not improve the nation's security. It favored a coordinated system, in which there would be three military Departments--War, Navy, and Air--each with a civilian Secretary of Cabinet rank. The Committee recognized serious weaknesses in the existing organization, particularly in the coordination of foreign and military policy and in the relationship between strategic planning and its logistic implementation. To counter these weaknesses, it recommended the creation of two important bodies directly under the President: the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). The Secretaries of War, Navy, and Air would be members of both organizations.

The Eberstadt Committee believed that, irrespective of whether or not the separate military departments were ultimately unified under one Department of Defense, legislation should be sought to insure the continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the Committee's opinion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had performed very satisfactorily during the war. They conceded that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sometimes experienced delays in reaching decisions, but the Committee found such delays preferable to the alternative of placing full military control in the hands of one officer, at the head of a single armed forces general staff. While it would be a more efficient instrument for reaching decisions, the latter arrangement had the inherent danger that expert minority opinions might be overridden without sufficient consideration. The Committee feared that, owing to inevitable limitations in the background, knowledge, and experience of the single superior officer, decisions might be reached that would prevent development of weapons, concepts, or command arrangements vital to fulfillment of the mission of one of the Services.

Under the proposed Organization for National Security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to be a part of and meet with the National Security Council. They would be charged with: a) preparing strategic plans and providing strategic direction for the forces; b) furnishing strategic advice to the President, the NSC and other government agencies; c) preparing joint logistics plans and assigning logistic responsibilities to the Services in accordance with such plans; and d) approving major Service material and personnel programs in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.

The Eberstadt Committee proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the three Service chiefs, plus the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. If the President desired to continue that position. The Committee had assessed the wartime experience as showing that full-time supporting groups such as the Joint War Plans Committee were more effective in producing a unified joint position than were the negotiations conducted in the part-time interservice committees. Accordingly, it recommended the establishment of a full-time Joint Staff to serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It would be headed by a Chief of the Joint Staff, who would function as an executive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and perhaps sit as a JCS member.

As for the relationship to exist between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments, the Committee merely noted that

In time of war the military strategists may be required to operate directly under the President. There does not seem to be any compelling reason for this during peace time. Approval of the Secretaries might well be required to render effective the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in periods of peace.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to maintain close liaison with other agencies within the proposed Organization for National Security, including a proposed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The Eberstadt plan was presented to the Senate Military Affairs Committee by Mr. Forrestal on 22 October 1945. A week later Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins set forth the Army position. This so-called "Collins Plan" had been prepared by a board of senior Army officers convened only a month earlier. It proposed the establishment of a single Department of the Armed Forces headed by a civilian Secretary of Cabinet rank. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, renamed the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, were to continue in existence. Their functions, to be fixed by law, would be advisory--the provision of recommendations on military policy, strategy, and budget requirements. In the matter of budget requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have specific authority to prepare and recommend to the President the military budget. The Secretary of Armed Services could comment on but not amend these budget recommendations. The membership of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff was to be increased to five by the addition of a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, whose duties were not precisely indicated.

The Senate Military Affairs Committee adjourned its hearings on 17 December 1945. Two days later, President Truman transmitted a message to Congress on reorganization of the armed forces in which he endorsed the main proposals of the Collins Plan: a single department with one Cabinet-level Secretary, a separate Air Force, a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and a purely advisory Joint Chiefs of Staff. This message, along with the testimony gathered at the hearings, was referred to a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Forces Committee headed by Senator Elbert Thomas. Major General Lauris Norstad and Vice Admiral Arthur W. Radford were assigned to assist the subcommittee in its deliberations.

On 9 April 1946, the Committee reported out a bill combining elements of both the Navy and Army plans. Like the Eberstadt Report it called for a general reorganization of the entire national security structure, and the inclusion of a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a National Security Resources Board. Like the Collins Plan it called for a single Department of Common Defense, a Chief of Staff of Common Defense, and a Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of the Service chiefs and the Chief of Staff of Common Defense. However, the powers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Thomas bill were less than those proposed in the Collins Plan. The responsibility for preparing the military budget, which General Collins would assign to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, became the responsibility of the Secretary of Common Defense. The Thomas bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, which conducted hearings on the bill early in May.

During the hearings Navy witnesses attacked the provisions of the bill calling for a Secretary of Common Defense and a Chief of Staff for Common Defense and expressed their fears that the Thomas bill, if enacted, would permit removal from the Navy Department of its naval air arm and Marines.

It soon became clear that the Thomas bill did not provide the compromise its drafters had intended. Therefore, President Truman on 13 May requested Secretaries Patterson and Forrester to submit for his review a list of points upon which they agreed and disagreed. He made it clear that, while not

committed to either Department's position in the controversy, he no longer favored the establishment of a single Chief of Staff.

The Secretaries submitted their views to the President on 31 May in a joint letter. They listed eight points upon which they agreed and four on which they did not. The War Department had receded from its previous position on two points. First, it agreed to the establishment of a higher national security structure as proposed in the Eberstadt Report. Second, in line with the President's wishes, it agreed not to press for a Chief of Staff of Common Defense. Instead, both Departments agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be retained and given responsibilities beyond the purely advisory role depicted in the early bills that had proposed a Chief of Staff or commander of the armed forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to

... formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic responsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate the military programs, to make recommendations for integration of the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction of the United States military forces.

On 15 June, President Truman announced his resolution of the outstanding issues, none of which affected the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Thomas bill was appropriately amended, and hearings resumed. Navy witnesses, however, opposed this revised version, leading to a postponement of further consideration until the 80th Congress convened early in 1947.

Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal chose not to wait until the 80th Congress convened to consider the matter further. They appointed General Norstad and Admiral Forrest Sherman to develop a blueprint for unification upon which legislation could be based. On 16 January 1947 the conclusions reached by the two officers were forwarded to the President by the Secretary of War and Navy as the plan under which the two departments could agree to unify under a single Secretary of National Defense.

President Truman concurred with the proposal, and Admiral Sherman and General Norstad then drafted a bill based on their plan. The President on 26 February forwarded it to both Houses of Congress as the proposed National Security Act of 1947.

Following several months of hearings and debate, the Congress passed the legislation in amended form as Public Law 253. The amendments generally concerned further limitation on the powers of the Secretary of Defense and provision of additional safeguards for the Navy air arm and the Marine Corps. The provisions concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, remained unchanged. They were, in effect, the proposals developed by General Norstad and Admiral Sherman.

The provisions were as follows:

(a) There is hereby established within the National Military Establishment the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one.

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff --

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;

(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

(7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense and shall perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

The functions assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff were, in large part, those that had been agreed to by Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal in May 1946. There was, however, one significant deletion from the authority proposed by the two Secretaries. In their version, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to "make recommendations for integration of the military budget." Public Law 253 made no specific provision for a budgetary function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Public Law 253 also provided for a Joint Staff, a proposal originally offered in the Eberstadt Report and revived by General Norstad and Admiral Sherman for inclusion in the draft National Security Act. The appropriate provision of Public Law 253, unchanged from the bill as originally introduced, were as follows:

There shall be, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not to exceed one hundred officers and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall perform such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Organizing the Joint Staff

With the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 by President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began consideration of the implementation of the provisions affecting their organization. This process began on 4 August when Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the Chief of Naval Operations, proposed

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue the existing structure of part-time interservice committees, with their full-time supporting groups incorporated in the new Joint Staff. Admiral Nimitz also recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve a directive to the Director, Joint Staff, spelling out his supervisory duties over the Joint Staff and imposing a specific limitation on his authority. The Director would be required, according to Admiral Nimitz's proposal, to forward all reports of JCS committees to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In cases involving split opinions, however, he would be authorized to submit his own views along with those of the majority and minority members of the committee.

The Acting Chief of Staff of the Army, while he agreed with Admiral Nimitz on the need to proceed immediately with the reorganization of JCS agencies, proposed that the details be worked out by the officer selected to be Director of the Joint Staff. He accordingly recommended, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, that the Director be selected at once and be directed to recommend a statement of functions for the Director and an internal organization for the Joint Staff. In preparing his recommendations the Director was to take into consideration the views of Admiral Nimitz.

Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA, was named by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the first Director, Joint Staff, on 25 August. After considering the opinions and recommendations of individuals both within and outside the JCS organization, General Gruenther submitted his plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 September 1947. The plan encompassed a statement of functions for the Director, Joint Staff, an organization for the Joint Staff, and a basic staff procedure.

Underlying General Gruenther's proposals was the premise, based on the provisions of the National Security Act, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would function as a planning, coordinating, and advisory body, not as an operating or implementing group. The Joint Staff proposed by General Gruenther was therefore designed to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this role. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan on 26 October 1947.

The new Joint Staff represented a modification of and addition to the existing committee structure. It consisted of the office of the Director and three staff groups--the Joint Intelligence Group, the Joint Strategic Plans Group, and the Joint Logistics Plans Group. These groups, which were

redesignations for the existing Joint Intelligence Staff, Joint War Plans Committee, and Joint Logistics Plans Committee, would continue to support the appropriate senior part-time interservice committee. The membership of these committees, however, had been broadened to include on each the director of the appropriate supporting joint staff group. In addition, while the Joint Intelligence Committee continued under the same title, the names of the other two were changed as follows: the Joint Staff Planners became the Joint Strategic Plans Committee; the Joint Logistics Committee became the Joint Logistics Plans Committee. The work of the other JCS Committee, which were not part of the Joint Staff, also came under the general supervision and coordination of the Director. These committees were the Joint Communications Board, the Joint Civil Affairs Committee, the Joint Military Transportation Committee, the Joint Meteorological Committee, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, and the Joint Munitions Allocations Committee.


The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint Secretariat, the Historical Section, and the US Delegation to the UN Military Staff Committee were placed outside the Joint Staff and directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The functions of the Director, Joint Staff, were generally to supervise and coordinate the work of the Joint Staff. He was to assign problems and studies to appropriate components of the Joint Staff and insure that the necessary reports were completed and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His supervisory functions did not, however, include the power to approve or disapprove the reports before submission. This power remained with the joint committees, but the Director was authorized to submit his own recommendations along with the committee reports.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization resulting from the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 is shown in the following chart (Chart IV).

CHART IV

THE JCS ORGANIZATION ON 22 OCTOBER 1947



The National Security Act Amendments of 1949

The reorganization of 1949 was accomplished by legislation entitled the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, which was signed by President Truman on 10 August 1949. This law strengthened the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense over the elements of the National Military Establishment, which was now redesignated the Department of Defense. The law also created the position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, thereby providing an officer to preside over the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and generally to expedite their business (though having no vote in their decisions). This new position replaced that of the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, which had been allowed to lapse with the illness and subsequent retirement of Admiral Leahy, early in 1949. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were designated as principal military advisors to the National Security Council, as well as to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The maximum personnel strength allowed the Joint Staff was increased from 100 to 210 officers.

These amendments had their origin in the experience of the first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, in administering the 1947 Act. Secretary Forrestal had soon found the need for a single officer to advise him on military problems and to provide liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For this purpose, he turned to General Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff. In the spring of 1948 he sought to have General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, US Army, assigned as his principal military advisor, but both Bradley and Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall objected that the General was needed in his current position. Later in the year, the Secretary arranged to have General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower recalled to active duty to serve as unofficial chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a period of several months beginning in January 1949.

In his first annual report as Secretary, Mr. Forrestal made clear his conviction that there should be a "responsible head" for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One of the JCS members might be selected for this purpose, or a fourth officer might be appointed to the position. In either event, the Chairman "should be the person to whom the President and the Secretary of Defense look to see to it that matters with which the Joint Chiefs should deal are handled in a way that will provide the best military staff assistance to the President and the Secretary of Defense." The Secretary believed that the Joint Staff

should be enlarged and that the provision for JCS membership for the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief should be abolished. He also set forth his conviction that the Secretary's authority over the National Military Establishment should be clarified and strengthened.

The Secretary obtained another opportunity to present his views as a result of the creation of a commission to survey the operations of the Federal Government. Mr. Forrestal had, in fact, been instrumental in instituting the legislation (the Lodge-Brown Act) under which this commission was established; he served as a member of it, but did not participate in the preparation of the commission's final report. Former President Herbert C. Hoover was named chairman and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, vice-chairman. Other members were Arthur S. Flemming, George H. Mead, George D. Aiken, Joseph P. Kennedy, John H. McClellan, James K. Pollock, Clarence J. Brown, Carter Manasco, and James H. Rowe, Jr.

To carry out an intensive survey of the National Military Establishment, the commission set up a special committee, or "task force," headed by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt. Other members were as follows: Raymond B. Allen, Thomas P. Archer, Hanson W. Baldwin, Chester I. Bernard, Charles W. Cole, John Cowles, J. S. Knowlson, John J. McCloy, Frederick A. Middlebush, Robert P. Patterson, Lewis L. Strauss, J. Carlton Ward, Jr., and Robert E. Wood. The committee took testimony from Secretary Forrestal, from the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from a long list of other military and civilian officials.

The Eberstadt Committee's report unmistakably reflected the views of Secretary Forrestal. The members recommended that the Secretary be given clear authority over the defense establishment and that he be provided additional assistance, military and civilian. He should be authorized to designate one of the JCS members as chairman, with the responsibility for "expediting the business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for keeping their docket current," but with no command authority over his JCS colleagues. The report also recommended that the Secretary take advantage of a provision in the existing law to appoint a "principal military assistant, or chief staff officer." This appointee should sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but should not be a member thereof. He should be responsible, in the Secretary's absence, for presenting and interpreting the Secretary's viewpoint, and also for bringing "split" JCS decisions to the attention of the Secretary. He would thus play somewhat the same role as that in which the

Director of the Joint Staff had been cast by Secretary Forrestal. The Committee further agreed with the Secretary that the Joint Staff should be "moderately increased."

One of the members, Mr. Robert P. Patterson, wished to go farther and combine the three Military Departments into one Department of Defense. The rest of the Committee, however, did not endorse his views. Another, Mr. John J. McCloy, urged the creation of a single, overall Chief of Staff, who would serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have "at least the power of terminating discussion in that body after he had given full opportunity for discussion."

The Hoover Commission not only published and disseminated the report of the Eberstadt Committee but also prepared one of its own on national security organization in which even greater status and authority was recommended for the Secretary of Defense. The Commission desired to reduce the Service Secretaries to the status of Under Secretaries of Defense, without Cabinet rank, recommendations that even Mr. Patterson had not made. The Commission's report also endorsed the proposal for a JCS Chairman, apparently envisioning him as a fourth appointee and not as one of the three incumbents elevated above his colleagues. The vice-chairman of the Commission, Dean Acheson, supported by three other members, echoed Mr. McCloy in urging a "single Chief of Staff," who would have control over the Joint Staff and serve as principal advisor to the Secretary and the President. These conclusions went beyond the views of the majority of the Commission.

President Truman incorporated the major conclusions of these two reports in a message to Congress on 5 March 1949. He recommended that the National Military Establishment be converted into an Executive Department, to be known as the Department of Defense, within which the existing Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force would be redesignated as military departments. The Secretary should be given clear responsibility for exercising "direction, authority, and control" over the Department of Defense. He would be empowered to make "flexible use" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other agencies set up by the National Security Act of 1947, such as the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. Finally, there should be a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who would take precedence over all military personnel and be the "principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense."

Shortly thereafter Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, drafted a bill intended to give effect to the President's proposals. In some ways it went beyond the President in the degree of authority proposed for the Secretary of Defense. For example, it would confer upon the Secretary the right to appoint the Director of the Joint Staff. The duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were enumerated as in the 1947 act, but it was specified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would perform these duties, or others, at the "discretion" of the Secretary of Defense. All statutory limits on the size of the Joint Staff were to be removed.

Secretary Forrestal sent a draft of this bill to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 15 March 1949. Two months earlier, he had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether, in their view, the functions assigned them by the 1947 Act should be revised.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to both requests on 25 March 1949. They voiced no major objections to the Tydings bill but suggested changes that would delimit more clearly the status and duties of the Secretary and the proposed JCS Chairman. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it should be specified that the Chairman would not, by virtue of his office, exercise military command over the other JCS members or the Services. Moreover, it should be made clear that the Chairman, in giving advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense, would be acting in his capacity as JCS Chairman, not as an individual. The purpose of this JCS recommendation was to indicate that the Chairman would be expected to present the views of his colleagues, as well as his own, on any issue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that they themselves, and not the Secretary of Defense, should appoint the Director of the Joint Staff. They found no fault with the duties assigned by the 1947 law, but recommended that these continue to be prescribed by statute and not left to the Secretary's discretion.

This latter recommendation was unacceptable to Secretary Forrestal, who reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that President Truman had expressed a firm desire to give the Secretary flexible authority. The other JCS proposals were acceptable, and he promised to submit them to the Bureau of the Budget and to Congress. Subsequently, his successor, Louis Johnson, sent Senator Tydings copies of the exchange of views between the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

indicating that the Bureau of the Budget had approved only one (the recommendation that the Chairman not exercise military command).

The Senate Armed Services Committee opened hearings on the Tydings bill on 24 March 1949. The first witness was Secretary Forrestal, who was scheduled to leave office in a few days. He gave general approval to the measure, while admitting that minor amendments might later be found desirable. He explained why he had in some degree altered the views that he had expressed in the early days of the unification debate. Concerning the proposal for a JCS Chairman, the Secretary explained that General Eisenhower's performance in this role had shown "how much more in the way of results can be attained by a man who is sitting over them directing and driving the completion of unfinished business." In his view, the Chairman's job would be to provide the agenda for JCS meetings, to see that the business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was "vigorously prosecuted," to seek to induce agreements, to identify those issues on which no agreement was possible, and to advise the Secretary of Defense. He would not, however, exercise command, nor would he himself make any decisions when the other JCS members could not agree.

Subsequent witnesses included Messrs. Hoover and Eberstadt, former Secretary of War Patterson, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, and Dan A. Kimball, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air (speaking in the absence of the Secretary, who was ill). None of these opposed the bill, although Mr. Patterson alone fully supported it as written. The strongest reservation came from Mr. Eberhardt, who believed that it would confer upon the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman a degree of power that would be dangerous. He believed that the law should stipulate that the Chairman would not outrank the other JCS members and would not exercise command or military authority over them, and that he would serve a fixed term of office. He also urged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group, and not merely the Chairman, be named as advisors to the President and the Secretary. His viewpoint on the status of the Chairman was upheld by ex-President Hoover, who added the suggestion that the Chairman should be given no vote in JCS decisions. Secretaries Kimball and Royall, while not seriously objecting to the provisions relating to the Chairman, agreed that a limited term of office would be desirable (Mr. Kimball recommended two years).

All three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to testify. Admiral Denfeld, the senior member of the group, acted as spokesman and presented the recommendations that he and his colleagues had made earlier to the Secretary of Defense. The senators showed themselves generally sympathetic to the JCS viewpoint. The question of a limitation on the size of the Joint Staff was introduced. Mr. Eberstadt, in his testimony, had suggested a ceiling of 200 officers. Admiral Denfeld told Senator Tydings that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had discussed this question with General Gruenther, who had suggested 250 as a reasonable number.

In the end, the Senate and the House of Representatives modified the Tydings bill considerably in the direction recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as by Messrs. Eberstadt and Hoover. The Chairman was to serve for two years, and was to be eligible for one reappointment only, except in time of war when there would be no limit on his reappointment. He would take precedence over all other officers of the Armed Forces, but would not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Services. His duties were carefully prescribed as follows:

- (1) To serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (2) To provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable.
- (3) To inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate as determined by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the President, of those issues upon which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not been reached.

The advisory function was assigned to the entire JCS membership, not merely to the Chairman. The JCS duties were listed, essentially as in the 1947 Act, in language that did not leave the assignment of these tasks to the Secretary's discretion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to continue to appoint the Director of the Joint Staff, and a limit of 210 officers was established for that body.

In summary, it is clear that the initiative for the 1949 reorganization came from Secretary Forrestal. The continuing

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The reorganization plan that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved provided for a Joint Staff arranged in the numbered J-Directorates of a conventional military staff. In this form it would be organized to work effectively with the similar staff structures of the unified and specified commands. Transition to the new arrangement would be accomplished by realignment and redesignation of the existing Joint Staff Groups, accompanied by a phased absorption of additional personnel. From this process would emerge a Joint Staff composed of the following elements:

- J-1 Personnel Directorate
- J-2 Intelligence Directorate
- J-3 Operations Directorate
- J-4 Logistics Directorate
- J-5 Plans and Policy Directorate
- J-6 Communications-Electronics Directorate
- Joint Military Assistance Affairs Directorate
- Joint Advanced Study Group
- Joint Programs Office.

With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, implementation of the first stage of the JCS plan began on 15 August 1958. The existing Joint Strategic Plans Group was divided to form the nucleus of the new J-3 and J-5 Directorates. Similarly, the Joint Logistics Plans Group supplied the initial personnel for the J-1 and J-4 Directorates. The Joint Intelligence Group became J-2, and the Joint Communications-Electronics Group became J-6.

During this same period of organizational realignment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff progressively assumed operational responsibility for the unified and specified commands, which passed from the control of the military departments that had theretofore served as executive agencies. Both this transfer of responsibility and the reordering and expansion of the Joint Staff were completed by 1 January 1959.

On 18 August 1958, General Twining had requested the Secretary of Defense to authorize a Joint Staff of 356 officers and 79 other personnel and an overall strength of 902 for the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary McElroy did so on 23 August.

A further aspect of implementation of the 1958 reorganization was the necessary revision of two basic Department of Defense Directives. DOD Directive 5100.1 defined the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments, while DOD Directive 5158.1 was the document that established the method of operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their relationships with other staff agencies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Development of draft revisions of both directives began in September. During the extended consultations that followed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided comments, and differences were adjusted in meetings of the Armed Forces Policy Council. On 31 December 1958, Secretary McElroy issued the final version of both directives.

The formal statement of the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in DOD Directive 5100.1 reiterated their legislative designation as the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. It also spoke of them as constituting the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense, serving in the chain of operational command extending from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to recommend to the Secretary of Defense the establishment and force structure of unified and specified commands and the assignment to the military departments of responsibility for providing support to such commands; also they were to review the plans and programs of commanders of unified and specified commands. The basic planning function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was directly related to the operational command responsibility by the following provision of the DOD directive:

To prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces, including the direction of operations conducted by commanders of unified and specified commands and the discharge of any other function of command for such commands directed by the Secretary of Defense.

The remaining functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were stated to be: (1) prepare integrated logistic plans and plans for military mobilization, (2) review major personnel, materiel, and logistic requirements of the armed forces in relation to strategic and logistic plans, (3) recommend the assignment of primary responsibility for any

function of the armed forces requiring such determination and the transfer, reassignment, abolition, or consolidation of such functions, (4) provide joint intelligence for use within the Department of Defense, (5) establish doctrines for unified operations and training and for coordination of the military education of members of the armed forces, (6) provide the Secretary of Defense with statements of military requirements and strategic guidance for use in the development of budgets, foreign military aid programs, industrial mobilization plans, and programs of scientific research and development, (7) participate, as directed, in the preparation of combined plans for military action in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations, and (8) provide the United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations and, when authorized, on other military staffs, boards, councils, and missions.

Development of the Joint Staff Subsequent to 1958

No major reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff took place after 1958. Nevertheless, the structure of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1969 (See Chart IX) differed in some respects from that of 1959. It continued to evolve in response to the enlarged role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a military staff supporting the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved various procedural changes, designed to implement fully the legislative provision that the Joint Staff should "operate along conventional staff lines." Also, the Chairman directed successive changes that generally followed a pattern of consolidation of functions within the Joint Staff directorates, with a corresponding reduction in the number of separate agencies reporting to the Director, Joint Staff.

Among the more important changes, the National Military Command Center came into operation in 1962, outside the Joint Staff but under the supervision of the Director for Operations, J-3; the J-2 Intelligence Directorate was disestablished on 1 July 1963, its functions and responsibilities being assumed by the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Joint Strategic Survey Council, last major agency of the committee type, dating from World War II, was disestablished effective 31 July 1964.

All changes in the organization were effected under the statutory limit on the size of the Joint Staff and thus occurred mainly in other elements of the organization, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

The changes in the structure of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that have taken place since 1 June 1958 are reflected in the following charts (Charts VII, VIII, and IX).

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CHART VIII

ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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